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SCENIC EASEMENTS IN THE HIGHWAY
BEAUTIFICATION PROGRAM*
By ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM**
Professor Cunningham examines the total concept of the scenic
easement as a device to implement the Highway Beautification Pro-
gram. In doing so, he discusses its historical origin, its recent appli-
cation in selected localities and highway projects, and the legal
problems arising from its use. The scenic easement has been widely
advocated as a means of protecting and preserving our roadside
natural beauty, and the author thoroughly examines all aspects con-
nected with its application. This work should have considerable
value to planners concerned with highway beautification. Because
of the thoroughness of the article, we have included the preceding
table of contents.
ITLE III of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965' provides
for an allocation to each state of federal funds equal to 3 per-
cent of the funds appropriated to that state for federal-aid highways
for any fiscal year, on a non-matching basis, "for acquisition of
interests in and improvement of strips of land necessary for the
restoration, preservation, and enhancement of scenic beauty adjacent
to such highways, including acquisition and development of publicly
owned and controlled rest and recreation areas and sanitary and
other facilities within or adjacent to the highway right-of-way
reasonably necessary to accommodate the traveling public."' Al-
though this provision obviously contemplates acquisition of land in
fee simple for "development of publicly owned and controlled rest
and recreation areas and sanitary and other facilities," the reference
to "interests in ... strips of land necessary for the restoration, pres-
ervation, and enhancement of scenic beauty adjacent to such [federal-
*This article is a preliminary product of a research project on Valuation and Legal
Implications of Scenic, Conservation, and Roadside Easements sponsored by the
American Association of State Highway Officials, in cooperation with the Bureau
of Public Roads, as part of the National Cooperative Highway Research Program
administered by the Highway Research Board of the National Academy of Sciences
-- National Research Council. The principal investigator for this project (NCHRP
Project HR 11-3) is Mr. Donald T. Sutte, Jr., of Hinsdale, Illinois. The author is
serving as legal consultant.
Publication does not necessarily indicate acceptance of the findings, opinions,
conclusions, or recommendations expressed or implied in this article by the Highway
Research Board, the National Academy of Sciences- National Research Council,
the Bureau of Public Roads, the American Association of State Highway Officials, or
any state highway department. The views expressed are those of the author alone.
No copyright to any portion of this article is claimed by the author or by the
Denver Law journal.
*"Professor of Law, University of Michigan; S.B. 1942, LL.B. 1948, Harvard
University.
123 U.S.C. §§ 131, 136, 319 (Supp. 1, 1965).
2 Id. § 319.
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aid] highways" clearly contemplates that less-than-fee interests may
be acquired for such purposes.
Title III of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 authorized
an appropriation of up to $120 million for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1966, for landscaping and scenic enhancement, and a like
appropriation for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1967. Public Law
89-309, approved October 1, 1965, appropriated $60 million for
landscaping and scenic enhancement for the fiscal year 1966, and
$59.5 million of this amount was actually obligated to the several
states as of June 30, 1966. On January 10, 1967, the Bureau of
Public Roads, pursuant to Title III of the Highway Beautification
Act of 1965, submitted to Congress a detailed estimate of the cost
of carrying out the provisions of the act, and a comprehensive study
of the economic impact of such programs (including advertising
control and junkyard control) on affected individuals and commer-
cial and industrial enterprises, the effectiveness of such programs
and the public and private benefits realized thereby, and alternate
and improved methods of accomplishing the objectives of the act.
The Bureau of Public Roads report' contains two sets of cost
estimates. For a "minimum" program to be carried out over some
10 years at a cost in the range of $200 million per annum, a total
of $189,170,000 would be allocated for acquisition of scenic strips
(or interests therein) adjacent to the highway right-of-way.4 For an
"ultimate" program to be undertaken at a cost in the range of $300
million per annum for a 10-year period, a total of $391,435,000
would be allocated.
In view of the very substantial amounts of federal funds made
available on a non-matching basis for the fiscal year 1966, and the
additional amounts likely to be made available thereafter, many
state highway agencies have become interested in the possibility of
acquiring "scenic easements" adjacent to existing and planned
federal-aid highways. In a large number of states which lacked
adequate enabling legislation, new legislation to authorize the acqui-
sition of scenic interests (including easements) was enacted in 1966
3 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REPORT ON 1967 HIGHWAY BEAUTIFICATION PROGRAM,
S. Doc. No. 6, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1967).
4 In addition to control of outdoor advertising and junkyards, this program would
provide only:
(1) acquisition or improvement of those scenic strips which have superior
or inherent scenic value or those where there is a high probability that other
uses of the land would soon destroy the inherent scenic value; (2) that
landscaping and roadside development at minimum cost which will provide
outstanding highway roadside beauty in conjunction with the adjacent
environment (or because of a lack of any existing appropriate treatment) ;
and (3) those safety rest areas or scenic overlooks which would have the
highest probable use to the traveling public or are sites of outstanding inter-
est and attractiveness.
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 3, at 5, 12.
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and 1967. It is the purpose of this article to describe the past experi-
ence and future plans of those state and federal agencies concerned
with the use of "scenic easements" for highway beautification, and
to indicate some of the constitutional, statutory, and other problems
that may attend such use.
I. SOME PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION
Although the term "scenic easement" has been the subject of
much writing and discussion during the last decade, it is used in
only a few of the state statutes authorizing acquisition of less-than-
fee interests in land adjacent to or near highways.5 Only two of
these statutes, the Arkansas and Missouri acts of 1939 providing
for creation of a Mississippi River Parkway,6 contain a definition:
"Scenic, landscape, sightly or safety easement" shall mean a
servitude devised to permit land to remain in private ownership for
its normal agricultural, residential or other use consistent with park-
way purposes determined by the secretary [U.S. Secretary of the
Interior], and at the same time placing a control over the future use
of the area to maintain its scenic, landscape, sightly or safety values
for the parkway in this state.7
This definition is similar to the definition contained in the
National Park Service's Requirements and Procedure to Govern
the Acquisition of Land for National Parkways, developed for use
in connection with the Blue Ridge and Natchez Trace National
Parkways.8 Although the congressional legislation authorizing appro-
priations to assist in creation of a Mississippi River Parkway - now
called the Great River Road - did not define "scenic easement," the
report entitled Parkway for the Mississippi,9 contained the follow-
ing discussion of "scenic easements":
Outright purchase of the farm scene, widespread through the
valley, would be unnecessary. Instead, scenic easements or reserva-
tions would be sought, averaging 300 feet wide, along both sides of
the construction right-of-way. There would be purchased from the
owner only his right to convert a certain part of his farm land to
residential or commercial uses. While he could not add new houses
or erect billboards, paralleling pole lines, or other structures, he
would continue to exercise all other privileges of ownership and in
5 See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7000 (West 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, § 4-
201.15 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 226.280 (1949).
A.RK. STAT. ANN. §§ 76-1801 to -1811 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 226.280-.430
(1949).
7ARK. STAT. ANN. § 76-1804(3) (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 226.280(3) (1949).
8
See W. WHYTE, SECURING OPEN SPACE FOR URBAN AMERICA: CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS 12 n.3 (Urban Land Institute Tech. Bull. No. 36, 1959). Congressional
enactments dealing with the Blue Ridge and Natchez Trace National Parkways may
be found in 16 U.S.C. §§ 460, 460a '(1964).
OTransmitted to Congress on November 28, 1951 by the Bureau of Public Roads and
the National Park Service, prepared pursuant to 63 Stat. 626 (1949), which author-
ized the Department of the Interior and the Federal Works Agency "to make a joint
survey of a route for a national parkway to be known as the Mississippi River Park-
way." Congress appropriated $250,000 for this survey.
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no way would be restricted in his agricultural pursuits. Neither
would the public have any right to enter upon these lands for any
purpose. This method of scenic conservation should result in large
savings over outright purchase, retire less farm land from the tax
rolls, and attach the pastoral views permanently to the parkway with-
out cost to the public for maintenance. 10
The Appraisal and Terminology Handbook of the American
Institute of Real Estate Appraisers defines a "scenic easement" some-
what more broadly as "a restriction imposed upon the use of the
property of the grantor for the purpose of preserving the natural
state of scenic and historical attractiveness of adjacent lands of the
grantee, usually the city, county, state or federal government." In
short, under the A.I.R.E.A. definition a "scenic easement" is a nega-
tive easement appurtenant designed to preserve scenic and historical
values. It should be noted, however, that there is nothing in the
nature of the interest requiring a "scenic easement" to be appur-
tenant, although "scenic easements" designed to preserve scenic
and historical values along highways will, normally, be appurtenant
to the highway, with the highway constituting the dominant estate.
From the point of view of the servient landowner, then, a
scenic easement is primarily a restriction upon the uses which he
might otherwise lawfully make of his land. From the point of view
of the persons entitled to the benefit of the easement, e.g., the travel-
ing public on a public highway to which a scenic easement is appur-
tenant, the scenic easement is essentially an easement of view. As
such, it may provide a benefit in at least three ways: (1) something
attractive to look at within the easement area; (2) an open area
to look through in order to see something attractive beyond the
easement itself; and (3) a screen to block out an unsightly view
beyond the easement area.
Since one of the chief advantages of the scenic easement is
flexibility, there is no one standard form. Within limits, the ease-
ment provisions are tailored to the needs of the servient landowner
and the particular landscape qualities desired to be preserved. In
general, however, scenic easement forms now in use include the
following:
(1) A restriction of new building construction or major
alteration of existing structures to farm and residential build-
ings only, with an express prohibition of new commercial struc-
tures and a saving clause permitting the continuance of existing
uses and structures;
(2) An authorization for necessary public utility lines and
roads;
(3) A prohibition against cutting "mature trees and
10 PARKWAY FOR THE MilSsissippi, supra note 9, at 11.
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shrubs," but with a provision authorizing normal maintenance;
(4) A prohibition against dumping;
(5) A prohibition against outdoor advertising, except for
advertising of activities located on the premises.
In addition to the above restrictions or negative rights, a scenic
easement may also include one or more affirmative privileges, such
as a right of entry in the state highway agency to remove structures
or plantings which are in violation of the restrictions, to repair
damage done to plantings or other vegetation in violation of the
restrictions, to cut and prune brush and trees in order to keep a scenic
view open, or to engage in landscaping operations."
It is obvious that scenic easements are at least first cousins to
conservation easements. Indeed, there is clearly a good deal of over-
lap between the scenic easement and the conservation easement. If,
as is stated in the Missouri and Arkansas enabling legislation for
the Great River Road,' a scenic easement is "a servitude devised
to permit land to remain in private ownership for its normal agri-
cultural, residential or other use consistent with parkway purposes,"
the conservation of land for agricultural use is clearly one of the
purposes, and one of the results as well, of a scenic easement acqui-
sition program.
A proposed Pennsylvania statute defined "conservation ease-
ments" as follows:
An aggregation of easements in perpetuity designed to preserve
in their natural state lands of cultural, scenic, historic, or other public
significance. Such easements could include restrictions against erect-
ing buildings or other structures; constructing or altering private
roads or drives; removal or destruction of trees, shrubs or other
greenery; changing existing uses; altering public utility facilities;
displaying of any form of outdoor advertising; dumping of trash,
wastes, or unsightly or offensive materials; changing any features of
the natural landscape; and any changes detrimental to existing drain-
age, flood control, erosion control, or soil conservation; any other
activities inconsistent with the conservation of open spaces in the
public interest. Conservation easements will permit all present
normal and reasonable uses, not conflicting with the purposes indi-
cated above, to be engaged in by the landowners, their heirs, suc-
cessors and assigns. 13 [Emphasis added.]
Although the proposed statute from which the above definition
is taken was not enacted, Pennsylvania did enact, in 1964, a statute
14
1 1 
See UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN, WORKSHOP MANUAL FOR CONFERENCE ON SCENIC
EAsEMENTs IN ACTION 10 (Madison, Wis., Dec. 16-17, 1966) [hereinafter cited as
WORKSHOP MANUAL].
12 Statutes cited note 6 supra.
13 This proposed statute, which was not enacted, is set out in full in W. WHYTE,
supra note 8, at 59.
14PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72 §§ 3946.1-.22 (Supp. 1966).
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authorizing "the [public] acquisition of lands for recreation, con-
servation and historical purposes before such lands are lost forever
to urban development or become prohibitively expensive."" "Con-
servation purposes" was defined to mean "any use of land for water
supply, flood control, water quality control development, soil erosion
control, reforestation, wild life reserves or any other uses that will
maintain, improve or develop the natural environment of soil, water,
air, minerals or wild life of this Commonwealth so as to assure their
optimum use."' 16 "Lands" was defined to mean "real property,
including improvements thereof or thereon, rights of way, water,
riparian, and other rights, easements, privileges, and any other
physical property or rights or interests of any kind or description
relating to or connected with real property."' 7 Thus a "conservation
easement" under the Pennsylvania statute would be an easement
designed to further any of the "conservation purposes" listed above.
New Jersey enacted a somewhat similar statute, the New Jersey
Green Acres Land Acquisition Act of 1961,1' which authorizes public
acquisition of "lands for recreation and conservation purposes,"'"
meaning "use of lands for parks, natural areas, forests, camping,
fishing, water reserves, wildlife, reservoirs, hunting, boating, winter
sports and similar uses for public outdoor recreation and conserva-
tion of natural resources. ' 2 0 The definition of "lands" in the New
Jersey statute2' is substantially identical with that in the Pennsyl-
vania act, and in addition the New Jersey act expressly authorizes
public acquisition of "an interest or right consisting, in whole or in
part, of a restriction on the use of land by others including owners
of other interests therein; such interest or right sometimes known as
a 'conservation easement.' "22
It would thus appear that the objectives of "conservation ease-
ments" are somewhat broader than those of "scenic easements" in
that the conservation easement may be designed to conserve all kinds
of natural resources such as agricultural land, water, forests, and
wildlife, as well as scenic landscape values. Moreover, conservation
easements may often be coupled with affirmative easements designed
to promote public recreational use of and access through private
151d. § 3946.2(4).
I6 1d. § 3946.3(2).
1
7 Id. § 3946.3(3).
18 N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 13:8A-1 to -18 (Supp. 1959-1961).
19Id. § 13:8A-4.
2°Id. § 13:8A-3(c).




land for hunting, fishing, boating, and camping.2" In addition, con-
servation easements may be employed to preserve open space in
order to "pace and place urban development,"24 or even to preserve
"open-space-just-for-open-space's-sake.''25 Viewed as a tool for use
in a highway beautification program, the conservation easement
offers an opportunity to achieve other objectives along with the
primary scenic objective of the federal highway beautification pro-
gram. In this article, however, we shall be concerned primarily with
scenic easements in the narrower sense, that is, those less-than-fee
interests which will contribute to "the restoration, preservation, and
enhancement of scenic beauty' 26 along our highways and which
the state highway agencies may acquire with federal funds pursuant
to Title III of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965.
However, there still remains a more technical problem of defi-
nition: are scenic easements really "legal easements," or are they
really "equitable servitudes"?
Under the definition of a "legal easement" given in the Restate-
ment of Property,27 six factors are stressed: (1) it is an interest in
land which is in the possession of another, and therefore cannot be
classified as an estate in land; (2) the essence of the interest is a
limited privilege of use or enjoyment of the land in which the
interest exists (the servient tenement); (3) the interest is legally
protected against interference by third persons, as well as by the
possessor of the servient tenement; (4) the interest is not terminable
at the will of the possessor of the servient tenement, but may con-
tinue in perpetuity, or for a designated lifetime, or for a term of
years; (5) the interest is not a normal incident of a possessory estate
in land; and (6) the interest is capable of creation by conveyance.
Easements can be classified in various ways. For present pur-
poses, the significant categories are "affirmative" and "negative."
If the owner of an easement is privileged to enter on the servient
tenement and to do acts thereon, e.g., to maintain a way across it, or
2 See WORKSHOP MANUAL 47, defining "conservation easements" as follows: "hunt-
ing rights, right to enter and manage waters, right of access to lake, right to insist
that cover and other habitat remain undisturbed '(a negative right), right to fish
from private land, etc." On the other hand, "the right to prevent any development
in a flood plain or to protect wetlands from drainage and agricultural use" is given
as an example of an "easement against development." For a good discussion of the
use of conservation easements to protect watersheds and to conserve agricultural land,
see W. WHYTE, supra note 8, at 16-17.
2 Beuscher, Conservation Easements and the Law, in PROCEEDINGS OF CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS AND OPEN SPACE CONFERENCE 20 (Madison, Wis., Dec. 13-14, 1961);
W. WHY rE, supra note 8, at 18.
25 Beuscher, supra note 24, at 20.
26 The quoted language is from Highway Beautification Act of 1965, Title III, 23
U.S.C. § 319(b) (Supp. I, 1965).
27 RESTATEMEN'r OF PROPERTY § 450, and comment thereon (1944). See also 3 H.
TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 756 (3d ed. 1939); 2 AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY §§ 8.4, 8.5 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952) ; 3 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY 405 (recomp. ed. 1967).
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to cause it to be covered with water, the easement is classified as
affirmative, since it privileges the owner of the easement to do
affirmative acts on the servient tenement which, but for the ease-
ment, would be unprivileged and tortious. Similarly, if the easement
privileges a possessor of land to do acts on his own land, such as
maintaining a factory that pollutes the air or causes excessive noise,
which, but for the easement, would be tortious under the law of
nuisance, the easement is classified as affirmative. A negative ease-
ment, on the other hand, essentially gives the owner of the easement
a veto power. The owner of a negative easement has the power to
prevent the possessor of the servient tenement from doing acts on his
own land which he would otherwise be privileged to do. A negative
easement may, for example, assure to its owner the access of light
to his windows over the servient tenement by giving him the power
to prevent the erection on the servient tenement of structures that
would obstruct the light; or it may assure the easement owner of
more lateral support from the servient tenement or more benefit
from a stream of water than he would otherwise be legally entitled
to receive, by prohibiting the exercise by the possessor of the servient
tenement of some of his "natural rights.""8
From what has already been said, it is clear that scenic ease-
ments must be classified primarily as negative easements, since the
essence of such interests is a restriction of the uses that might other-
wise be made of the servient tenement.2 Whenever a scenic ease-
ment includes a right of entry for any purpose, however, it is clearly
to that extent an affirmative easement.
Recognizing that scenic easements are primarily negative restric-
tions on the use of the servient tenement, the question must still be
raised whether the Anglo-American common law recognizes such
easements at all." °
A negative easement of prospect or view seems to have been
recognized by the civil law of Europe."' But in England it was held
at an early date that, although there can be an easement of light
where a defined window receives a defined amount of light, there
can be no easement of prospect (i.e., the right to a view) .2 As the
court rather quaintly said, "for... prospect, which is a matter only
of delight, and not of necessity, no action lies for stopping thereof
.... [T]he law does not give an action for such things of delight.1
s3
2 See 3 R. POWELL, supra note 27.
29 See text accompanying note 11, supra.
30 That is, whether scenic easements are recognized as legal easements as distinguished
from equitable servitudes.
31 E. WASHBURN, EASEMENTS AND SERVITUDES 20 (4th ed. 1885).
32 William Aldred's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 57b, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1610).
33 Id. at 58b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 821.
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It is possible, of course, that if the need for it should arise today,
the English courts would overrule this old precedent and recognize
a "legal" easement of prospect. A continued refusal to recognize
such easements at law could not be based on the theory that the list
of permissible "legal easements" is closed, for the English courts
have recognized that "the category of servitudes and easements must
alter and expand with the changes that take place in the circumstances
of mankind.' '34 Rather, such continued refusal would have to be
based on the view that the list of easements is "not open to interests
which do not conform to the rules about the general nature of ease-
ments, ''" and that "the extent of the right claimed must be capable
of reasonably exact definition, for otherwise it could not be granted
at all.' ' 6 As we have seen, one requirement of an easement is that
it be capable of creation by conveyance.
Where the content of a scenic easement is carefully defined,
i.e., the restrictions on land use are carefully spelled out, it is hard
to see any objection to regarding the easement as a "legal" interest
in land. Even assuming that the English courts will refuse to recog-
nize a "legal" scenic easement, however, it should be noted that in
England "it is often possible to secure by way of contract rights
which are too indefinite to be easements; and a restrictive covenant
properly framed may be used to confer a right of amenity, e.g., an
unspoilt view, upon one piece of land as against another, so as in
substance to create a right of property to that effect.' '
37
In the United States there is a substantial body of case law
recognizing a common law negative easement of prospect or view.
Although there are dicta in Michigan"8 and South Carolina8" cases
to the effect that no such easement is recognized in those states, the
dicta in both cases are based on cited earlier cases which are clearly
not in point."' The Michigan court, moreover, suggested in another
34 Dyce v. Lady James Hay, 1 Macq. 305, 312 (H.L. 1852).
3 5
MEGARRY & WADE, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 808 (3d ed. 1966) [hereinafter
cited as MEGARRY & WADE]. The most famous statement of this general principle is
Lord Brougham's assertion in Keppell v. Bailey, 2 My. & K. 517, 535, 39 Eng. Rep.
1042, 1049 (Ch. 1834), that "it must not therefore be supposed that incidents of a
novel kind can be devised and attached to property at the fancy or caprice of any
owner."
3 8 
MEGARRY & WADE at 809.
87 Id. at 810.
8Hasselbring v. Koepke, 263 Mich. 466, 475, 248 N.W. 869, 872 (1933).
39 Schroeder v. O'Neill, 179 S.C. 310, 315, 184 S.E. 679, 681 (1936).
40The diotum in Hasselbring is based on Hawkins v. Sanders, 45 Mich. 491, 8 N.W.
98 (1881), and Kuzniak v. Kozminski, 107 Mich. 444, 65 N.W. 275, 61 Am. St.
Rep. 344 (1895), neither of which deals with easements of view or prospect.
Schroeder bases its dictum on Bailey v. Gray, 53 S.C. 503, 31 S.E. 354 (1898),
which is also not in point.
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case41 that there is such a thing as a "common-law negative ease-
ment of air, light, and view." A common law negative easement of
prospect or view has been recognized in California, 42 Massachusetts,43
and Rhode Island, 44 at least, and apparently also in New York,
45
Vermont,4" and Wisconsin. 4' The Wisconsin case specifically recog-
nizes a scenic easement as such.
It is thus apparent that there is substantial American case law
supporting the view that an easement of view or prospect is a recog-
nized "legal" interest in land,48 particularly when the purpose of
the easement is to secure light and air as well as a scenic view across
the servient tenement. Moreover, there is substantial case law recog-
nizing and enforcing negative easements somewhat similar to scenic
easements, viz., "clearance easements" around airports49 and around
the sites of guided missile (Nike) installations.5" "Clearance ease-
ments""' give the agency operating the airport (1) the right to
prevent new construction from protruding into the airspace above
the glide angle prescribed by the Federal Aviation Agency; (2) the
right to remove the projections of any buildings that do so; (3) the
right to cut and trim any vegetation growing up into this space; and
(4) a right of entry to enforce the above rights. Similar easements
are obtained around the sites of Nike installations, authorizing the
elimination of obstructions around such sites in order to prevent
interference with radar beams. 2 Most of the cases are concerned
with the valuation of "clearance easements" taken under the power
of eminent domain, but they appear to recognize the "clearance ease-
ment" as a permissible type of property interest.5
More generally, it would seem that scenic easements of the
type now under discussion would meet the requirement of "definite-
41 Johnstone v. Detroit, G.H.&M. Ry, 245 Mich. 65, 79, 222 N.W. 325, 330 (1928).
42 Peterson v. Friedman, 162 Cal. App.2d 245, 328 P.2d 264 (1958).
43 Ladd v. Boston, 151 Mass. 585, 24 N.E. 858 (1890) ; Attorney General v. Williams,
174 Mass. 476, 55 N.E. 77 (1899).
Cadwalader v. Bailey, 17 R.I. 495, 23 A. 20 (1891).
45 Latimer v. Livermore, 72 N.Y. 174 (1878).
46 Fuller v. Arms, 45 Vt. 400 (1873); Hopkins the Florist, Inc. v. Fleming, 112 Vt.
389, 26 A.2d 96 (1942).
47 Kamrowski v. State, 31 Wis. 2d 256, 142 N.W.2d 793 (1966).
48 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 450, comment k at 2909 (1944).
49 See N. WILLIAMS, LAND ACQUISITION FOR OUTDOOR RECREATION- ANALYSIS OF
SELECTED LEGAL PROBLEMS 43 '(Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission
Study Report No. 16, 1962).
50 Id.
5 1 These are sometimes known as "avigation easements" or "aviation corridor ease-
ments."
52 These easements are sometimes known as "electronic easements."
53 See cases cited in N. WILLIAMS, supra note 49, at 43 nn.32-38.
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ness of content" suggested by the Restatement of Property54 as a
significant criterion for recognition of a new type of easement in
American law. In any event, it seems clear that scenic easements will
be recognized and enforced by appropriate equitable remedies as
equitable servitudes, whether such interests are recognized and
enforced "at law" or not. Tulk v. Moxhay,5 5 the case generally con-
sidered as establishing the doctrine of equitable servitudes, really
involved "scenic restrictions."
The precise significance of Tulk v. Moxhay in England, where
only the burden of lease covenants could "run with the land at law,"
was the subject of some dispute for a considerable period of time. In
1882, Jessel, M.R., stated in London and South Western Railway v.
Gomm56 that the doctrine of Tulk v. Moxhay was
either an extension in equity of the doctrine of Spencer's Case to
another line of cases, or else an extension in equity of the doctrine
of negative easements; such, for instance, as a right to the access of
light, which prevents the owner of the servient tenement from build-
ing so as to obstruct the light.... Where there is a negative covenant
expressed or implied, as, for instance, not to build so as to obstruct
a view, or not to use a piece of land otherwise than as a garden,
the Court interferes on one or other of the above grounds. This is
an equitable doctrine, establishing an exception to the rules of the
Common Law which did not treat such a covenant as running with
the land, and it does not matter whether it proceeds on analogy to a
covenant running with the land or on analogy to an easement.
But in London County Council v. Allen5 7 the English Court of
Appeal clearly adopted the easement analogy.
In the Allen case, the London County Council had entered into
a covenant with Allen, a builder, purporting to bind Allen, his heirs,
and assigns not to "erect or place, or cause or permit to be erected
or placed, any building, structure, or other erection upon" two plots
owned by Allen which the Council intended to reserve "for the
making of roads." Allen mortgaged one plot and transferred the
equity of redemption to his wife, who built three houses on it. The
Council then sought a mandatory injunction to pull down the houses.
The trial judge found that neither Mrs. Allen nor the mortgagee had
"satisfied him they had not notice, actual or constructive, of the
covenant," and "apparently treated the duty and interest of the
county council in the matter of new streets as sufficient to make the
54 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 450, comment m at 2910 (1944).
55 2 Phil. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
- 20 Ch. D. 562, 583 (1882).
57 [19141 3 K.B. 642.
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covenant bind the land in the hands of assigns from Allen." On
appeal, it was held that Mrs. Allen and the mortgagee were not
bound, because, in order to affect them, the right created in the
Council by the covenant must be in the nature of a negative ease-
ment; that an easement required both a dominant and a servient
tenement; and that as the Council had no land to which the benefit
of the covenant could attach, there could be no dominant tenement,
and therefore no negative easement binding on a servient tenement,
but only an easement in gross, which did not bind assigns of the land.
In view of the English courts' refusal to recognize easements
in gross, by not allowing them to "run with the land," the decision
in London County Council v. Allen is said to be logical, but subject
to criticism because of its tacit admission that equity's concept of
property interests must be restricted to the categories established by
courts of law.
In the United States, the courts have generally recognized the
concept of equitable servitudes created by covenant, even where the
burden of the covenant would not "run with the land at law." But
since in most American jurisdictions the rules limiting the running
"at law" of burdens created by covenant are much more liberal
than in England,58 many covenants are enforceable in the United
States either on the ground that the burden runs with the land
at law or on the ground that the covenant creates an equitable
servitude. Although the courts tend to speak in terms of equitable
servitudes when the equitable remedy of injunction is sought, in
many instances the injunction could be granted on the theory that
the burden of the covenant runs with the land at law but the legal
remedy of damages is inadequate. Hence it is understandable that
some American courts tend to enforce restrictive covenants pri-
marily as contracts concerning land, while other courts tend to
enforce them on the ground that they create equitable interests
58 In England, the burden of a covenant will "run with the land" only as between land-
lord and tenant "at law"; it will not "run" as between owners of adjacent land in
fee simple because there is no privity of estate between such owners. Webb v. Russell,
3 T.R. 393, 100 Eng. Rep. 639 (K.B. 1789). No American jurisdiction except New
Jersey has adopted the strict English rule, however. In most states, privity of estate
may exist by virtue of a conveyance of some interest in land between the parties to
the covenant, the covenant being contained in the deed and relating in some way to
the use of the land conveyed to the grantee or land retained by the grantor. In Mas-
sachusetts, the existence of an easement will supply the necessary privity of estate so
that the burden of a "covenant in aid of the easement" will "run with the land at
law." The RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, § 534 (1944) asserts that either type of
privity is sufficient to allow the burden of the covenant to "run with the land at
law." For criticism of the privity of estate requirement, and an argument that most
American jurisdictions do not in fact impose such a requirement at all, see C. CLARK,
REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH LAND" 111-43, 206-
59 (2d ed. 1947).
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analogous to easements. Still other courts waver back and forth
between the contract and the easement theory.
59
It would seem that, under the contract theory, there is less reason
for American courts to insist on a dominant tenement to which the
benefit of the equitable servitude can be appurtenant. On the other
hand, since American courts have uniformly recognized legal ease-
ments in gross, 0 there is reason to suppose that equitable servitudes
in gross will also be recognized and that the doctrine of London
County Council v. Allen6 will be rejected in the United States. It
must be admitted, however, that recognition of legal easements in
gross has been limited to affirmative easements; and, as a matter
of fact, it is difficult if not impossible to imagine an easement of
light and air, or of support, or any other negative easement recog-
nized at common law which could be enjoyed except by one who
possesses a dominant tenement. There are very few American cases
dealing with enforcement of restrictive covenants where the benefit
is in gross, and the decisions are in conflict.62
In any case, as we shall see later, the question whether the
burden of scenic restrictions will run with the servient land is not
likely to turn on whether the interest of the party seeking to
enforce the restrictions is classified as a legal easement or an
equitable servitude. In the great majority of cases, moreover, the
equitable remedy of injunction will be the one sought when violation
of scenic restrictions occurs; and this remedy will be available
whether the interest of the plaintiff is classified as a legal easement
or an equitable servitude. In the relatively few cases where the
legal remedy of damages is sought, the recovery will be possible
in most states either on the theory that the plaintiff has a legal
easement or that the burden of the scenic restrictions runs with
the servient estate at law as well as in equity.
59 For a fuller discussion of the contract and easement theories of enforcement, see 3
H. TIFFANY, supra note 27, § 861; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 27,
§ 9.24; C. CLARK, supra note 58, at 171-77; 3 R. POWELL, supra note 27, 420.
G0 That is, American courts have held that the burden of an easement in gross passes
with the servient estate when it is transferred, so that the original owner of the ease-
ment, at least, can enforce it against any subsequent possessor of the servient estate.
In contrast, the English courts will enforce the easement in gross only as a personal
contract between the original parties. As we shall see, however, American courts have
not uniformly regarded the benefit of an easement in gross as transferable.
61 [1914) 3 K.B. 642.
62 Cases holding the burden of an equitable servitude in gross will run with the servient
land: Pratte v. Balatsos, 99 N.H. 430, 113 A.2d 492 (1955); Van Sant v. Rose,
260 Ill. 401, 103 N.E. 194 (1913). Contra: Kent v. Koch, 166 Cal. App.2d 579, 333
P.2d 411 (1958); Foreman v. Sadler's Executor, 114 Md. 574, 80 A. 298 (1911);
Genung v. Harvey, 79 N.J. Eq. 57, 80 A. 955 (1911).
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II. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE EXPERIENCE WITH
SCENIC EASEMENTS"3
A. The Blue Ridge Parkway and the Natchez Trace Parkway
During the 1930's the National Park Service embarked on a
program to build scenic parkways in Virginia and North Carolina
along the Blue Ridge between the Shenandoah and Great Smokey
Mountains National Parks, and along the old Natchez Trace in
Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi between Nashville and Natchez.
Started in 1933, the 469-mile Blue Ridge Parkway is now about 96
percent complete. About 60 percent of the Natchez Trace Parkway
has been completed. These parkways are essentially elongated parks
encompassing scenic and historical values of national significance.
They contain a motor road designed for slow or moderate speed
within a right-of-way averaging 125 acres per mile. There is partial
to complete control of access, and commercial traffic is prohibited.
When the Blue Ridge and Natchez Trace Parkways were
planned it was decided, partly in order to keep costs down and
partly because the primary public use of adjacent land was to be
the observation of scenic beauty, that only a portion of the land
needed for the parkways would be purchased in fee simple and
that scenic easements would be purchased in the remaining land.
The actual formula was 100 acres in fee simple and 50 acres
subject to scenic easements per mile of parkway. The parkways
have been constructed entirely with federal funds on land acquired
by the states and donated to the federal government. Scenic ease-
ments were also acquired by the states and transferred to the
National Park Service. Ultimately, the scenic easements acquired
along the Blue Ridge Parkway covered nearly 1,500 acres, 4 and
the scenic easements acquired along the Natchez Trace Parkway
covered more than 4,500 acres.6" In general, the scenic easements
63 This discussion is based largely on the following sources: Disque, The Great River
Road -A Model for Americds Scenic Routes, in HIGHWAY RESEARCH RECORD No.
161, ROADSIDE DEVELOPMENT 34-49 (Highway Research Board 1967); W. Matusze-
ski, Less Than Fee Acquisition for Open Space: Its Effect on Land Values 4-7, Jan.,
1966 (unpublished paper, Institute of Legal Research, University of Pennsylvania) ;
R. NETHERTON AND M. MARKHAM, ROADSIDE DEVELOPMENT AND BEAUTIFICATION:
LEGAL AUTHORITY AND METHODS, PART I, at 68-69 (Highway Research Board,
1965); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A PROPOSED PROGRAM FOR SCENIC ROADS AND
PARKWAYS 59, 98-99, 125-27 (1966); WORKSHOP MANUAL at 11-12; W. WHYTE,
supra note 8, at 12; N. WILLIAMS, supra note 49, at 44-45; P. Wykert, Environmental
Easements 38-43, Sept. 1965 (unpublished student paper at the University of
Michigan).
64 This is the figure given by W. Matuszeski and P. Wykert, supra note 63, and the
WORKSHOP MANUAL. N. WILLIAMS, supra note 49, at 44-45, and U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, supra note 63, both give a figure of 2,500 acres.
65 This is the figure given by W. Matuszeski and P. Wykert, supra note 63, and the
WORKSHOP MANUAL. N. WILLIAMS, supra note 49, at 44-45, and U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, supra note 63, both give a figure of 5,000 acres.
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along these parkways included the land use restrictions listed in
section I, above. No public right of entry was acquired.
The National Park Service's experience with the scenic ease-
ments along these parkways was rather unhappy. The purchase of
the easements was negotiated by state agents. It has been suggested
that this procedure resulted in the landowners not being fully
apprised of the rights they were relinquishing, since the state agent
tended to be concerned only with getting the landowner's signature
on the easement deed. Moreover, there were no set standards for
appraising the rights acquired. The states were given a lump sum
and instructed to buy as many scenic easements as possible. Con-
sequently, there was much dickering and very little uniformity in
the prices paid. The net result was that many landowners did not
understand just what rights they had sold, and many of them were
bitter at what they regarded as unfair treatment when they discovered
that they had been paid less than other landowners were paid for
the same easement over similar land. The difficulty was com-
pounded when the original owners of the servient land were suc-
ceeded by their heirs or grantees, who had not signed the easement
deeds. These successors of the original grantors of the scenic ease-
ments often were ignorant of, or did not feel bound by, or were
inclined to minimize the importance of, the easements granted by
their predecessors in title. As a result, friction between the National
Park Service and the servient landowners increased; the number
of violations steadily increased; and the cost of policing the scenic
restrictions became substantial.
Difficulties with the scenic easements along the Blue Ridge
and Natchez Trace Parkways arose chiefly from two causes: either
the landowner wanted to harvest standing timber, or he wanted
to subdivide and develop his land for resort or residential use. The
National Park Service had particular difficulty in enforcing the
usual scenic easement restriction against cutting "mature trees and
shrubs." It was often difficult to obtain an injunction to prevent
anticipated violations because of judicial reluctance to issue injunc-
tions in advance of actual damage. After a violation occurred,
however, it was often difficult to prove damages.
In at least two cases a United States district court ultimately
issued an injunction. In United States v. Darnell," the issues were
(1) whether certain trees and shrubs - some allegedly already cut,
and others which the servient landowner was allegedly threatening
to cut- were in fact "mature trees and shrubs," and (2) whether
the United States could prove the likelihood of irreparable injury
68 Civil No. 100-W, M.D.N.C., May 30, 1949.
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from cutting so as to warrant injunctive relief. In United States v.
Bedsaul,67 another case before the same judge to enforce another
series of scenic easement rights, the court issued detailed instructions
(in the words of the easement involved) on the methods to be
followed "in accordance with good farming practice" to thin and
trim white pines, to remove scrub pines, and to remove and clear
thickets; and also enjoined cutting of "mature trees and shrubs."
As a result of the friction with landowners, difficulty in poli-
cing scenic easements, and difficulty in getting local state courts and
United States district courts to grant complete injunctive enforce-
ment, the National Park Service practically discontinued the pur-
chase of scenic easements in the 1950's and turned to a full fee
simple purchase program for both the Blue Ridge and Natchez Trace
Parkways. 8 As a result of this change in policy, the Department of
Interior requested and obtained legislation in 1961 to authorize the
exchange of scenic easements over certain lands along the Blue Ridge
and Natchez Trace Parkways for smaller areas in fee simple.69
B. The Great River Road
The Great River Road - a scenic highway on both sides of the
Mississippi River from New Orleans to Lake of the Woods in
Canada - was originally conceived and planned in the late 1930's
as the Mississippi River Parkway, along lines similar to the Blue
Ridge and Natchez Trace Parkways. The states were to acquire ease-
ments and rights-of-way.70 But because of the intervention of World
War II no state actually acquired any land for the proposed parkway
until the post-war period.
Through the efforts of the Mississippi Parkway Commission,71
federal funds were provided in 1949 for a study to determine the
feasibility of developing a Mississippi River Parkway. 72 The study
was conducted jointly by the Bureau of Public Roads and the
National Park Service and presented as a report to Congress in
195 1.7 The report recommended against development of a com-
pletely new traffic facility patterned after the Blue Ridge and Nat-
chez Trace Parkways. Such federal parkways are "scenic routes for
67 Civil No. 138-W, M.D.N.C., Dec. 19, 1951.
68 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 49, at 45.
69 16 U.S.C. § 460a-5 (1964). See H.R. REP. No. 5765, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
70 Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 226.280-.430 (1949). As we have seen, supra text at note 6,
this is one of the few statutes which defines a scenic easement.
71 This commission now consists of 10 persons from each of the 10 states bordering
the Mississippi, plus 10 persons from each of the two Canadian provinces of Mani-
toba and Ontario. Appointments are made by the governor of the state or premier of
the province.
7263 Stat. 626 (1949).
73 PARKWAY FOR THE MISSISSIppI, supra note 9.
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pleasure travel in the ideal sense of the words. ' 74 But along the
proposed route of the Mississippi River Parkway, many desirable
riverside locations were already pre-empted by existing highways,
railroads, cities, and commercial and industrial development. Acqui-
sition of new rights-of-way in these areas, and in highly productive
agricultural areas, would have been prohibitively expensive and
would have resulted in duplication of existing highways at least
potentially adequate for traffic purposes. The report concluded that
federal development, administration, operation, and maintenance of
a Mississippi River Parkway along the lines of the Blue Ridge and
Natchez Trace Parkways would be too difficult and too expensive
to be justified.
The 1951 report to Congress did, however, recommend a plan
by which the 10 Mississippi River states could improve existing
highways close to the river to give them a parkway-like character
and connect them where necessary with newly constructed parkway
sections to form a continuous route. Many of these existing highways
were already units of state federal-aid systems, and improvements to
them could be made through ordinary federal-aid procedures. The
report proposed a scenic route having the following characteristics:
(1) Ownership and control by the individual state;
(2) Design and construction by the states with federal
advisory service furnished when requested;
(3) Federal assistance in financing through the usual
federal-aid channels plus additional federal aid to provide
parkway features;
(4) Partial or complete control of access;
(5) An adequate scenic corridor protected by land use
control of the adjacent roadside through acquisition of wider
right-of-way and the use of scenic easements;
(6) Adequate interpretive and public-use facilities to por-
tray scenic, recreational, historical, cultural, geographic, and
other features along the route;
(7) Use of existing highways where these have parkway
potential or where no reasonably available route of parkway
calibre exists;
(8) Use of new location wherever conditions warrant;
(9) Commercial traffic excluded or regulated in sections
on new location, wherever reasonably available alternate traffic
facilities exist.
This scenic route plan was endorsed by the Mississippi River
Parkway Commission in 1952. Congress indicated its support of the
74 Disque, supra note 63, at 41.
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plan when it approved, as part of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of
1954, 7  an authorization for the Secretary of Commerce to spend up
to $250,000 to assist the 10 states bordering the Mississippi River
in "expediting the interstate planning and coordination of a con-
tinuous Great River Road and appurtenances thereto traversing the
Mississippi Valley from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico. ' 76 Under
this congressional authorization, and a similar authorization in 1964
to spend up to $500,000, 77 the 10 states have available to them the
services of highway engineers of the Bureau of Public Roads and
landscape architects of the National Park Service who are highly
skilled and experienced in parkway development and land-use
planning.
Since 1954, the highway agencies of all 10 Mississippi River
states have requested and obtained advisory service reports from
Bureau and Park Service consultants. These reports have recom-
mended routes consisting in part of existing roads and in part of
new roads, with recommendations for development of areas adjacent
to the routes for scenic, recreational, and other public uses. Addi-
tional studies containing detailed recommendations for land acqui-
sition, scenic easement acquisition, and control of access have been
completed for five states and are in process for three others.
No special federal funds have been made available for con-
struction of or right-of-way acquisition for the Great River Road,
but a very substantial part of the total mileage of the road is coinci-
dent with existing routes of the federal-aid primary and secondary
highway systems. The section extending south from St. Louis to
West Memphis, Arkansas, is in the traffic corridor of Interstate
Route 55. Such landscaping as may be desirable will be eligible for
interstate highway funds on the regular basis of 90 percent federal
and 10 percent state funds. The acquisition of scenic easements along
any part of the Great River Road will be eligible for non-matching
federal-aid funds -the so-called "3 percent funds" -under Title
III of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965.78
Prior to passage of the Highway Beautification Act only six of
the 10 Mississippi River states79 had adopted legislation to authorize
75 68 Stat. 70 (1954) (codified in scattered sections of 23 U.S.C.).
76 68 Stat. 70, 75 (1954). This changed the name of the proposed road from Mississippi
River Parkway to Great River Road and extended the northern terminus from Lake
Itasca in Minnesota to the Canadian border. Ontario and Manitoba are now members
of the Mississippi Parkway Commission.
778 Stat. 1092 (1964).
7879 Stat. 1032 (1965), amending 23 U.S.C. § 319.
79
See AaK. STAT. ANN. §§ 76-1801 to -1811 (1957), and §§ 76-1812 to -1818 (Supp.
1967); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 308.1-.5 (Supp. 1966); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
161.1419-145 (1960 and Supp. 1966); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 5964-74, 5978-84
(1952); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 226.280.430 (1949); Wis. STAT. § 84.105 (1965).
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acquisition of scenic easements and other action necessary for devel-
opment of the parkway features of the Great River Road, and only
Wisconsin had actually carried out any substantial scenic easement
acquisition. As a result of the failure of the other states to take
effective action, it is estimated that at least one-half of the scenic
values available when the Great River Road was proposed in the
1930's have been lost by diversion of land to adverse uses. But
passage of the Highway Beautification Act has stimulated several
other Mississippi River states to enact enabling legislation which
will authorize the acquisition of scenic easements along all federal-
aid interstate, primary, and secondary roads.80 This legislation, of
course, will provide a basis for scenic easement acquisition along the
Great River Road, as well as other highways in these states. Minne-
sota has already worked out a plan to obtain scenic easements cover-
ing its part of the Great River Road with "3 percent funds" under
Title III.
The Great River Road as now conceived will be a continuous
scenic route extending generally along both sides of the Mississippi
from Lake Itasca to the Gulf of Mexico, with two extensions north-
ward through Minnesota into Manitoba and Ontario to form a loop
around the Lake of the Woods. Its total length will be nearly 3,800
miles. The Canadian loop will connect with the 5,000 mile Trans-
Canadian Highway.
C. Other National Park Service Experience
The experience of the National Park Service with scenic ease-
ments along the Blue Ridge and Natchez Trace Parkways was unsat-
isfactory, as we have seen. Although the Service has continued to
encourage the Mississippi River states in carrying out the Great River
Road project, which utilizes the scenic easement device on a large
scale, its disillusionment with the scenic easement led the National
Park Service to oppose (unsuccessfully) the use of scenic easements
in connection with the proposed Ozark Rivers National Monument.
This opposition was based on the grounds that 20 years of experi-
ence with scenic easements had demonstrated that such easements
breed misunderstandings, cause administrative difficulties, are diffi-
cult to enforce, and cost only a little less than the fee simple. As
finally adopted in 1964, the enabling legislation8' authorized the
Secretary of Interior to acquire scenic easements within the desig-
nated Riverways area.
The National Park Service in recent years has made significant
use of the scenic easement in special situations to which it seems
80 It would appear that all of the Mississippi River states except Tennessee now have
enabling legislation sufficient for scenic easement acquisition.
81 16 U.S.C. §§ 460m through 460m-7 (1964).
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particularly well adapted. For example, the Park Service has obtained
a 48-acre scenic easement at Cumberland Gap National Historical
Park, a 46-acre scenic easement at Harper's Ferry National Historical
Park, a 21-acre scenic easement at Manassas National Battlefield
Park, and scenic easements covering at least 325 acres in the Piscata-
way Park area on the Potomac River shoreline opposite Mount
Vernon. The Piscataway easements were acquired under a 1961
congressional joint resolution82 which authorized the Secretary of
Interior to acquire scenic easements and other interests in land in a
defined area along the Maryland shore opposite Mount Vernon by
donation or other appropriate means, and also to enter into "agree-
ments and covenants" with property owners for the purpose of pre-
serving the scenic beauty of the area. Of a total of 3834 acres within
the designated area, 2682 are to be acquired by donation of scenic
easements by the present owners (some 150 to 160 of them). The
remainder of the area, comprising 1152 acres immediately adjacent
to the Potomac and the stage front of the Mount Vernon overlook,
is to be acquired in fee simple either by gift or by purchase.
More dramatic and controversial was the recent action of the
National Park Service in taking a scenic easement on 47 acres of the
Merrywood Estate adjacent to the George Washington Memorial
Parkway in Virginia. Builders had purchased the tract and had
succeeded in getting the local zoning changed to permit high-rise
apartments. The National Park Service then invoked a federal
statute8 3 to condemn a scenic easement which would preclude any
development for other than single-family dwellings and thus protect
the scenic quality of the Potomac River palisades which form the
frontage of the tract. The purchase price to the builders had been
$650,000 before the rezoning. As plaintiffs in a suit against the
government, they claimed the easement had reduced the value of
the land from $2,354,700 to $295,000. The United States contended
that $500,000 was a fair price for the easement. The condemnation
jury awarded the plaintiffs $744,500, which was in excess of the
original cost before the zoning change, but well below the differ-
ences between the original cost and the estimated value when zoned
for high-rise apartments.
The area adjacent to the Merrywood tract, totalling about 215
acres, is composed of some 69 private holdings. Donations of scenic
easements from the owners of these private holdings are now being
solicited by the National Park Service. Such easements, generally
similar to those obtained in the Piscataway Park area, will restrict
lot size to one acre or larger, permit only single-family residential
8275 Stat. 780 (1961).
316 U.S.C. § lb(7) (1964).
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development with homes limited to 40 feet in height, and prohibit
all industrial and commercial development.
The National Park Service has also been authorized to acquire
scenic easements at Antietam National Battlefield Site,84 and it has
drawn up a document especially for this purpose.
Under its present policy, it would seem that the National Park
Service may acquire some scenic easements along the Foothills Park-
way, the George Washington Memorial Parkway, and the Palisades
Parkway. The Foothills Parkway in Tennessee was authorized in
1944 and, now about 50 percent complete, will provide not only a
68-mile scenic panorama of the Great Smoky Mountains National
Park but numerous recreation developments as well. The George
Washington Memorial Parkway, authorized in 1930, will be approx-
imately 48 miles long. About 65 percent of it is now completed. The
3-mile Palisades Parkway in Washington, D.C., is still in the design
and planning stage. It will follow the top of the palisades overlook-
ing the Potomac River and connect with the George Washington
Memorial Parkway at the Maryland line.
In closing this discussion of the National Park Service's experi-
ence, it might be noted that the Park Service has approximated the
effect of a scenic easement in some areas adjacent to the Blue Ridge
and Natchez Trace Parkways where it has acquired the land in fee
simple, by giving neighboring landowners "special use permits"
which authorize use of the parkway land for grazing or the growing
of crops. The neighboring landowners pay a small fee for the priv-
ilege, and also relieve the Park Service of the cost of maintaining
some of the land adjacent to the parkways.
III. STATE SCENIC EASEMENT ENABLING LEGISLATION
A number of states had highway legislation authorizing scenic
easement acquisition8 5 prior to enactment of the Highway Beauti-
16 U.S.C. §§ 430nn-430oo (1964).
8 5
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 19.05.040(7) (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 76-532(f)
(1957); CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1238(18) (West 1958); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 191-
92, 7000-01 (West 1966); CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE § 104.3 (West 1956); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 17, § 132(c) (4) (1953) (semble) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, § 4-
201.15 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); IND. ANN. STAT. § 36.2946 (Supp. 1967); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 313.67 (Supp. 1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 161.20, 173.01-.05,
173.31-.35 (Supp. 1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 226.280-.430 (1949); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 39-1320(2)(f) (1960); ORE. REV. STAT. § 366.345 (1965); TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. art. 6674w-3, § 1(a) (1960) ; Wis. STAT. § 84.09 (1965).
See also the Great River Road enabling statutes, supra note 79. In addition to
statutes authorizing state highway agencies to acquire scenic easements, there are a
number of pre-Highway Beautification Act statutes which authorize acquisition of
scenic easements by state park, recreation, or conservation agencies. See, e.g., CAL.
PuB. RES. CODE § 5006 (West 1956); CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE §§ 887.2-.3 (West
Supp. 1967); Ky. REV. STAT. § 148.061 (Supp. 1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1B-
15.9 (semble), 13:8A-6, -8, -12(b) (Supp. 1966); N.Y. CONSERV. LAW § 676-a.1
(McKinney 1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 3946.1-.22 (Supp. 1966); TENN.




fication Act of 1965.8" Some of this pre-Beautification Act legislation
rather specifically authorizes acquisition of scenic easements;" some
of it simply authorizes the acquisition of any kind of property inter-
est for purposes so broadly defined as to include, on a reasonable
construction of the statutory language, acquisition of scenic ease-
ments;88 and some of it authorizes acquisition of property for very
narrowly defined scenic purposes in connection with highways.89
The only substantial program of scenic easement acquisition initiated
under any of the pre-Beautification Act statutes is the Wisconsin
program.
Since enactment of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965, at
least 24 states 0 have adopted scenic highway legislation inspired by
86 79 Stat. 1028, amending 23 U.S.C. §§ 131, 136, 319'(1964).
87 See, e.g., CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE §§ 887.2-.3 (West Supp. 1967); CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 7000 (West 1966) ; Wis. STAT. §§ 84.105, 15.60(6) (i) (1965). See also
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, § 4-201.15 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 36.2946 (Supp. 1967); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 226.280-.430 (1949).
88 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 19.05.040 (1962) '("acquire property" and "preserve and
maintain the scenic beauty along state highways"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 313.67
(Supp. 1967) ("construction, reconstruction, improvement, and maintenance of...
scenic beautification areas along the primary roads of the state including the acquisi-
tion of such property and property rights needed to accomplish said purposes");
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 173.01-.05 '(Supp. 1966) ("all rights in property.. neces-
sary to carry out the purposes" which, broadly defined, are "to conserve the natural
beauty of areas adjacent to certain highways"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-1320(2)
(1960) ("State highway purposes...shall include... preservation of objects of
attraction or scenic value adjacent to, along, or in close proximity to highways and
the culture of trees and flora which may increase the scenic beauty of such high-
ways"); ORE. REV. STAT. § 366.345 (1965) ("may acquire ... any right or interest
... deemed necessary for the culture of trees and the preservation of scenic or historic
places and other objects of attraction or scenic value adjacent to, along or in close
proximity to state highways"); and TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. art. 6674w-3, § 1(a)
(1960) ("Any land in fee simple or any lesser estate or interest... necessary or
convenient for ... any... purpose related to the laying out, construction, improve-
ment, maintenance, beautification, preservation and operation of State Highways")
(emphasis added).
89 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 76-532(f) (1957) ("For the culture and support of
trees and shrubbery which benefit any State highway by aiding in the maintenance
and preservation of the roadbed, or which aid in the maintenance and Promote the
attractiveness of the scenic beauties associated with any State highways") (emphasis
added).
90 ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 76-2520, -2521 (Supp. 1967); CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE
§§ 895-97 (West Supp. 1967); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 120-3-10(2) (1963), as
amended, Ch. 38, [1966] Colo. Laws 178; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13a-85a (Supp.
1966); Act. no. 270, [1967) Ga. Laws; HAWAII REv. LAWS § 129-12(c) (1955), as
amended, Act. no. 43 [1966] Hawaii Acts; IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 40-2801,-2802 (Supp.
1967) ; Ky. REV. STAT. § 177.090 (Supp. 1966); LA. REV. STAT. § 48:269 (Supp.
1966); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 153, 154 (Supp. 1967) ; Mo. CODE ANN.
art. 89B, §§ 236-38 (Supp. 1967) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 81, § 13B, added by Mass.
Acts 1967, ch. 397; MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 252.251-.253 (Supp. 1966) ; Miss. CODE
ANN. § 8023.3 (Supp. 1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 226.750-.770 (Supp. 1966);
MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. §§ 32-2422 to -2425 (Supp. 1967); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 27:7-22.4, -22.5 (Supp. 1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-11-14 (Supp. 1967);
N.Y. H'WAY LAw § 21 (McKinney Supp. 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 24-17-09,
para. 4 (Supp. 1967); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5529.03-.04 (1954), as amended,
S.B. 66, §§ 1-3, [1967] Ohio Laws; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 670-413.1 (Supp.
1966); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 37-6.2-1 to -4 (Supp. 1966); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 33-74.1 (Supp. 1966); Ch. 85, [1966] S.D. Laws; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 27-12-
109.1 to -109.3 (Supp. 1967) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 261, 262 (Supp. 1967);
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-133, -134 (Supp. 1966); WASH. REV. CODE § 47.12.250
(Supp. 1965); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-2A-17(h) (Supp. 1967).
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Title III of the Beautification Act." In almost every case the new
legislation is broad enough to permit state highway agencies to
acquire scenic easements adjacent to federal-aid highways. In Cali-
fornia and Missouri the new legislation supplements earlier legis-
lation authorizing acquisition of scenic easements adjacent to state
highways. 2 Elsewhere the new legislation provides authority for
scenic easement acquisition that was previously lacking. In Louisiana
the new scenic legislation has been buttressed by a constitutional
amendment.93
A majority of the post-Beautification Act statutes simply author-
ize the state highway agency, in substance, to acquire "interests in...
strips of land necessary for the restoration, preservation, and
enhancement of scenic beauty adjacent to... [federal-aid] high-
ways," using either the exact language of the Highway Beautification
Act of 1965 or language of similar import.94 Most of these statutes
authorize acquisition of the fee simple or any lesser interest for scenic
purposes.95 Only three states have statutes which define what may
be acquired ("strips of land") so narrowly as to raise a serious
question whether scenic easements may be acquired. 6
The California statute97 expressly declares that "the acquisition
of interests in real property for the preservation, maintenance or
conservation of scenic lands or areas adjacent to" interstate and
federal-aid primary highways "constitutes a public use and purpose."
The North Dakota and Virginia statutes" expressly provide that
acquisition of scenic interests is "in the public interest."
A number of the post-Beautification Act statutes declare vari-
ously that acquisition of scenic interests shall be deemed for a "high-
way purpose,"99 that such interests shall constitute "part of the
OlAmending 23 U.S.C. § 319 to provide -3 percent non-matching funds" for scenic
"restoration, preservation, and enhancement" of lands adjacent to federal-aid high-
ways.
92 See CAL. STs. & H'wAYS CODE §§ 895-96 (West Supp. 1967); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 226.280-.430 (1949).
93 LA. CONST. art. 6, § 19.3, adopted by popular referendum on Nov. 8, 1966. This
amendment, in substance, authorizes the legislature to implement the Highway Beauti-
fication Act of 1965, and validates the advertising control, junkyard control, and
scenic preservation legislation enacted in Louisiana in 1966.
94 California, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and
West Virginia statutes cited note 90 supra.
9 California, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York (very broad
definition), North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia statutes cited note 90 supra. The Ohio
statute does not permit fee acquisition more than 300 feet from the right-of-way,
however.
96 See Connecticut, Mississippi, and South Carolina statutes cited note 90 supra.
97 Statute cited note 90 supra.
98 Statutes cited note 90 supra.
99 See New Mexico statute cited note 90 supra.
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adjacent or nearest highway,"' 100 that the cost of acquisition shall be
deemed a "highway cost,"'' or that "highway construction and
maintenance" shall include acquisition of such interests.1'0 A few
states provide expressly that only federal funds may be used for
acquisition of scenic interests,10 3 or that state funds may be used
only when they will be fully reimbursed from federal funds.
0 4
Pennsylvania authorizes the expenditure of up to 110 percent of the
amount that can be reimbursed from federal funds.' 0
Most of the state statutes expressly authorize acquisition of
scenic interests by condemnation as well as by other methods. 0
The most popular formula is "purchase, gift, exchange, or condemna-
tion.'O'1° A few statutes omit the reference to "exchange, ' "0 8 and a
few add "lease."' 0 9 Although one statute mentions only "purchase
or condemnation, ''11 it is almost certain that "gift" and "exchange"
would be considered to fall within a broad definition of "purchase."
Only three states completely bar the use of condemnation,"' while
one state allows condemnation only to a distance of 100 feet from
the edge of the right-of-way," 2 and another allows condemnation
only to a distance of 500 feet from the edge of the right-of-way."'
One state prohibits acquisition of any commercial building, 1 4 while
another prohibits acquisition of any dwelling.'" 5 Two states prohibit
condemnation of scenic interests within any industrial or commercial
area, 1"6 and one state prohibits acquisition by any means at all in
areas zoned industrial or commercial.
117
100 See Utah statute cited note 90 supra.
101 See New Jersey and West Virginia statutes cited note 90 supra.
1
0
2 See South Carolina statute cited note 90 supra.
103 See Mississippi and Montana statutes cited note 90 supra.
104 See California and Colorado statutes cited note 90 supra.
105 See Pennsylvania statute cited note 90 supra.
106 Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Virginia, and West Virginia statutes cited note 90 supra.
107 See Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, North Dakota,
and West Virginia statutes cited note 90 supra.
108 See Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, and Virginia statutes cited note 90 supra.
109 See, e.g., Louisiana statute cited note 90 supra. See also Massachusetts ("eminent
domain, purchase, or otherwise") and Mississippi ("gift, purchase, or otherwise")
statutes cited note 90 supra.
110 See Colorado statute cited note 90 supra.
111 See Connecticut (purchase only), Montana (gift, purchase, or exchange only), and
Utah (same) statutes cited note 90 supra.
112 See Virginia statute cited note 90 supra.
113 See Pennsylvania statute cited note 90 supra, which allows acquisition of "property
or such lesser estate or interest" by gift or purchase to a distance of 1000 feet
from the right-of-way, and authorizes acquisition by condemnation "in base fee" to a
distance of 500 feet from the right-of-way.
114 See California statute cited note 90 supra.
115 See Georgia statute cited note 90 supra.
116 See Michigan and New York statutes cited note 90 supra.
117 See Connecticut statute cited note 90 supra.
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One state limits acquisition for scenic purposes to "strips of
land of limited width.""' One state authorizes acquisition to land
"not to exceed one thousand (1000) feet from the right of way,""'
and another to land "parallel to and contiguous with the highway
and... not exceed[ing] a width of 1000 feet from the adjacent right
of way line.' °2 0 On the other hand, one state expressly authorizes
acquisition of scenic interests extending more than 660 feet from the
edge of the highway right-of-way.'
At least two states expressly permit acquisition in fee simple
for scenic purposes, followed by resale or lease "subject to such
reservations, conditions, covenants or other contractual arrangements
... as will preserve the scenic character or beauty of the area trav-
ersed by the highway.
' 
"12
In at least three states, authorization for acquisition of scenic
interests is tucked away in the statute dealing with control of out-
door advertising along the highways.'2
IV. STATE EXPERIENCE WITH SCENIC EASEMENTS AND
PLANS FOR FUTURE USE
A. Visconsin1
4
As previously indicated, Wisconsin is the only state with any
substantial experience in the use of scenic easements to preserve
scenic beauty along highways. At the present time, Wisconsin has
acquired approximately 1125 scenic easement parcels' 25 covering
'Is Id.
119 See Pennsylvania statute cited note 90 supra, and quoted in note 113 supra.
120 See Idaho statute cited note 90 supra.
121 See North Dakota statute cited note 90 supra.
12 See California and Ohio statutes cited note 90 supra.
12 See Minnesota statutes cited note 85 supra, and Michigan and North Dakota statutes
cited note 90 supra.
1m The discussion of Wisconsin's scenic easement program is largely drawn from the
following sources: Disque, supra note 63; Jordahl, Conservation and Scenic Ease-
ments: An Experience Resume, 39 LAND ECONOMICS 343-65 (1963); Leverich,
Appraisal, Communication, Negotiation, Administration, in PROCEEDINGS OF CON-
FERENCE ON SCENIC EASEMENTS IN ACTION 35-48 (Madison, Wis., Dec. 16-17,
1966) ; W. Matuszeski, supra note 63, at 17-18; B. Mullen, Scenic Easements: Wis-
consin Progress (Report to 1966 Conference of American Association of State High-
way Officials, Wichita, Kan., Nov. 30, 1966); B. Mullen, Scenic Easements: Tech-
niques of Conveyancing (Report to American Bar Association National Institute,
Chicago, June 3, 1967, in ABA, JUNKYARDS, GERANIUMS AND JURISPRUDENCE: AES-
THETECS AND THE LAW) ; R. NETHERTON AND M. MARKHAM, supra note 63, at 68-70;
Note, Progress and Problems in Wisconsin's Scenic and Conservation Easement Program,
1965 Wis. L. REv. 352 [hereinafter cited as 1965 Wis. L. REV.]; Sawtelle, Scenic
Easements for the Great River Road, in PROCEEDINGS OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
AND OPEN SPACE CONFERENCE 47-52 (Madison, Wis., Dec. 13-14, 1961); WORK-
SHOP MANUAL, supra note 11, at 12-25; WHYTE, OPEN SPACE ACTION 71-89 (Out-
door Recreation Resources Review Commission Study Report No. 15, 1962); P.
Wykert, supra note 63, at 36-38.
12 Letter from B. J. Mullen, Director of Right of Way, State Highway Commission of
Wisconsin, to the author, June 19, 1967.
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about 12,500 acres of land and protecting some 282 miles of high-
way.' 26 To date, all of these scenic easements have been acquired
either as part of the Great River Road project or in certain limited
areas specified by statute.
1. The Great River Road
Wisconsin enacted enabling legislation in 1939127 to permit
participation in the Great River Road project, then known as the
Mississippi River Parkway, but the expected federal legislation was
not forthcoming until after World War II, and Wisconsin did not
acquire any land for the proposed parkway until after World War II.
Original plans provided for purchase in fee simple of an 825-foot-
wide right-of-way for the Great River Road to preserve scenic views.
But it soon became apparent that fee simple purchase of such right-
of-way would mean the taking of -many farm houses and other farm
buildings which the state did not want, and which abutting farm
owners would not wish to relinquish. Consequently, the state high-
way commission decided to acquire scenic easements along the Great
River Road right-of-way, 128 on the assumption that, with proper
restrictions to preserve scenic beauty, the landowners affected (mostly
farmers) could continue to use the land as before, the local tax base
would not be substantially reduced, and the state could save a great
deal of money by not purchasing the full fee simple.
Rather surprisingly, in connection with the first nine projects
for scenic easement acquisition along the Great River Road, it was
necessary to condemn only 28 percent of the parcels. And overall, it
has been possible to purchase about 90 percent of the desired scenic
easements by negotiation, without resort to condemnation. To date,
no landowner has successfully argued to a Wisconsin court that the
"taking" of a scenic easement over his land by condemnation was
"unnecessary" or "not for a public use." Recently, the Supreme Court
128 B. Mullen, Scenic Easements: Wisconsin Progress, supra note 124, at 3.
127 The 1939 legislation, in modified form, is now part of Wis. STAT. § 84.105 (1965).
Para. (6) of that section provides (in part):
All lands for right of way to be acquired in fee simple and all easements
necessary to be acquired for the purposes of the proposed national parkway
development shall be acquired by the state highway commission in the name
of the state, as may be required by the act of the United States congress
applicable thereto.... The commission may acquire such lands by gift,
purchase agreement, or by exercising the right of eminent domain in any
manner that may be provided by law for the acquirement of lands for public
purposes....
'
2 8 This could be accomplished either under Wis. STAT. § 84.105 (1965) or under the
general highway acquisition enabling act, which is now Wis. STAT. § 84.09 (1965);
the latter provides (in part): "(1) The state highway commission may acquire by
gift, devise, purchase or condemnation any lands for establishing, laying out, widen-
ing, enlarging, extending, constructing, reconstructing, improving and maintaining




of Wisconsin, in Kamrowski v. State," 9 squarely rejected the land-
owner's contention that the public enjoyment of scenic beauty adja-
cent to a highway is not a "public use" of land which justifies use
of the power of eminent domain. The court accepted the legislative
determination that "protection of scenic resources along highways is
a public purpose," and rejected the landowner's argument that a
ncg.ttive easemrnent cannot be a public use because public use requires
physical occupancy by the public. In so doing, the court accepted the
trial judge'.- view that a scenic easement permits "visual occupancy"
by the motoring public. The court also pointed out, "Whatever may
be the law with respect to zoning restrictions based upon aesthetic
considerations, a stronger argument can be made in support of the
power to take property, in return for just compensation, in order to
fulfill aesthetic concepts, than for the imposition of police power
restrictions for such purpose.' '13 0 And the court rejected the land-
owner's contention that he was denied equal protection of the laws
because scenic easements were not to be taken from the owners of
all lands abutting the Great River Road.
By September 1, 1961, Wisconsin had acquired scenic easements
adjacent to 53 miles of the Great River Road right-of-way at an
average cost of $575.26 per mile.13 ' Of this amount, payments to
landowners averaged $484.13 per mile.' The average cost per acre
was $19.17'3 as compared to a fee simple cost of $41.29 per
acre for land acquired for the right-of-way itself.'3 4 Considering
only the payments to landowners, the average cost per acre for scenic
easements was only $16.25.' s 5 On September 1, 1961, Wisconsin
embarked on a 10-year, $50 million resource development and con-
servation program financed by a 1-cent tax on the sale of each pack-
age of cigarettes.' 3 6 Two million of the $50 million were earmarked
for the acquisition of scenic easements, with first priority given to
completing scenic easement acquisitions along the Great River
129 31 Wis. 2d 256, 142 N.W.2d 793 (1966).
130 Id. at 797.
131 1965 Wis. L. REv. 354. Data was provided by the Wisconsin Highway Commission.
The $576.77 per mile figure was obtained by dividing the total cost of $30,569 by
the number of "highway miles" (53). "Highway miles are miles which have ease-
ments protecting at least one side of the highway." Id. at 355 n.14.
132 1965 WIs. L. REV. 354. The $484.32 per mile figure was obtained by dividing the
total payments to land owners of $25,669 by the number of "highway miles" (53).
133 1965 Wis, L. REV. 354.
134 WORKSHOP MANUAL 15.
135 1965 Wis. L. REV. 354. The $16.25 figure was obtained by dividing the total pay-
ments to landowners of $25,669 by the number of acres (1579).
138 This was authorized by the Resource Development and Outdoor Recreation Act
(1961), Wis. STAT. § 15.60 (1965). The program initiated under this act is known
as the "ORAP program."
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Road. 13 7 The total amount budgeted for scenic easement acquisi-
tion along the Great River Road for the period 1961-1965 was
$693,000.11s By November 30, 1966, the Wisconsin highway com-
mission had acquired scenic easements over some 571 parcels cover-
ing 6,189 acres of land and extending for a distance of 122 miles
for the Great River Road. 3 9 A majority of these scenic easements
were acquired with ORAP funds under the 1961 statute. 40 By June
3, 1967, it was estimated that the number of scenic easements along
the Great River Road had increased to 575.41
Although the average cost of scenic easements acquired for the
Great River Road between September 1, 1961, and December 31,
1964, was $40.99 per acre, 142 the average payment to landowners
for scenic easements in this period was only $20.50 per acre, 143 as
compared to $16.25 per acre in the period prior to September 1,
1961.1" The cost figure of $40.99 per acre reflected to a large extent
a change in accounting procedure by which the costs of engineering
surveys and preparation of detailed plats required by the state high-
way commission were included.145 These costs were not included
prior to 1961. In addition, the cost figure of $40.99 per acre included
appraisal fees, negotiation costs, and title examination - all of
which were included prior to 1961 - as well as the amount paid to
the landowner.
1 46
2. Scenic Easements Elsewhere in Wisconsin
Wisconsin's 1961 Resource Development and Outdoor Rec-
reation Act, authorizing expenditure of $50 million for resource
development and conservation over a 10-year period, provided, with
respect to scenic easements, that first priority should be given to
completing scenic easement acquisition along the Great River
Road. 47 It further provided that scenic easements should be acquired
along Lake Michigan and Green Bay, Lake Superior; along the
137WIS. STAT. § 15.60(6)'(i) (1965).
138 $293,000 was budgeted for scenic easement acquisition from 1961 to 1963, and an
additional $400,000 for the period 1963-1965. Disque, supra note 63, at 47.
139 B. Mullen, Scenic Easements: Wisconsin Progress, supra note 124, at 3.
140 As of December 31, 1961, 234 scenic easement parcels had been acquired. Sawtelle,
supra note 124, at 51. Prior to September 1, 1961, only 1579 acres along the Great
River Road were subject to scenic easements, and only 53 miles of the highway were
protected by scenic easements. 1965 Ws. L. Rav. 354. The scenic easements acquired
since September 1, 1961, have all been acquired with ORAP funds.
141 B. Mullen, Scenic Easements: Techniques of Conveyancing, supra note 124, at 1.




144 See note 135, supra, and accompanying text.
1 4 5 
WORKSHOP MANUAL 15.
146 Id.
147 WIs. STAT. § 15.60(6)(i) (1965).
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Chippewa, Wisconsin, Fox, Milwaukee and Wolf rivers; in the
lake and forest country of northern Wisconsin; and through the
Menominee Indian reservation and the Kettle Moraine area. 148
Harold Jordahl, writing in November 1963,'4° reported that pur-
suant to this authority state highway commission right-of-way agents
had appraised 13 scenic easement parcels encompassing 163 acres in
a project in southeastern Wisconsin at $7,690 or $46.56 per acre, and
13 scenic easement parcels encompassing 90 acres in northern Wis-
consin, along Lake Superior, at $2,485 or $27.61 per acre. Five
scenic easement parcels encompassing 48 acres in the southeastern
Wisconsin project had actually been acquired for $4,950, or $103.12
per acre.150 The relatively high cost reflected development pressures
on rural and semirural land in this part of the state.15' One scenic
easement parcel in the northern Wisconsin project had been acquired,
encompassing 14.6 acres, at a cost of $75, or about $5 per acre.' 52
A later report indicates that the total cost of scenic easements
acquired for the protection of Wisconsin highways other than the
Great River Road during the period 1961-1964 averaged $214.40
per acre.' This, of course, included all field expenses: appraisal
fees, cost of negotiation, precise engineering surveys, preparation
of detailed plats, and preparation of detailed descriptions. 5 4 On
the average, only $53.50 per acre was paid to the landowners for
the scenic easements. 5 This figure is substantially higher than the
figure for Great River Road scenic easements, however. The higher
price of these easements apparently resulted from the fact that many
of them were acquired in areas where development pressures were
much greater than along the Great River Road.
The percentage of cases where it was necessary to condemn
scenic easements has been about the same in areas outside the Great
River Road project as along the Great River Road - i.e., condemna-
tion has been necessary in only about 10 percent of all acquisitions.' 56
Of all the parcels condemned for scenic easement acquisition
1 8 Id.
149 Jordahl, supra note 124, at 356.
150 Id. The figures quoted are amounts paid to landowners for the easements.
151 Id.
152 Id. This figure is also the amount paid to the owner.





156 This is the figure given by B. Mullen, Scenic Easements: Wisconsin Progress, supra
note 124, at 3. The same author, in Scenic Easements: Techniques of Conveyancing,
supra note 124, at 5, gives the figure of 25 percent, but this is apparently erroneous.
In a letter to the author dated November 1, 1967, Mr. Mullen states: "Our best
information is that we are still acquiring approximately 90 percent of our scenic ease-
ment areas by negotiated purchase and that condemnation is necessary in only about
10 percent of the cases."
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throughout Wisconsin, only 12 condemnations (as of June 3, 1967)
had resulted in litigation.' 57
As of February 1, 1967, the Wisconsin Highway Department
estimated that it had acquired approximately 570 scenic easement
parcels in the priority areas listed in the 1961 ORAP legislation
(exclusive of the Great River Road).158 These scenic easement par-
cels encompassed approximately 6,300 acres of land along some 160
miles of highway.' 59
3. The Wisconsin Scenic Easement "Package"
When Wisconsin's scenic easement program along the Great
River Road was started in 1952, the easements acquired by the state
highway commission imposed substantially the same land use restric-
tions as did the scenic easements along the Blue Ridge and Natchez
Trace Parkways. Signs and billboards were prohibited, except for
signs of 8 square feet advertising goods sold on the premises or the
sale, hire or lease of the property; dumping of offensive or unsightly
materials was prohibited; and cutting of trees and shrubs was pro-
hibited, except as incidental to permitted uses. 6 Easement deed
forms used in the 1950's expressly permitted the following principal
uses: (a) single-family residences on tracts of not less than 5 acres;
and (b) general farming, including farm buildings, except fur
farms and farms used for disposal of garbage, rubbish, or sewage.'
6'
In addition, (c) telephone, telegraph or electric lines or pipes, or
pipe lines, or micro-wave radio relay structures, for the purpose of
transmitting messages, heat, light or power were permitted, along
with (d) uses incidental to any of the permitted principal uses.'62
Moreover, the easement deed form provided (e) that "[ajny use
existing on the premises at the time of the execution of" the ease-
ment deed was permitted, and that "[elxisting commercial and
industrial uses of land and buildings" could be "maintained and
repaired," but not expanded or structurally altered. 6 3 It was expressly
stated that the easement did not "grant the public the right to enter
.. for any purpose. '
16 4
157 B. Mullen, Scenic Easements: Techniques of Conveyancing, supra note 124, at 5. The
figure was only nine as of November 30, 1966. See B. Mullen, Scenic Easements:
Wisconsin Progress, supra note 124, at 3.
158 Letter, supra note 125. Both in that letter and a later letter to the author dated
November 1, 1967, Mr. Mullen indicated by implication that the figure of 700 scenic
easements given in Scenic Easements: Wisconsin Progress, supra note 124, at 1, is not
correct.
15 9 As of November 30, 1966, the acreage was approximately 6,311, and the mileage
was 160. B. Mullen, Scenic Easements: Wisconsin Progress, supra note 124, at 3.







The 5-acre lot restriction soon proved impractical in most loca-
tions.' 15 The Wisconsin highway commission then changed its policy
so as to permit single family residences in urban fringe areas on lots
with a minimum frontage of 300 feet.' 66 Such spacing not only pre-
vented an excessive number of entrances to the highway, but also
permitted a reasonable return to the servient landowner in areas
ripe for residential development and reduced the cost of acquiring
scenic easements in such areas- without, in the usual case, interfer-
ing unduly with the scenic value of the landscape. More recently,
the highway commission has tried limiting the permitted single
family residences to a stated number per tract, especially where high
land is interspersed with low, marshy land. It is hoped that this will
concentrate residential development into compact subdivisions instead
of encouraging ribbon development, as does the 300 foot frontage
requirement. 
1 7
The Wisconsin scenic easement forms used in the 1950's and
early 1960's provided, 68 in effect, that all existing uses on the
servient land other than agricultural and residential uses were to
be treated like "nonconforming uses" under a zoning ordinance;
they were allowed to continue but could not be expanded, and build-
ings in which such uses were carried on could not be structurally
altered.
In 1961, however, the Wisconsin highway commission changed
its attitude toward existing commercial uses,' 69 for it had become
apparent that rigid enforcement of the prohibition against expansion
or structural alteration prevented modernization of structures and
often resulted in roadside blight. Easements obtained since 1961
have allowed commercial property owners to remodel their buildings
to prevent decay and blight and to provide the quality of services
concurrently desired by highway travelers. In some cases, also, exist-
165 Letter from B. J. Mullen, Director of Right of Way, State Highway Commission of
Wisconsin, to the author, May 9, 1967.
166 Id. See also WORKSHOP MANUAL 13.
167 Letter, supra note 165.
168 Forms used in the early 1960's dropped the express reference to "existing commercial
and industrial uses and buildings," but imposed essentially the same restriction by
including in the list of "permitted uses": "Any use not heretofore specified which
exists upon or within the restricted area as of the time of execution of this easement,
including normal maintenance and repair of existing buildings, structures and appur-
tenances, but such use shall not be expanded nor shall any structures be erected or
structural alterations be made within the restricted area." See scenic easement form
in WORKSHOP MANUAL 81. The same form is given in PROCEEDINGS OF CONSERVA-
TION EASEMENTS AND OPEN SPACE CONFERENCE, Appendix A (Madison, Wis.,
Dec. 13-14, 1961). In this form, "construction, erection, maintenance and repair of
buildings incident to" general crop or livestock farming is specifically permitted.
Residential use is not expressly permitted, but there is a blank space which could be
filled in so as to make residential use a permitted use.
169 The discussion in the text here is based on WORKSHOP MANUAL 13, 22. Permission
to remodel, however, is subject to limitations designed to prevent construction which
would block the scenic view from the highway. Id. at 22.
VOL. 45
SCENIC EASEMENTS
ing industrial land uses have been permitted to continue as "conform-
ing uses" by virtue of specially drawn easement deed provisions. For
example, easements acquired from owners of land on which sand
and gravel mining sites or rock quarry sites are located may expressly
allow continuance of mining and quarrying without the limitations
on expansion normally imposed on "nonconforming uses.''170 Other-
wise, scenic easements covering such land would cost as much as the
fee simple title.
The Wisconsin scenic easement forms originally used in the
1950's attempted both to state the restrictions imposed on land use
and to spell out the permitted uses the landowner could make of his
land consistent with the scenic objectives sought to be achieved.
This turned out to be confusing and troublesome. Within a few
years landowners started to besiege the highway agency with ques-
tions as to whether some use not specifically mentioned in the scenic
easement deed would be permissible. Hence the scenic easement deed
form was changed so as to state only the use restrictions to be
imposed on the servient land, without any attempt to specify "per-
mitted uses."
During the 1950's the Wisconsin highway commission generally
considered that it was only necessary to purchase restrictive scenic
easements, without any affirmative or positive rights. 7 ' But this
policy proved inadequate. 7 ' Some of the easements purchased in
the 1950's are in areas which have now produced trees so large as
to block the entire scene sought to be preserved. The highway com-
mission has been helpless to deal with this problem because the
scenic easement form used at the time of purchase did not grant to
the commission the right to enter the easement area to cut and prune
trees selectively to preserve the view. Moreover, the scenic easement
deeds used in the 1950's granted the highway commission no right
to enter the easement area to restore its scenic value when necessary
- e.g., to remove and replace elm trees killed by the Dutch elm dis-
ease. In recent years, therefore, the scenic easement deed forms used
in Wisconsin have been changed to provide expressly that highway
department personnel may enter the easement area to "plant and/or
selectively cut or prune trees and brush to improve the scenic view
and to implement disease prevention measures.'
' 73
170 See Sawtelle, supra note 124, at 49; Whyte supra note 124, at 88.
171 See text accompanying notes 160-64 supra.
172 This discussion is based on B. Mullen, Scenic Easements: Wisconsin Progress, supra
note 124, at 4. Deeds used in the early 1960's, at least, contained the following pro-
vision: "This easement grants to the State of Wisconsin, and its agents, the right to
enter upon the restricted area only for the purpose of inspection and enforcement of
the terms of the easement."
173 See text following note 175 infra, "Specific Rights Conveyed," items (b) and (c).
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In recent years, the Wisconsin highway commission has also
decided that a more flexible approach to the scenic easement restric-
tions to be imposed on servient land is desirable, since each scenic
easement site differs from all others.'74 One site may cover a 40-
acre tract for the purpose of preserving the beauty of a wooded hill-
side. Another site may be acquired for the purpose of cutting a
"window" in a wall of trees to open up a scenic view. And still
another site may require acquisition of the right to plant trees to
enhance scenic beauty. In order to provide the needed flexibility, a
new scenic easement instrument was developed several years ago
which listed all the conceivable scenic restrictions and affirmative
rights which it might be desirable to include in any scenic easement
"package." In particular cases, the restrictions and affirmative rights
not to be included were simply crossed out. But experience with this
form of instrument indicated that it made scenic easement acquisi-
tion unnecessarily difficult because it created apprehension in the
minds of the landowners, who were suspicious of items X-ed out
on the instrument they were subsequently asked to sign.
To deal with this problem, it was recently proposed that scenic
easement forms be standardized in three or four groups - e.g.,
those which protect a view located above the highway level, those
protecting a view on the same level as the highway, and those pro-
tecting a view below the highway level. This proposal was rejected,
however, and it was decided instead to use a simple one-sheet scenic
easement deed form with ample blank space for typing in the restric-
tions and affirmative rights agreed on in each particular case. The
highway commission negotiators now work from the following list:
SPECIFIC RIGHTS CONVEYED
The right of the State of Wisconsin, its agents and contractors,
to enter upon the easement area:
(a) To inspect for violations of the provisions of this ease-
ment and to remove or eliminate advertising displays,
signs and billboards, stored or accumulated junked auto-
mobiles, farm implements or parts thereof, and other sal-
vage materials or debris, and to perform such scenic res-
toration as may be deemed necessary or desirable.
(b) To plant and/or selectively cut or prune trees and brush
to improve the scenic view and to implement disease pre-
vention measures.
(c) To plant and/or selectively cut or prune trees and brush
to improve the scenic view and to implement disease
prevention measures. The area excluded from this pro-
vision is described as follows: (Then describe excluded
areas such as the residence, etc.)
174 The discussion in the text here is based on WoRKsHoP MANUAL 20-22; B. Mullen,
Scenic Easements: Wisconsin Progress, supra note 124, at 6-9; B. Mullen, Scenic





1. The right to erect, display, place or maintain upon or
within the scenic area any signs, billboards, outdoor advertising
structures or advertisement of any kind, except that one (1) on-
premise sign of not more than .......... square feet in size may
be erected and maintained to advertise the sale, hire, or lease of
the property, or the sale and/or manufacture of any goods, products
or services upon the land. Any existing signs, other than the one
on-premise sign, and/or advertisements as described above shall be
terminated and removed on or before .......................
2. The right to dump or maintain a dump of ashes, trash,
rubbish, sawdust, garbage, offal, storage of vehicle bodies or parts,
storage of farm implements or parts, and any other unsightly or
offensive material.
3. The right to cut or remove any trees or shrubs.
4. The right to cut or remove any trees, except marketable
timber and then in accordance with standard forest cropping prac-
tices existent in the area, and at no time will the scenic area be
denuded of trees.
5. The right to park trailer houses, mobile homes, or any port-
able living quarters.
6. The right to quarry, or remove, or store any surface or sub-
surface minerals or materials.
7. All rights except general crop and/or livestock farming
(agricultural) within the first ........ feet of the scenic area as
measured normal to the (center line) (reference line) (nearest edge
of pavement) (right of way line) of the highway.
8. All rights except general crop and/or livestock farming
(agricultural).
9. The right to develop the easement area except for limited
residential development consistent with applicable state and local
regulations. Such limited rights retained by the owner are as follows:
(a) Each single family residential lot fronting on and abutting
(Identify Highway) shall be limited to a minimum width
of .......... feet as measured parallel to the highway;
(b) A total of ........ single family residential lots is the
maximum number authorized for the easement area.
10. The right to change the use of the easement area from
residential to any other use.
11. The right to change the use of the easement area from
commercial to any other use.
175
In drafting a scenic easement deed, the right to enter to inspect
for and eliminate violations, (a) above, will normally be included,
and in most cases either (b) or (c) will also be included. If, in
view of the characteristics of the particular parcel, no right of entry
is desired for any purpose, no provision for a right of entry is
included in the deed. In every case, however, the deed form will
contain two printed paragraphs assuring the landowner that the
175 This list is set out in WORKSHOP MANUAL 20-22; B. Mullen, Scenic Easements:
Wisconsin Progress, supra note 124, at 7-8; B. Mullen, Scenic Easements: Techniques
of Conveyancing, supra note 124, in Exhibits 2 and 3.
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public has no right of entry in the easement area and that the state
has no right of entry except for the specific purposes set forth in
the deed. These paragraphs are included to assure the landowner
that the public will not be permitted to use the scenic easement area
as a park, and that the highway commission will not have the right
to use it for highway construction purposes. They make the scenic
easement more "salable" from the state's viewpoint.
The list of restrictions ("specific rights relinquished") is to
be used as a guide by the highway commission's field representatives
in developing the scenic easement package best suited for a partic-
ular location. Any combination of the listed restrictions may be used,
depending on the character of the scenic easement site and the objec-
tive sought to be accomplished. Some of the restrictions are alterna-
tives both of which would not be included in the same scenic ease-
ment deed - e.g., items 3 and 4; items 7, 8, and 9. Item 9, dealing
with residential development, leaves some room for negotiation with
the landowner as to the number of residential lots and the minimum
width of lots to be permitted in the easement area. It is important
to note that the list of restrictions is not intended to be all-inclusive
and that, if the field representative decides that some additional
restriction is desirable, he is authorized to include such restriction in
the proposed scenic easement deed.
The flexible approach embodied in the above listing of "specific
rights conveyed" and "specific rights relinquished" obviously requires
that the highway commission's field representatives shall be capable
of exercising an informed judgment in determining which affirma-
tive rights and restrictions to include in the scenic easement deed.
It also requires the enforcement agent to become familiar with the
varying provisions of each scenic easement deed. To aid the enforce-
ment agent, Mr. B. J. Mullen has suggested that a book of scenic
easement plats be kept for each highway maintenance area, showing
the restrictions on each parcel and the affirmative rights granted to
the highway commission.1
76
During the 1950's scenic easements along the Great River Road
in Wisconsin were generally acquired over strips extending 350 feet
back from the center line of the highway right-of-way. 177 It is now
recognized, however, that a uniform strip running 350 feet back
from the center line of the right-of-way is not necessarily sufficient
to preserve the scenic views most worth preserving. For example,
176 B. Mullen, Scenic Easements: Wisconsin Progress, supra note 124, at 14.
177 All the sources agree on this point. The discussion in the text of why and how the
original practice was modified is based on WORKSHOP MANUAL 20; B. Mullen,
Scenic Easements: Wisconsin Progress, supra note 124, at 12.
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there are along the Great River Road many coulees which run back
from the highway far beyond the 350-foot easement line, and many
of these coulees present some of the most beautiful views along the
entire Great River Road: steep bluffs reaching skyward on both
sides of a lush valley and sudden outcroppings of rock bursting out
through heavy cover of trees and brush. Since the 350-foot easements
do not restrict land use beyond the easement line, many of these
lovely vistas may be spoiled by future development. Since 1961,
therefore, the Wisconsin highway commission has adopted a more
flexible approach to the depth of scenic easements, under which the
easement is to be designed to fit the topography.
To date under the ORAP program the commission has concen-
trated on specific locations which, for many projects, include six to
10 parcels in order to preserve one scenic objective such as a view
of a lake from the highway. Currently, the commission is thinking
in terms of complete scenic corridors which will turn scenic highways
into parkways. For example, Interstate 94 between Madison and
Milwaukee is presently under study with a view to development of
the 70-plus miles between the two cities as a scenic parkway.
4. Scenic Easement Site Selection, Appraisal, and
Negotiation
178
As part of the ORAP program, a resource value inventory of
the entire state of Wisconsin has been made on a county by county
basis. When the resource values disclosed by the inventory, including
streams, lakes, forests, and hilly areas, are placed on a map of the
state and then overlaid with a map of the highway transportation
network, natural lineal scenic highway corridors can be recognized.
Delineation of these natural corridors has apparently provided some
aid in scenic easement site selection at times. But in areas where
enough scenic easements to create a complete scenic highway corridor
cannot be acquired, the resource value inventory provides only a very
general guide to scenic easement site selection. The usual practice is
to make site selections on the basis of a careful field viewing by a
committee in each highway district, with all selections subject to
review by the staff of the highway commission.
Before the Wisconsin highway commission acquires a scenic
easement, the right-of-way agent reviews the marketability of the
178 This section of the text is based primarily on the following sources: B. Mullen,
Scenic Easements: Wisconsin Progress, supra note 124, at 5-10, 12-13; B. Mullen,
Scenic Easements: Techniques of Conveyancing, supra note 124, at 2; R. NETHERTON
& M. MARKHAM, supra note 124, at 71; R. Sawtelle, Experiences in the Acquisition
of Scenic Easements by the State of Wisconsin (unpublished paper presented to the




title by examining the local public land records. Abstracts are not
obtained unless the fee simple title is to be acquired instead of a
scenic easement. After the appraised value of the scenic easement
has been determined, the state highway commission offers the land-
owner this value; there is no dickering over price, although there
may be some give-and-take with respect to the exact content of the
scenic easement package. Condemnation is resorted to only when
the landowner will not sell at the appraised value.
An appraisal of each parcel is made on site, the appraiser con-
ferring with the owner to learn of his immediate plans for any
change in the use of the land and to discover any items that might have
been overlooked. Theoretically, such appraisals should be made on
the basis of the difference between the value of the whole premises
before and after acquisition of the scenic easement. But since experi-
ence has shown that acquisition of a scenic easement often has no
adverse effect on the value of the land lying beyond the restricted
area, the area to be covered by the scenic easement may be considered
as a separate unit. The appraisal process then becomes an effort to
establish the difference between the value of that unit before and
after acquisition of the scenic easement.
Determination of the "before" value of a scenic easement parcel
is not always easy, because of the difficulty in determining what the
"highest and best use" of the land really is. Much of the land is
located in rural areas, and is either devoted to agricultural use or is
substantially unused for anything at all. The development potential
of the land is often uncertain in such cases, and the "highest and best
use" may be quite speculative. Determination of the "after" value
of a scenic easement parcel may be even more difficult because there
are almost no "comparables" to use in fixing "after" values.
Recently, however, the Wisconsin highway commission has been
able to establish some comparable "before" and "after" values in
cases where excess land is purchased and then resold subject to scenic
restrictions. This occurs where a right-of-way acquisition cuts up an
agricultural tract so badly that the owner sells his entire tract to the
highway commission. If the excess is resold subject to scenic restric-
tions, the high bid for the land subject to scenic restrictions can be
compared to the appraised value of the excess land free of scenic
restrictions. Under current Wisconsin practice, the ORAP fund is
charged for the difference, if any.
The Wisconsin experience suggests that there are really two
different problems in the appraisal of scenic easements. First, in
strictly rural areas, where no development is likely in the foreseeable
future, the damage to the landowner resulting from imposition of
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scenic easement restrictions on part of his land is usually quite small.
The landowner loses a few dollars of annual income from billboard
rental payments, and he is inconvenienced by the series of meetings
leading up to final negotiation of the easement purchase. In such
cases, the Wisconsin highway commission has accepted the premise
that scenic easements do have some value, and that payment of at
least a nominal amount is likely to be the determining factor in
persuading the landowner to grant the desired scenic easement.
Hence the highway commission makes an offer of "nominal" pay-
ment, which apparently is usually based on a standard flat rate of
20 cents a front foot. It should be noted, however, that even in
"nominal" damage cases, the highway commission demands a rather
complete appraisal document, with a careful site analysis, good pic-
tures, a sketch, a dissertation on the market data available, and a
logical conclusion as to how the proposed scenic easement affects
the value of the servient land.
The second kind of appraisal problem arises where the land
in question has substantial development potential because of its
proximity to urban centers. In such cases, serious consideration must
be given to probable future uses, such as residential subdivisions,
motels, or other commercial developments. But the appraiser cannot
assume that all properties are potential sites for either residential
or commercial development. It is usually clear, for example, that
there will be insufficient business for total commercial development
along a particular highway for many years to come. Consequently,
the value of the scenic easement is usually established as a percent-
age of the future development value of the land based on the num-
ber of commercial or residential units that foreseeable future demand
will support and the suitability of the particular land for such devel-
opment, keeping in mind that unrestricted development will be per-
mitted beyond the scenic easement strip and that signs are permitted
within the restricted area if they advertise a business on the premises.
Despite the difficulties involved in valuation of scenic ease-
ments, the Wisconsin experience clearly demonstrates that these
difficulties can be overcome. It has also demonstrated that the
appraiser must fully understand what it is that he is supposed to
appraise- i.e., he must be fully informed of the exact provisions
of the scenic easement to be acquired. Because of the rather confus-
ing mixture of "restrictions" and "permitted uses" in the scenic ease-
ment forms used in the 1950's, Wisconsin appraisers sometimes did
not fully understand just what rights were to be relinquished by the
landowner, and consequently had unnecessary difficulty in deter-
mining the effect of the scenic easement on the value of the land.
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It should be noted that the policy of the Wisconsin highway
commission has been to acquire scenic easements mainly in rural and
semirural areas, and never within the limits of cities or villages.
Moreover, the Wisconsin highway commission from the beginning
of its scenic easement program has applied one lesson derived from
the experience of the National Park Service with the Blue Ridge
and Natchez Trace Parkways: that a fee simple title rather than a
scenic easement should be obtained in forest lands having value for
commercial lumbering, since the cost of an easement which prohibits
the harvesting of timber will approximate the cost of fee simple
purchase.
More recently, the Wisconsin highway commission has adopted
the policy of buying a fee simple estate rather than a scenic easement
at those locations where the cost of a scenic easement would approx-
imate the value of the fee simple. Under the current policy in Wis-
consin, about 5 percent of the scenic parcels acquired are purchased
in fee simple.
5. Enforcement of Scenic Easement Restrictions 7 9
During the early years of the scenic easement acquisition pro-
gram for the Great River Road, enforcement problems seem to have
arisen mainly from uncertainty as to just what restrictions were
imposed on the servient land. No doubt the language of the early
easement deeds, with their intermingling of "restrictions" and "per-
mitted uses," was a major cause of this uncertainty. One remedy, in
Wisconsin, has been to have the easement purchasing agent state,
restate, clarify, and reclarify the rights and duties of the parties at
the time of acquisition of the easement. In this connection, all Wis-
consin scenic easement purchasing agents are required to keep a
"negotiator's diary" containing summaries of all conversations with
the landowner, signed by the agent, and stating in detail exactly
what was discussed at each meeting or during each telephone con-
versation with the landowner. This makes it more difficult for the
landowner to say, as landowners have frequently said in the past, "I
know it's not in the deed, but Mr. so-and-so told me that I could do
this," in order to excuse a violation of easement restrictions. Of
course, it is hoped that the new easement deed forms, containing a
clearer statement of the restrictions imposed on the landowner, will
help to eliminate uncertainty which may give rise to unintentional
violations.
179 This section of the text is based primarily on WORKSHOP MANUAL 19-23.
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In general, enforcement of scenic easement restrictions along
Wisconsin's Great River Road has not encountered much difficulty.
Enforcement is the responsibility of highway department personnel
who work closely with field representatives from the district office
of the state highway commission. Periodic inspections are conducted
and easement violations are quickly reported. The servient landowner
is first given a notice requiring him to take corrective action - e.g.,
to remove signs erected or maintained in violation of the easement
restrictions. Failure of the landowner to take corrective action may
result in entry on the servient land by highway department personnel
to abate the violation or in a suit for an injunction. The local courts
have been fully educated with respect to the Wisconsin scenic ease-
ment program, and are much less hostile to state highway commission
agents seeking injunctive relief than were the courts of the southern
states toward federal agents seeking injunctive relief against scenic
easement violations along the Blue Ridge and Natchez Trace Park-
ways.'
0
One recurrent problem in enforcement has arisen from the plac-
ing of house trailers on residential lots which meet the 300-foot
minimum frontage requirement. For the future, at least, this problem
has been resolved by placing in the easement deed form an express
prohibition against house trailers.
6. Plans for Future Use of Scenic Easements
The Wisconsin highway commission plans to complete acquisi-
tion of scenic easements for the Great River Road in the near future.
A proposed statutory amendment which would remove the location
restrictions on scenic easement acquisition imposed by the ORAP
priorities was to have been presented to the 1967 legislative session,
but has been withheld until the ORAP committee can complete its
recommendations for changes in the ORAP legislation. If this amend-
ment is ultimately adopted, making ORAP funds available for acqui-
sition of scenic easements along highways in any part of Wisconsin,
the highway commission plans to use state ORAP funds, as far as
possible, for acquisition of scenic easements and scenic overlook
sites, and to use federal "3 percent funds" for development of scenic
overlook sites, for removal of billboards, and for removal or screen-
ing of junkyards pursuant to the Highway Beautification Act of
180 In a letter to the author dated May 9, 1967, Mr. B.J. Mullen reported as follows:
"We have approximately 6 violations involving signs at the present time. We have
had good results so far with voluntary action of the landowner. We may have to go
to the courts to clear some of the above signs but have not taken this step to date."
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1965.181 For the time being, it would appear that only federal 3 per-
cent funds are available for scenic easement acquisition outside the
Great River Road and the other priority areas listed in the 1961
ORAP legislation.
In response to the Highway Beautification Act of 1965, a new
Scenic Beauty Bill' was introduced in the 1967 legislative session
and is still pending. This bill would expressly authorize acquisition
of "the fee simple or any lesser interest, as determined by the state
highway commission to be reasonably necessary to accomplish the
purposes of" the bill, which are "to promote the safety, convenience
and enjoyment of travel on, and protection of the public investment
in, the state trunk highway system, and to provide for the restoration,
preservation and enhancement of scenic beauty within and adjacent
to such highways." It is doubtful whether such authorization is really
necessary, since the Wisconsin highway commission has for several
years been acquiring scenic easements in the priority areas listed in
the ORAP legislation under an earlier statute.1 3 However, another
provision of the proposed Scenic Beauty Bill is designed to meet a
clearly demonstrated need of the state highway commission for
variance-granting power.
No scenic easement instrument, however well drafted, can antic-
ipate all the changes that may take place in the future. Conditions
affecting the scenic easement site may change radically in a period
of 10 or 20 years. Yet the scenic easement normally imposes restric-
tions that will operate in perpetuity. Wisconsin has already had
substantial experience with requests from landowners for a release
of or variance from the restrictions imposed on their lands by scenic
easements. Under present Wisconsin law,'8 4 if the highway commis-
sion decides to grant a landowner's request and release or modify
some scenic easement right previously acquired, it must classify such
right as "excess," have it appraised, and obtain the approval of the
Governor in order to dispose of the "excess right" in question. This
statutory procedure presents no particular problem in disposing of
excess realty when the highway commission initially acquired a fee
simple estate. Indeed, the procedure is probably desirable, since the
transaction is open for all to see. But the procedure is time-consuming,
181 Letters from B.J. Mullen to the author, May 9, June 19, and Nov. 1, 1967.
1
8This is Assembly Bill 323, introduced on March 7, 1967. If enacted, it will create a
new Chapter 85 of the Wisconsin Statutes, "relating to the restoration, preservation
and enhancement of scenic beauty within and adjacent to the state trunk highway
system."
1 83 WIs. STAT. § 84.09 (1965). See quotation in note 128 supra.
1
8 4 Id. § 84.09 (5).
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cumbersome, and unnecessary when applied to the release of or
variance from scenic easement restrictions.
The proposed Scenic Beauty Bill contains a provision which
would authorize the state highway commission "to grant variances
or releases of conditions, terms or restrictions contained in easements
secured for highway beautifcation or in conveyances containing any
reservations or restrictions regarding the use or occupation of prop-
erty conveyed by the commission" whenever this "shall be determined
by the commission to be in the public interest." It has been further
suggested that the highway commission should be required to deter-
mine whether the right to be released has a significant market value
and if so to require the landowner requesting the release to pay such
market value to the commission.
B. California
Since 1933 the California Department of Parks and Recreation
or a predecessor agency has from time to time acquired scenic ease-
ments over land in or immediately adjacent to state parks. The first
scenic easement, acquired in 1933, covered lands adjacent to Point
Lobos State Reserve. By its terms, the grantors agreed as follows:
That, other than farm buildings, they will not [without the
permission of the State Park Commission first obtained] allow any
new structures upon said described property for strictly business or
commercial purposes, and that any new buildings other than farm
buildings shall not be constructed upon said premises nearer than
250 feet from the west line of the State Highway and that so far as
reasonably feasible the natural growth of trees and forest thereon
will not be destroyed or materially altered.
The second scenic easement, covering lands adjacent to Pfeiffer-
Big Sur State Park, was acquired in 1934. It imposed significantly
greater restrictions on the servient land than did the Point Lobos
scenic easement of 1933."85 The Pfeiffer-Big Sur restrictions were
essentially a prototype of the restrictions included in a 1946 scenic
easement deed form approved by the California Attorney General
for general use in scenic easement acquisition.'8 6
The 1946 scenic easement deed form was used in the acquisition
18 5 Copies of the 1933 and 1934 scenic easement deeds were furnished by Mr. F. C.
Buchter, Departmental Counsel, Department of Parks and Recreation.
186 Copies of this 1946 scenic easement deed were furnished by Mr. F. C. Buchter, supra
note 185, and by Mr. Earl P. Hanson, Chief, Division of Beaches and Parks, Depart-
ment of Parks and Recreation. The same scenic easement deed is reprinted in W.
WHYTE, SECURING OPEN SPACE FOR URBAN AMERICA: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
60-61 (Urban Land Institute Tech. Bull. No. 36, 1959). Presumably the Department
would use this form at the present time in acquiring additional scenic easements in
or adjacent to state parks.
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of nine scenic easements at Columbia State Historic Park.' 8 7 At
Columbia, the aim of the park is to preserve and interpret the looks
and life of a California gold rush town as authentically as possible.
The acquisition program has proceeded on a piecemeal basis, and
scenic easements have been acquired to preserve the original character
of the buildings and their surroundings until funds are available for
fee simple purchase. Subsequently, about one-half of these scenic
easement areas (including buildings) have been acquired in fee
simple.
The State of California also has what might be considered a
scenic easement in the area adjacent to the Monterey Custom
House.' 88 The scenic easement was contained in a stipulated judg-
ment defining the interests of the state and the city in a described
area adjacent to the Custom House building and stating that the
state should have an easement for light and air.
Scenic easement acquisitions by the California Department of
Parks and Recreation (or its predecessor agency) have been carried
18 The restrictions contained in the scenic easement deeds at Columbia Historic Park
are as follows:
1. That no structures of any kind will be placed or erected upon said
described premises until application therefor, with plans and specifications
of such structures, together with a statement of the purpose for which the
structure will be used, has been filed with and written approval obtained
from the said State Park Commission;
2. That no advertising of any kind or nature shall be located on or
within said property without written approval being first obtained from
the State Park Commission;
3. That no painting or exterior surfacing which, in the opinion and
judgment of the said State Park Commission, are inharmonious with the
landscape and general surroundings, shall be used on the exterior of any
structure now located on such property, or which may, as hereinbefore
provided be constructed thereon;
4. That all new plantings by the Grantors shall be confined to native
plants characteristic of the State Park region, except flowers, vegetables,
berries, fruit trees and farm crops;
5. That the general topography of the landscape shall be maintained
in its present condition and that no excavation or topographic changes shall
be made without the written approval of the State Park Commission;
6. That no use of said described property, which in the opinion and
judgment of said State Park Commission, will or does materially alter the
landscape or other attractive scenic features of said land, or will be incon-
sistent with State Park rules and regulations, or with the proper operation
of a State Park, other than those specified above shall be done or suffered
without the written consent of the said State Park Commission.
There is a further provision excepting and reserving to the grantor, inter alia,
The right to maintain all of the buildings now existing and if all or
any of them shall be destroyed or damaged by fire, storm, or other casualty,
to restore the same in conformity with the design and type of building of
the historic period which the State Park has been established to commem-
orate; the plans to be submitted and approved by the State Park Commission
as provided in Paragraph I hereof.
Information about the Columbia State Historic Park and the scenic easements
obtained in connection therewith was furnished by letters to the author from Earl P.
Hanson, Chief, Division of Beaches and Parks, Aug. 10, 1967; from Ed V. Dwyer,
Recreational Planner, Division of Beaches and Parks, Aug. 16, 1967; and from F. C.
Buchter, Departmental Counsel, Department of Parks and Recreation, Sept. 8, 1967.
188 Information about the Monterey Custom House easement was furnished by letter
from F.C. Buchter, supra note 187.
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out under authority of a 1927 statute which, in its present form,
provides as follows:
The department, with the consent of the Department of
Finance, may acquire by purchase or by condemnation proceedings
brought in the name of the people of the State of California title to
or any interest in real and personal property which the department
deems necessary or proper for the extension, improvement, or devel-
opment of the state park system. The department shall attempt to
purchase property by negotiation with the owner before it com-
mences condemnation proceedings.' 8 9
Since 1963 the California Department of General Services has been
responsible for the acquisition program for the Department of Parks
and Recreation, operating under authority of the Property Acquisition
Law. 9 ' However, no scenic easements have been acquired since 1963.
Most of the scenic easements now administered by the Cali-
fornia Department of Parks and Recreation were gifts to the state." 1
As one official of the Department puts it, "We have not had any
particular problems of policing the scenic easements acquired by
gifts since in each case the donations were made by persons who
were sympathetic with the program undertaken. Whether problems
will be encountered when the principals involved are no longer in
active ownership of the properties is hard to imagine."'192 It should
be noted, however, that each park has a resident ranger "who is in
constant observation of the easement."' 9'
The only enforcement problem to arise so far has involved the
Monterey Custom House easement. The City of Monterey wants to
construct a marina which arguably will encroach on the defined ease-
ment area. The issue is whether a seawall, which is invisible from
the plaza of the Custom House, will violate the easement restrictions.
There has been no litigation to date, and it appears that administra-
tive negotiations will preserve the state's rights in the easement
area.1
9 4
In general, it would appear that substantial further acquisitions
of scenic easements adjacent to state parks in California are unlikely.
One official of the Department of Parks and Recreation says, "We
1 8 9 
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5006 (West Supp. 1967).
1
9
0 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 15850-66 (West 1963).
191 There is some conflict on this point. Both Mr. Earl P. Hanson and Mr. Ed V. Dwyer,
in their letters, supra note 187, state that all the department's scenic easements were
acquired by gift, without any cost to the state. On the other hand, Mr. F.C. Buchter,
in his letter, supra note 187, states, "As a general rule, the property owners [at
Columbia State Historic Park] required payment for the easements, although the
prices were not excessive. A few were gift deeded to us."
12 Letter from Earl P. Hanson, rupra note 187. This is confirmed in letter from Ed V.
Dwyer, supra note 187.
193 Letter from Ed V. Dwyer, supra note 187.
' Information on this point was furnished by letters from F.C. Buchter to the author,
Sept. 8 & Dec. 13, 1967.
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have never used condemnation in acquiring scenic easements nor
have we contemplated doing so. We have looked at the possibility
of attempting to buy scenic easements and have found that the
problems of valuation are so great as to be unworkable."'9 5 Another
official has expressed the following opinion:
The difficulty of determining how much control a scenic ease-
ment gives reduces their value to the Department. Another aspect
which has toned down our interest in scenic easements is that there
is not a satisfactory method for the appraisal of the value, and unless
the landowner is cooperative in accepting a nominal consideration,
the cost of the easement is so high where land is restricted for park
compatible uses that acquisition [in fee] is more practicable, since
this will insure the public the use of the land as well as the scenic
attraction. Land value in California is so high and the desirability
of land for subdivision near State Parks makes it unlikely that scenic
easements will be acquired for nominal consideration.19 6
Although the Department of Parks and Recreation is given
broad new authority to acquire scenic easements under the California
Parkway Act of 1965,1°" at present the implementation of that act
is still in the early planning stage.
Prior to 1963, California had both a constitutional provision
and some legislation under which the state highway agency had the
power to acquire excess land adjacent to state highways and to resell
it subject to scenic restrictions,' 9 8 but it appears that no use was
ever made of this power. In 1963, the Westside Freeway Park and
Development Act "' authorized the Departments of Water Resources,
Parks and Recreation, Fish and Game, Finance, and Public Works
to acquire the fee simple or any lesser interest in certain scenic areas
in conjunction with construction of the new Interstate Route 5. The
Department of Public Works was expressly empowered to acquire
scenic easements along the new highway, provided the cost of such
scenic easements would be reimbursed by the federal government. 00
To date, however, no scenic easements have been acquired under the
1963 Westside Park and Freeway Development Act.
The year 1963 also saw the enactment of legislation establishing
195 Letter from Mr. Earl P. Hanson, supra note 198.
16 Letter from F.C. Buchter, supra note 187.
197 CAL. STs. & H'wAYS CODE §§ 885-87.5 (West Supp. 1967).
198 The constitutional provision is CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 141/. Implementing legislation
is CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE § 104.3 (West 1956).
199 CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 7000-01 (West 1966).
O0 Id. § 7000. The limitation to expenditure of federal-aid funds for acquisition of
scenic easements by the Department of Public Works is apparently controlling,
despite the broader authorization in § 7001 for expenditure of public funds for"acquisition of interests or rights in real property." But the specific authorization in
§ 7000 for the Department of Public Works to acquire scenic easements apparently
does not limit the broader power conferred by § 7001 on "any of the state depart-
ments specified in this chapter" to acquire "the fee or any lesser interest, develop-
ment right, easement, covenant or other contractual right necessary to achieve the
purposes of this chapter."
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a Master Plan for State Scenic Highways in California.2"' While the
state's role as planner, catalyst, and active participant should not be
minimized, it is apparent that the statute gives local governmental
agencies the primary responsibility for controlling land use outside
the highway right-of-way and within the scenic highway corridor.
Consequently, the major efforts of the Advisory Committee on a
Master Plan for Scenic Highways and other state agencies involved
in the scenic highway program were initially devoted to development
of planning and design standards for scenic corridor protection.
These efforts resulted in a publication entitled The Scenic Route: A
Guide for the Designation of an Official Scenic Highway.2 °2 The
Advisory Committee reviewed it and recommended its adoption on
an interim basis, subject to further review by other public agencies
and conccrned citizens. The Director of Public Works adopted the
Guide on this interim basis, and it is currently being followed in
designating official scenic highways in California.
Highways designated by the state legislature to be within the
Master Plan for Scenic Highways are eligible to become Official
Scenic Highways when (1) the roadway and right-of-way meet scenic
highway standards set forth in the Guide, or the state has developed
a plan and program to bring a specific road and right-of-way into
conformity with such standards; and (2) protection of the scenic
corridor has been assured by the local jurisdictions through which
the highway runs and by public agencies owning land within the
corridor.
The Guide broadly states that "land use controls consistent with
the general plan should be in effect over the entire corridor, ' 20 3 and
includes a rather detailed set of guidelines in regard to urban develop-
ment in both rural and urban areas, building heights and setbacks,
signs and outdoor advertising, placement of utility lines, cover and
screening of earthwork operations, erosion control, preservation of
the natural condition of edges of lakes, rivers, and creeks, preserva-
tion and restoration of plant material, clearing for views, site plan-
ning and architectural and landscape design in private developments,
property maintenance on private properties, and public uses within
the highway corridor. The particular land use controls to be employed
by local governmental agencies for protection of the scenic highway
corridor include zoning ordinances, subdivision regulations, building
201 CAL. STs. & HWAYS CODE §§ 227-29.1, 260-63.9 (West 1967).
202 This publication (hereinafter referred to as the Guide] was prepared by the Inter-
departmental Committee on Scenic Highways, composed of representatives from the
Departments of Public Works, Parks and Recreation, and Water Resources, and the
State Office of Planning, and was based on policy directions from the Advisory




codes, housing codes, fire protection codes, anti-litter ordinances,
weed and insect controls, water quality controls and forestry regula-
tions- all based on the police power delegated to local govern-
mental agencies.
The Guide also states that "every opportunity for acquisition
of corridor land in fee should be thoroughly explored by public
agencies" to provide for "such public uses as information centers,
roadside rests, vista stations, parks, playgrounds, wild areas, wildlife
refuges, schools, colleges, cultural centers, administrative centers,
fairgrounds, even airports" ;204 and that, "when public uses are not
contemplated, the acquisition of development rights or scenic ease-
ments should be actively pursued by public agencies.'"'25 With
respect to "these lesser property rights," it is asserted that they
"retain the land on the tax rolls - if at a lower rate, leave responsi-
bility for maintenance with the private owner, allow private uses
compatible with the scenic highway program, and are acquired at
a lower cost than outright purchase."2 °
It is not clear whether the Guide contemplates acquisition of
"development rights or scenic easements" by state agencies, by local
governmental agencies, or by both. It would appear, however, that
acquisition by local governmental agencies is contemplated, since at
the time of the Guide's publication the power of the Department of
Public Works to acquire scenic easements adjacent to state highways
was very limited.
Although acquisition of scenic easements is one of the methods
suggested for implementing the Master Plan for Scenic Highways,
it is rather clear that this was not initially viewed as one of the
major features of the California scenic highway program. But
passage of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 stimulated
interest in acquisition of scenic interests, and in 1966 the California
legislature adopted a Scenic Areas Act207 authorizing the Depart-
ment of Public Works,
if federal funds are available for reimbursement therefor, [to]
acquire, either in fee or in any lesser estate or interest, real property
adjacent to any highway included in the national system of inter-
state and defense highways or the federal-aid primary highway
system, which the department considers necessary for the preserva-
tion, maintenance or conservation of scenic lands or areas adjacent
to such highways or which it considers necessary to preserve,
improve or enhance the scenic beauty of or points of interest in the
lands or areas traversed by such highways. 208
2




2CAL. SmS. & H'WAYS CODE §§ 895-97 (West Supp. 1967).
208 CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE § 895 (West Supp. 1967).
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Currently, the Department of Public Works is engaged in plan-
ning for scenic area acquisition, both in connection with the State
Scenic Highway system and in connection with other state highways
which are eligible for federal 3 percent funds under Title III of the
Highway Beautification Act.
Pursuant to a legislative mandate appended to the 1966 Scenic
Areas Act, the California Department of Public Works recently
reported to the legislature on the progress made and the program
developed for the acquisition of scenic areas adjacent to highways
under the 1966 act.209 Since only federal-aid funds are to be used
for acquisition of scenic areas under the 1966 act, it was decided
that federal policies and procedures would be the basic controls in
the acquisition program. The policies and procedures are set out in
Bureau of Public Roads Policy and Procedure Memorandum No.
21-4.6, dated January 24, 1966.
Pursuant to this memorandum, and to the directive contained in
Title III of the Highway Beautification Act with respect to the
making of a detailed estimate of the cost of carrying out the pro-
visions of the Act, preparations for making the required estimate
were started in California in late May 1966. The completed estimate
encompassed several facets of the Beautification Program, including
junkyard and billboard control, costs of landscaping, rest area and
scenic overlook construction, in addition to the costs of scenic area
acquisition. A part of the estimate is an inventory of scenic areas
which have an "intrinsic scenic beauty" and which are desirable to
preserve against future alteration or destruction. Selection teams
chose a total of 136 scenic areas adjacent to the Interstate system,
and 658 areas adjacent to the primary system. Interstate scenic
areas totaled approximately 27,300 acres to be protected at an ap-
proximate cost of $7,644,000; and the primary areas covered 94,400
acres to be protected at an estimated cost of $55,826,000.210
The teams were guided in scenic area selection by the following
criteria, in addition to those formulated by the Bureau of Public
Roads:
1. The area should contain features which would attract the eye of
a passing motorist, such as:
a. typical pastoral scenes containing an expanse of open land
and interesting cultural elements;
209 DIVISION OF HIGHWAYS, CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF PUBLIC WORKS, REPORT ON ACQuI-
SITION OF SCENIC AREAS ADJACENT TO STATE HIGHWAYS (Dec. 1966), prepared
pursuant to Ch. 125, § 3, [19661 Cal. Stats., (1st Ex. Sess.).210 Id. at 8-9. Bureau of Public Roads estimate requirements included the establishment
of a class of area designated as "Top Quality," generally defined as including the
most desirable areas from a scenic viewpoint. The California totals of the "Top
Quality" scenic areas showed 63 areas aggregating 9,238 acres at an estimated acqui-
sition cost of $5,262,000 for the Interstate System and 273 areas aggregating 38,531




b. attractive or interesting growth of natural shrubs, vines,
trees, or timber stands;
c. views of water or wetlands, such as lakes, stream beds or
ocean shores;
d. interesting rock outcroppings or other geologic formations,
such as bluffs or cliff faces;
e. mountain or alpine valley views;
f. selected desert views;
g. attractive urban landscape views; and
h. historically interesting and appealing sites.
2. The area should be outlined, if possible, by natural features.
a. In the absence of natural boundaries, the area should be long
enough to hold the attention of a motorist traveling 50 miles
per hour, or approximately 73 feet per second, for at least
thirty seconds - or roughly 2200 feet.
b. The maximum width of the area should generally be limited
to that in which billboard controls may be exercised, although
it may be narrower or wider in special circumstances.
3. The areas should be spaced so as to make a trip interesting and
pleasant, assuming that the features of intervening spaces may
be altered considerably.
a. Along highways having heavy traffic volumes, areas may be
closer together than along highways having a lighter traffic
volume.
b. In continuous forest, areas may be spaced at fairly long inter-
vals and selection should be governed by interesting terrain
points.
c. In open country, areas may be infrequent.
d. In any long mileage of similar terrain, selection should be
dictated by points of interest.
4. Consideration should be given to areas having possible sites for
scenic overlooks and rest areas.
5. Areas which will involve heavy and continuous maintenance
expenditures for brush control, erosion control or tree trim-
ming should be avoided.
6. Areas containing cultivated trees and vines should be avoided
because of the impossibility of enforcing a continuation of the
same usage.
7. Sites otherwise qualified and in danger of imminent adverse
development should receive highest priority.
8. Prior to the acquisition of scenic areas, each proposed location
will be reviewed by the Division of Highways' Landscape Archi-
tect for general conformance to these criteria. The Landscape
Architect will also establish a statewide priority list within the
framework and these criteria and Federal Standards. 21'
In California, the following general criteria have been estab-
lished for determining the property interest to be acquired in "scenic
lands or areas adjacent to" highways with federal 3 percent funds:
This interest may range from an easement for one specific pur-
pose which will not interfere at all with the owner's use of the land
to the complete fee title which will transfer all the owner's rights to
211 Id. at 11-13.
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the State. The present or potential use of the land and its natural
features will dictate the interest to be acquired.
The property interest to be acquired can range from a fee
simple interest to minimal controls on scenic lands adjacent to the
highway. In any event only the minimum property interest necessary
to preserve the scenic attributes of the highway will be acquired.
An example of fee acquisition might be where the value of the
land depends upon its timber resource potential, and the owner will
be prevented from harvesting any trees.
Essentially, remaining value to the owner determines whether
or not fee title should be taken. When the acquisition of lesser inter-
est is indicated, consideration will be given to the taking of only
negative rights or to both negative and positive rights.
In the instance of an acquisition to preserve a view of open
farmland, only a negative right may be necessary, e.g., to prevent the
farmer from developing an unsightly materials pit, or prevent the
cutting of trees or other natural growth, or erecting signs.
In the instance of an acquisition of a site which is necessary
to preserve an alpine valley view, it may be necessary to acquire
negative rights to prevent the owner from taking the above-
mentioned actions, and a positive right to allow the State to trim
trees and brush to open up the view. 212
It should be noted that the scenic area acquisition program
under the 1966 Scenic Areas Act, which is to be entirely funded by
federal 3 percent funds under the Highway Beautification Act, is
not designed to supplant, or conflict with, California's scenic high-
way program under the 1963 Scenic Highways Act. 213 At the present
time these are separate programs, but in the future as more funds
become available they are likely to become more integrated. -1 4
Several hundred miles of the proposed scenic highway system
are now included in the Interstate system, so that federal 3 percent
funds can be used for scenic interest acquisition along this part of
the scenic highway system pursuant to the Bureau of Public Roads
Memorandum of January 24, 1966, which sets the highest priority
on "the acquisition of interests in strips of land necessary for the
... purposes [stated in the Highway Beautification Act] that are
adjacent to Interstate System highways." Since all or most of the
remaining mileage of the proposed scenic highway system con-
sists of primary highways, federal 3 percent funds can ultimately
also be used for scenic interest acquisition along these primary
highways, which constitute the second highest priority under the
Bureau of Public Roads Memorandum.
For the 1966-1967 fiscal year, the Bureau of Public Roads
made an exception to its general priorities for the use of federal
212 Id. at 14-15.
213 Id. at 17.
214 Letter from John B. Matheny, Assistant Chief Counsel, Division of Contracts and
Rights of Way (Legal), Department of Public Works, State of California Transporta-
tion Agency, to the author, June 22, 1967.
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3 percent funds and approved a "balanced program" for the use
of some $5 million appropriated for use in California. This balanced
program includes roadside planting and acquisition of rest areas,
vista points, and scenic areas.215
As previously indicated, the Department of Parks and Recre-
ation has broad authority to acquire scenic easements under the
California Parkway Act of 1965.16 Preliminary plans for develop-
ment of a state parkway system include the following policy
statement:
Scenic easements must be obtained along the corridor to retain
the present character of the land or assure the scenic quality of future
development through set-back, height, lot size, landscaped buffers,
use of land, tree cutting and other types of restrictions. No arbitrary
acreage is recommended to be included in easements (the national
parkway standards call for an average of 25 acres per mile). 21
However, the California Parkway Act of 1965 expressly provides:
The cost of parkway construction shall be expended from funds
other than those available for state highway construction. The
Department of Parks and Recreation may also accept grants on
behalf of the state and may accept financial or other assistance for,
or in aid of, the state parkway system.218
Under this limitation, it is not clear whether federal 3 percent funds
could be used for scenic easement acquisition in connection with the
development of the proposed parkway system. Of course, such funds
could not be used unless the parkway roads were part of the federal-
aid primary or secondary system, which is unlikely to be the case
except where parkways are established along existing state high-
ways superseded by freeways or along existing county highways.
C. Experience and Current Plans With Regard to Scenic Easements
in Other States
As previously indicated,2"9 the Bureau of Public Roads had
obligated a total of $59.5 million, as of June 30, 1966, for land-
scaping and scenic enhancement pursuant to Title III of the High-
way Beautification Act. Under the stimulus of this federal funding,
it appears that all or most of the states have begun to develop pro-
grams for the "restoration, preservation, and enhancement of scenic
beauty adjacent to" their federal-aid highways. In most of the states
215 The "balanced program" is set out in DIVISION OF HIGHWAYS REPORT, supra note
209, at 20. Confirmation of federal approval of this balanced program is contained
in letter, supra note 214.
216 CAL. STS. & H'wAYs CODE §§ 885-87.5 (West Supp. 1967).
217 CALIFORNIA REsOURCES AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND RECREATION, CALI-
FORNIA PARKWAYS: PRELIMINARY REPORT 30 (Dec. 1966) (prepared pursuant to
CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE § 886 (West. Supp. (1967)).
218 CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE § 887.5 (West Supp. 1967).
219 Text accompanying notes 1-2 supra.
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where there is adequate enabling legislation,22 ° these programs
include acquisition of scenic easements, and a few states (in addition
to those with pre-Beautification Act scenic easement programs) have
already started the acquisition of scenic easements.
A questionnaire sent to all of the states known to have scenic
easement enabling legislation brought answers from 19 state highway
agencies (in addition to California and Wisconsin). In eight
22 ' of
these 19 states, scenic easement acquisition has already begun; in
nine,222 planning is under way but no scenic easements have yet
been acquired. Montana plans to acquire all scenic strips in fee
simple and to resell the land subject to scenic restrictions at a later
date. And Oregon plans to acquire and retain title to all scenic
strips in fee simple. Of the eight states where scenic easement
acquisition is already under way, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, and
Minnesota appear to have the most vigorous programs.
In Illinois,2 3 approximately $6 million of federal funds have
been obligated for scenic enhancement pursuant to Title III of
the Highway Beautification Act. Of this amount, about $750,000
has been allocated for scenic easement acquisition. At the inception
of the Illinois scenic acquisition program, each of the highway
districts selected a number of widely dispersed sites for scenic ease-
ment acquisition. Currently, however, the question of location is
under reconsideration. Present thinking is that the highway agency
should acquire scenic easements along both sides of the highway
for substantial distances in the most scenic areas of Illinois. If
this approach is adopted, it may result in acquisition of scenic
easements along highway stretches of 15 miles or more adjacent
to rivers or extending through rolling and hilly areas offering
a panoramic view. To date, the Illinois highway agency has acquired
three scenic easements, none of which exceeds one-fourth mile in
length. The total amount expended for these scenic easements, all
acquired by negotiated purchase, is about $61,000.
In Iowa,12 4 the highway commission has already acquired scenic
easements covering more than 500 acres, as well as almost 100 acres
in fee simple, at a total cost of $44,000 exclusive of engineering
and negotiation costs. The Iowa highway commission is planning
220 See section III of text supra. At least 40 states now appear to have adequate enabling
legislation.
221 Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Ohio, and Texas.
222 Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Rhode
Island, and West Virginia.
22 Letter from Allen R. Austin, Engineer of Right of Way, Division of Highways, Illi-
nois Department of Public Works and Buildings, to the author, Nov. 29, 1967.
22 Letter from Robert W. Pratt, Assistant Right of Way Planner, Iowa State Highway
Commission, to the author, Nov. 7, 1967.
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for ultimate acquisition of 377 scenic parcels - 58 on the Interstate
system and 319 on the primary system. In a majority of these parcels,
a scenic easement rather than a fee simple estate will be acquired.
Out of the total of $1,810,216 in federal funds obligated to Iowa
for 1966-1967, $380,270 will be used to acquire scenic easements,
and the remainder will be used to acquire highway rest areas. To date,
all scenic easements have been acquired by negotiated purchase,
and the Iowa highway commission plans to avoid use of its power
to condemn during the first five years or so of the acquisition program.
In Michigan,22 5 although no accurate figures on actual acqui-
sitions are available, it is clear that the program now under way is
very substantial. A total of some 223 scenic acquisitions, involving
sites averaging five acres, has been programmed. For 1968, $760,000
has been budgeted for acquisition of scenic strips - 175 strips on
the Interstate system and 12 on the primary system - and 75 sites
have already been selected on the Interstate system. Acquisition of
scenic strips in southern Michigan has been given priority since
that is where most of the state's population is located. In general,
wooded areas (especially along lakes and streams) have been
selected. To date, it would appear that most scenic strips adjacent
to limited-access highways have been acquired in fee simple. In the
future, as acquisition along free-access highways begins, more exten-
sive use of scenic easements is planned. Initial acquisitions in
northern Michigan will be in fee simple, for scenic overlooks or
turnouts, but it is hoped that the scenic easement device can be
used in later acquisitions there. To date, most scenic strip acquisitions
in Michigan have been by negotiated purchase.
In Minnesota,"' since 1965, the highway department has con-
ducted a statewide inventory of scenic areas adjacent to Interstate
and trunk highways in connection with the allocation of federal
highway beautification funds for the fiscal years 1966 and 1967.
Some priority was given to scenic areas along the Great River Road.
The total amount of federal funds obligated to date for scenic
enhancement in Minnesota pursuant to Title III is $1,204,047, of
which $1,042,866 is to be used for scenic easement acquisition and
the remainder for acquisition of highway rest areas. The total planned
program of scenic easement acquisition in Minnesota calls for acqui-
sition of easements covering approximately 8,872 acres and protect-
ing about 218 miles adjacent to the Interstate and trunk highway
2 Interview with J.E. Burton and personnel of the Michigan Department of State High-
ways, Sept. 19, 1967.
220 Letters from Leo A. Korth, Director of Right of Way Operations, Minnesota Depart-
ment of Highways, to the author, May 5 & Oct. 25, 1967.
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systems. At present, a total of six scenic easement parcels has been
purchased (two on the Interstate and four on the trunk highway
system). Offers to purchase have been made on 34 parcels (six on
the Interstate and 28 on the trunk highway system). One hundred
fifty-seven parcels are in the appraisal stage (71 on the Interstate
and 86 on the trunk highway system), and title information has been
ordered on 385 parcels (52 on the Interstate and 333 on the trunk
highway system).
Of the states where planning for scenic easement acquisition
is currently in progress, only Maryland and New York have really
had prior experience with highway scenic easements.
In Maryland,"7 scenic easements - under the name of "high-
way protective easement areas" -were acquired along the Baltimore-
Washington Parkway during the early stages of construction. It was
found, however, that the prohibition against billboards, auto junk-
yards, et cetera, was so restrictive that it was necessary to pay practi-
cally the full fee simple value of the land for the "highway protec-
tive easement area." Consequently, the scenic easement approach
was soon abandoned and the right-of-way was widened to include
the desired scenic areas 8.2 2 But in 1966 Maryland adopted new legis-
lation which is broad enough to permit the highway agency to
acquire scenic easements. The Maryland highway beautification
program is still in the planning stage, and it is not clear whether
or not the scenic easement device will be used to a substantial extent.
The chairman of the State Roads Commission has indicated the Com-
mission believes that, "with the exception of large areas such as wet-
lands and hill side or mountain areas, the cost of acquiring an ease-
ment will very nearly approach the cost of securing the land in fee
simple."22 His conclusion is that,
if the State, in acquiring easements, has to pay a price approximat-
ing that of its fee simple value, then the most reasonable approach
for the State to take is to acquire such land in fee simple, thus shed-
ding itself of the necessity for perpetual policing of land retained
in private ownership, the cost of which could well exceed the value
of the land secured. 280
In New York, 28' the State Thruway Authority originally sought
to protect its right-of-way through a combination of the police power
22 Letter from Jerome B. Wolff, Chairman of the Maryland Roads Commission and
Director of Highways, to the author, Nov. 13, 1967.
See Moser, Methods Used to Protect or Preserve and Acquire Rights of Way for
Future Use in Maryland, in HIGHWAY RESEARcH BOARD BULL. No. 77, at 52
(1953).
29 Letter, supra, note 227.
2o Id.
31 Letter from Saul J. Corwin, General Counsel, New York Department of Public
Works, to the author, May 22, 1967.
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and easements. Signs have been prohibited by the state's police power
up to a distance of 500 feet from the edge of the roadway. Beyond
this point the Thruway Authority purchased 1,000-foot easements in
scattered areas to prohibit billboards. These easements were acquired
at the same time as the rights-of-way.3 2 But extension of the scenic
(anti-billboard) easement approach to other state highways was
halted by the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Schul-
man v. People,2" 3 holding that the New York Department of Public
Works had no statutory authority to condemn negative easements
to prohibit billboards adjacent to state highways. Since the Depart-
ment construed the Schulman holding as precluding acquisition of
scenic (anti-billboard) easements "by grant or purchase" as well as
by condemnation, the net result was to halt acquisition of such ease-
ments entirely in 1961. However, in response to the Highway Beauti-
fication Act of 1965, the New York legislature in 1966 enacted a
statute234 authorizing the superintendent of public works "to acquire
property for the restoration, preservation and enhancement of natural
or scenic beauty of areas traversed by state highways." The term
"property" as used in the statute is defined very broadly and clearly
includes scenic easements. But the New York scenic easement pro-
gram appears still to be in the planning stage. Extensive studies have
been undertaken, and a total of $3,030,484 in federal funds was
obligated to New York for highway landscaping and scenic enhance-
ment as of June 30, 1966.285
In Montana,2 a6 the decision has been made to proceed along
quite different lines than in most other states. Because the highway
commission is uncertain about the restrictions that will be required
to maintain adequate control of scenic strips, a fee simple title in
such strips will be acquired initially, and the highway commission
will "live with them for a period of about two years."2 7 At the
end of that period the highway commission will attempt to resell
the scenic strips subject to whatever restrictions it then believes to
be necessary. The grantor will be permitted to use the land for agri-
cultural or grazing purposes for a nominal fee during the period of
fee simple ownership by the state, if he so desires, and he will have
232See W. WHYTE, SECURING OPEN SPACE FOR URBAN AMERICA: CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS 14 (Urban Land Institute Tech. Bull. No. 36, 1959).
10 N.Y.2d 249, 176 N.E.2d 817 (1961).
34 N.Y. H'WAY LAW § 21 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REPORT ON 1967 HIGHWAY BEAUTIFICATION PROGRAM,
S. Doc. No. 6, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (Comm. Print 1967).
23- Letter from Robert E. Crampton, Chief Right of Way Agent, Montana Highway
Commission, to the author, Oct. 27, 1967. It should be noted that the Montana






the right to match the high bid when the land is resold unless he
voluntarily relinquishes this right in advance.288
In Oregon,2 39 although the highway commission acquired in
1946 an interest somewhat like a scenic easement2 40 for the purpose
of preserving a grove of myrtle trees along the Oregon Coast High-
way, it does not propose to use any federal funds received under
Title III of the Highway Beautification Act for acquisition of scenic
easements. This is because most scenic areas are located in forested
areas, and the highway commission would have to pay the value of
the standing timber whether it acquired a fee simple or only a scenic
easement. Moreover, the problems of managing the standing timber
under a scenic easement arrangement would be extremely difficult.
On the other hand, acquisition of scenic forest land in fee simple will
allow the highway commission to develop the land for public rec-
reational use.
The scenic easement deed forms developed for use in Iowa,
Michigan, and Minnesota resemble, in general, the forms used in
Wisconsin in the late 1950's and early 1960's.41 The land-use restric-
tions in the Iowa, Michigan, and Minnesota deed forms are practi-
cally identical.24 2 The Iowa form contains a list of "permitted
238 The advantages of the purchase and resale technique are as follows:
(a) the appraisal problem will be minimized; (b) there is less likelihood of
disagreement as to value; (c) the chance for successful negotiation of a
purchase is increased by permitting the owner a low-cost use of the land
during the period of fee simple ownership by the state, with a probable
opportunity to repurchase a substantial interest in the land at a reasonable
price later on; (d) the danger of acquiring an inadequate property interest
at the outset is avoided; (e) the highway department will have adequate
time to determine what restrictions will be necessary for proper control of
each individual site; (f) a public resale of the "excess" property rights
should result in the lowest net cost of the scenic interest to be retained by
the state. The former owner will have the right to match the high bid in the
public sale unless he voluntarily relinquishes this right in advance.Id.
239 Letter from D.H. Moehring, Right of Way Engineer, Oregon State Highway Depart-
ment, to the author, Oct. 23, 1967.
240 For the text of the easement see Lindas, Western Experience with Scenic View and
Protection Easements, in HIGHWAY RESEARCH CIRCULAR No. 23, at 10 (Apr. 1966).
241 See text accompanying notes 160-73 supra.
242 In the Iowa form, e.g., the restrictions are as follows:
(1 ) No use or occupation other than the aforementioned uses shall be estab-
lished or maintained within the boundaries of this easement area. (2) No
dumps for the disposal of ashes, trash, rubbish, sawdust, garbage, offal or
any unsightly and offensive material shall exist. Storage of accumulated
junked automobiles, farm implements or parts thereof and other salvaged
material now existing shall be terminated upon the date of this instrument.
(3) No overhead pipes, conduits or wires for the purpose of transmitting
message, heat, light or power shall be erected. (4) No trees or shrubs shall
be planted, destroyed, cut or removed from this area except as are incidental
to a permitted occupation or use of the property or required for reasons of
sanitation or disease control, and except for selective cutting of timber or
other soil and game conservation practices as permitted in writing by the
grantee. (5) No rights are to be granted to the general public to enter upon
this area for any purpose.
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uses"24 like that in the early Wisconsin forms. The Minnesota form
expressly authorizes continuance of "the present use of the scenic
area, including any present use not herein specifically set forth, in a
manner not inconsistent with the above described terms and condi-
tions" (i.e., restrictions). The Michigan form does not expressly
authorize continuance of present uses, and provides that "no new or
additional structures shall be constructed upon the scenic area with-
out a written permit from the Michigan State Highway Commis-
sion." The Minnesota form contains a similar provision, requiring a
written permit to construct any new or additional structure "within
one hundred (100) feet of the trunk highway right of way as now
established." Although new utility lines are a "permitted use" in the
Iowa form, the Michigan and Iowa forms require a written permit
from the state highway agency before new utility lines can be in-
stalled within the scenic easement area.
The Iowa, Michigan, and Minnesota easement forms all provide
that the general public shall have no right to enter upon the scenic
easement area for any purpose. All three also provide that the state
and its agents shall have the right to enter upon the scenic easement
area to inspect, to enforce the scenic restrictions, to remove from the
easement area any unauthorized advertising devices or other materi-
als, to cut and remove brush, undergrowth, dead or diseased trees,
and to perform selective tree cutting and trimming in the easement
area. The Iowa form also authorizes the state or its agents to revege-
tate the area with grass or trees for conservation purposes.
In Illinois, different forms of scenic easement deeds have been
prepared to deal with different situations, e.g., a "woodland scenic
easement," a "cropland scenic easement," and a "grazing land scenic
easement." The restrictions in all these Illinois forms are somewhat
more extensive than those in the Iowa, Michigan, and Minnesota
forms.
2 4 4
D (1) General crop or livestock farming, including construction, erection,
maintenance, and repair of buildings incidental to such use, also the estab-
lishment of recommended conservation practices. (2) Any other use specified
as existing upon or within the restricted area at the time of execution of
this contract may continue but shall not be expanded, nor shall any struc-
tures be erected or structural alterations be permitted within the boundaries
of this easement. (3) Underground telephone, telegraph, electric or pipe
lines for the purpose of transmitting any message, heat, light or power.
(4) Signs of not more than square feet in size may be erected, under
rules and regulations promulgated from time to time by the Iowa State
Highway Commission, to advertise the sale or rental of personal property
and real property and to advertise activities being conducted on the property
where the signs are located.
The Illinois restrictions are too extensive to set forth here. The "cropland scenic ease-




V. SOME CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
A. "Public Purpose" and "Public Use" Requirements for Use of
Eminent Domain and Expenditure of Public Funds
Although Title III of the Highway Beautification Act 245 pro-
vides for allocation to each state of federal funds equivalent to 3 per-
cent of the funds apportioned to that state for federal-aid highways
for any fiscal year, to be "used for landscape and roadside develop-
ment within the highway right-of-way and for acquisition of interests
in and improvement of strips of land necessary for the restoration,
preservation, and enhancement of scenic beauty adjacent to such
highways,... without being matched by the State," many states pre-
sumably will want to supplement the federal funds available under
Title III with additional funds of their own. But expenditure of
state funds for other than a "public purpose" is generally prohibited
by the state constitutions.2 46 Hence it will be important in many
states to determine whether acquisition of scenic easements in con-
nection with the highway beautification program involves a public
purpose.
Moreover, although most scenic easements will undoubtedly be
acquired by negotiated purchase, ability of the state highway agency
to exercise the power of eminent domain will be absolutely neces-
sary to the success of any scenic easement acquisition program. With-
out that ability, it may prove impossible to persuade many landown-
ers to sell at a reasonable price, and in any case it will be impossible
to deal with the inevitable few hold-outs. But almost all state con-
stitutions allow the taking of private property by eminent domain
245 78 Stat. 1028, § 301(a), amending 23 U.S.C. § 319 (Supp. I, 1966).
246 See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 6; HAwAu CONST. art. VI, § 6; LA. CONST. art.
art. IV, § 8; Mo. CONST. art. X, § 3; TEx. CONST. art. VIII, § 3. Other state con-
stitutions prohibit either a grant of public money or a loan of the state's credit to
private individuals, associations, or corporations. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 94;
ARiz. CONST. art. IX, § 7; CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 31; COLO. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1
& 2; DEL. CONST. art. VIII, § 8; N.M. CONST. art. IX, § 14; N.Y. CONST. art. VII,
§ 8. See also NEv. CONST. art. 8, § 9; N.J. CoNsT. art. VIII, § III, para. 3. And a
great many of the state constitutions simply prohibit the giving or lending of the
state's credit to private individuals, associations, or corporations. See, e.g., ARK.
CONST. art. XVI, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 10; GA. CONST. art. VII, § III, para.
IV; IDAHO CONST. art. VIII, § 2; IOWA CONST. art. VII, § 1; Ky. CONST. § 177;
MD. CONST. art. III, § 34; MINN. CONST. art. IX, § 10; MIss. CONST. art. 14, § 258;
OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 4; OKLA. CONST. art. X, § 15; PA. CONST. art. IX, § 6;
S.C. CONST. art. X, § 6; TENN. CONST. art II, § 31; TEx. CONST. art. III, § 50;
UTAH CONST. art. 6, § 31; VA. CONST. art. XIII, § 185; WASH. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 5; W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 6; Wis. CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
Provisions which merely prohibit the giving or lending of the state's credit to
private persons have generally been construed to prohibit expenditure of public
funds for any purpose which is not "public" in nature.
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only for "public use, ''247 and a statute authorizing the taking of pri-
vate property for other than "public use" will violate the fourteenth
amendment's prohibition against deprivation of property without due
process of law.248 Hence it becomes important to determine whether
the taking of a scenic easement by eminent domain is a taking for
public use as that term is judicially defined.
It should be clear, of course, that if the taking of a scenic ease-
ment by eminent domain meets the public use test, the expenditure
of public funds to pay the landowner for the easement acquired will
necessarily satisfy the "public purpose" test. On the other hand, a
determination that the taking serves a "public purpose" does not
self-evidently mean that the taking is for "public use." The major
difficulty in this regard arises from the fact that a scenic easement
is essentially a set of land-use restrictions imposed on private prop-
erty, and that the public does not acquire any affirmative "use"
privileges in the conventional sense.
For present purposes the two most important cases on the public
purpose and public use requirements are Berman v. Parker249 and
Kamrowski v. State.25° In the Berman case, the United States Supreme
Court sustained a congressional act authorizing urban redevelopment
in the District of Columbia against constitutional attack even though
the statute authorized the taking by eminent domain of private
property and the sale or lease thereof to other private persons for
private rather than public uses. The court explained its decision in the
following terms:
The power of Congress over the District of Columbia includes
all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over its affairs.
... We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has been known
as the police power. An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer
24 The Federal Constitution and all but three of the state constitutions contain provisions
which have been construed to protect the owner of private property from an exercise
of the power of eminent domain for purposes which do not involve a "public use."
Some state constitutions expressly forbid the taking of private property in invitum
for private uses. In a majority of states the negative implication of the conventional
condemnation clause - that private property shall not be taken for public use with-
out payment of just compensation -is used to protect a property owner from a
taking for private uses. Even in the three states which have no express constitutional
provision as to eminent domain, it has been held that other constitutional provisions
preclude the taking of private property for private use or without payment of just
compensation. Moreover, most state constitutions contain a clause prohibiting the
taking of property without due process of law, or some equivalent provision, and in
some instances the state courts have relied upon the state due process clause in hold-
ing a taking for private use unconstitutional, either because the eminent domain clause
had not then been adopted in the state in question or because the court was not satis-
fied with the implied prohibition contained in that clause.
For a more extended discussion, with citation of authorities, see 2 P. NICHOLS,
THE LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.1 (3d rev. ed. 1963).
4
8 Hairston v. Danville & W. Ry, 208 U.S. 598 (1908) ; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140,
40 Am. Dec. 274 (N.Y. 1843). For a discussion see 1 P. NICHOLS, supra note 247,
§ 4.7.
249 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
250 31 Wis. 2d 256, 142 N.W.2d 793 (1966).
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limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on its own facts. The
definition is essentially the product of legislative determinations
addressed to the purposes of government, purposes neither abstractly
nor historically capable of complete definition. Subject to specific
constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public
interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such
cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the
public needs to be served by social legislation .... This principle
admits of no exception merely because the power of eminent domain
is involved. The role of the judiciary in determining whether that
power is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow
one....
Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and
order - these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the
traditional application of the police power to municipal affairs. Yet
they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit
it ....
... The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive.
... The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic
as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to deter-
mine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.
In the present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have
made determinations that take into account a wide variety of values.
It is not for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District
of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as
well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands
in the way.
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right
to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the
power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end.
251
Although it is obvious that the Supreme Court in Berman used
the term "police power" in its broadest sense, as constituting the
totality of legislative power - including the power of eminent
domain - rather than simply the power to regulate, many state
courts have relied on the Berman dictum as to aesthetic values in
sustaining aesthetic zoning under the police power.25 2 Whether the
Berman case really supports "aesthetic regulation" or not, it seems
clear that the case does support both the use of public funds and the
use of eminent domain to acquire scenic easements, which are
designed to forward aesthetic values and to make the community
beautiful.
Although the Berman case did not - and could not - decide
that the fourteenth amendment permits the exercise of state eminent
domain powers for purposes which do not involve any "use by the
public" in the narrow sense, or primarily for aesthetic purposes, the
case did decide that the fifth amendment permits this when the
251 348 U.S. at 31-33.
252 See, e.g., State ex. rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 271-
72, 69 N.W.2d 217, 222 (1955).
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power of Congress is challenged.258 And it is improbable that the
Supreme Court will apply different standards in dealing with an
attack on state scenic easement enabling legislation based on the
fourteenth amendment. It thus seems clear that the Supreme Court
will sustain state scenic easement enabling legislation as against any
fourteenth amendment attack based on the arguments that land made
subject to scenic easement restrictions will not be available for use
by the public or that aesthetic purposes are not public purposes.
Moreover, the Berman opinion is likely to be viewed as a persuasive
precedent by state courts in dealing with attacks on scenic easement
enabling legislation grounded upon state constitutional provisions
as to public use and public purpose.
More significant even than Berman v. Parker, in all probability,
is the recent decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Kamrowski
v. State, specifically upholding the acquisition of scenic easements
under the power of eminent domain, as against the contention that
"public enjoyment of scenic beauty of certain land is not a public use
of such land." The Wisconsin court pointed out:
It is... clear that the legislature has determined that the protection
of scenic resources along highways is a public purpose, has set the
policy of acquiring scenic easements along particular routes, in
order to protect such resources, and has delegated to the state high-
way commission the function of deciding the exact terms of the ease-
ments to be acquired, and of exercising the power of eminent domain
to acquire them.
The concept of the scenic easement springs from the idea that
there is enjoyment and recreation for the travelling public in viewing
a relatively unspoiled natural landscape, and involves the judgment
that in preserving existing scenic beauty as inexpensively as pos-
sible a line can reasonably be drawn between existing, or agricul-
tural (and in these cases very limited residential) uses, and uses
which have not yet commenced but involve more jarring human
interference with a state of nature. We think both views can reason-
ably be held.
The learned trial judge succinctly answered plaintiffs' claim
that occupancy by the public is essential in order to have public use
by saying that in the instant case, "the 'occupancy' is visual." The
enjoyment of the scenic beauty by the public which passes along the
highway seems to us to be a direct use by the public of the rights in
land which have been taken in the form of a scenic easement, and
not a mere incidental benefit from the owner's private use of the
land.
Whatever may be the law with respect to zoning restrictions
based upon aesthetic considerations, a stronger argument can be
made in support of the power to take property, in return for just
compensation, in order to fulfill aesthetic concepts, than for the
2"The Berman case clearly held that use by the public is not required, and the dictum
in favor of aesthetic purposes is an extremely strong one.
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imposition of police power restrictions for such purposes. More
importantly, however, we consider that the concept of preserving a
scenic corridor along a parkway, with its emphasis upon maintaining
a rural scene and preventing unsightly uses is sufficiently definite so
that the legislature may be said to have made a meaningful decision
in terms of public purpose, and to have fixed a standard which
sufficiently guides the commission in performing its task.
2 5 4
There are two possible lines of attack on the public use issue.
First, following the Wisconsin court in Kamrowski, the courts could
simply hold that the "enjoyment of the scenic beauty by the public
which passes along the highway" is "a direct use by the public of the
rights in land which have been taken in the form of a scenic ease-
ment." Second, the courts might rely on cases holding "public use"
to mean simply public purpose, public benefit, or public welfare. In
substance, the Supreme Court did this in Berman v. Parker. And even
before the recent spate of cases dealing with the public use issue in
the urban renewal context, many courts tended to accept the broad
view that public use means only "public advantage, benefit, or wel-
fare," rather than the narrow view that public use requires the
property taken by condemnation to be available for use by the pub-
lic.215 5 Indeed, one scholarly comment published in 1949 was entitled,
The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Re-
quiem.256 The commentator concluded his discussion of the public
use doctrine in the state courts as follows:
The expanding social philosophy of the present century has
brought in the state courts an almost complete abandonment of the"use by the public" test. Symptomatic are the housing and slum
clearance cases of the last decade. In 1937, Congress enacted a hous-
ing statute which granted federal subsidies to states which would
condemn slum areas and construct homes for the use of families
which could not otherwise afford them. Eminent domain was, of
course, necessary to execute this program. Since, however, the dwell-
ings for which the eminent domain power was to be employed were
for the use of only those individuals who would lease them, such
acquisitions could well have run afoul of the "use by the public"
test. But twenty-two state courts of last resort have endorsed the
takings as being constitutionally unobjectionable ....
Although the "use by the public" test continues to be raised
occasionally by counsel litigating state takings, its effect is virtually
nil. Emptied of its only tangible content, the doctrine of "public
use" itself loses all practical significance. True, even a broad con-
cept of "public use" implies a limitation, and many state courts still
accord vocal acknowledgment to the concept. But they invariably
24 31 Wis. 2d at 263-66, 142 N.W.2d at 796-97.
255 See 2 P. NICHOLS, supra note 247, § 7.2 [2] and cases cited therein. Under this view
of "public use" it has been held that the scope of eminent domain has been made as
broad as the powers under the police and tax provisions of the constitution. Id. That,
in substance, was the holding in Berman v. Parker. For a state urban renewal case
which relied on prior decisions adopting the "broad view" see Gohld Realty Co. v.
City of Hartford, 141 Conn. 135, 104 A.2d 365 (1954).
25
6 58 YALE L.J. 599 (1949).
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find that the particular project under consideration is satisfactorily
public in nature.
25 7
Since 1949, many urban renewal cases have even more conclu-
sively established, in a majority of the states, that a public use suffi-
cient to justify the exercise of the eminent domain power can be
found whenever a substantial public purpose is involved in the gov-
ernmental action in question, viewed in its entirety.258
Six states259 avoided the "public use" issue by adopting consti-
tutional provisions specifically authorizing urban renewal programs
in which the resale of urban renewal land to private redevelopers is
a characteristic feature. In at least 28 states, 260 however, the courts,
without the aid of special constitutional provisions, have sustained
urban renewal statutes which authorize the use of eminent domain
to acquire land for urban renewal, and the resale of such land to
private agencies for redevelopment in accordance with a publicly
approved plan and subject to land-use restrictions designed to assure
continued compliance with that plan. The courts of these 28 states
have, in effect though not always in express terms, equated public
use with substantial public purpose.
Although most of the cases emphasize the public purpose and
public use (the terms are used interchangeably) involved in clear-
ance of slum and blighted areas, 6 ' some cases also recognize that
resale of urban renewal project land subject to restrictions which
limit its future use to publicly authorized purposes creates a kind of
continuing public use of the land.26 2 The parallel with a scenic ease-
ment program is clear, since the essence of a scenic easement is
restriction of the use of privately owned land to achieve a purpose
declared by the legislature to be a public purpose. Moreover, the
argument in support of scenic easements is enhanced since the resale
27 Id. at 607-08 (footnotes omitted).
258P. NICHOLS, supra note 247, § 7.51561 n.1 and 1967 supp., citing cases from
34 states upholding urban renewal enabling acts. For a similar list of 30 states,
with a useful classification of the cases, see Miller v. City of Tacoma, 61 Wash. 2d
374, 378 P.2d 464, 475-77 (1963) (appendix).
259 California, Georgia, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, and New York. See Miller v.
City of Tacoma, supra note 258. The Georgia constitutional amendment was a
response to Housing Authority v. Johnson, 209 Ga. 560, 74 S.E.2d 891 (1953),
holding the urban renewal program unconstitutional.
260 Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. Only South Carolina
is still clearly contra. See 2 P. NicHOLS, supra note 247, § 7.51561 n.1.
26 The opinion in Zurn v. City of Chicago, 389 111. 114, 128-29, 59 N.E.2d 18, 25
(1945) is typical. State court decisions on the constitutionality of urban renewal acts
authorizing the exercise of the eminent domain power have been significantly influ-
enced by the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Berman v. Parker, discussed
in text between notes 249 and 253 supra.
262 See, e.g., Gohld Realty Co. v. City of Hartford, 141 Conn. 135, 104 A.2d 365 (1954).
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to private users feature of urban renewal programs is completely
absent from the proposed scenic easement program.
Assuming that acquisition of scenic easements can be deemed
for a public use if it is for a public purpose, the next question is
whether a public purpose can be found where, admittedly, aesthetic
considerations form the principal basis for scenic easement acqui-
sition.
In the writer's opinion, there can be little doubt that in all, or
almost all states, if judicial determination is sought, acquisition of
scenic easements in connection with the highway beautification pro-
gram will be held to constitute a "public purpose."
In the first place, the adoption of Title III of the Highway
Beautification Act26 clearly expresses the judgment of the Congress
that expenditure of federal funds for acquisition of scenic easements
involves expenditure for a public purpose, and the action of some 38
state legislatures in adopting enabling legislation for acquisition of
scenic easements clearly expresses a similar judgment by these state
legislatures. As William H. Whyte has pointed out,264 something
serves a public purpose if the public thinks so, and this, in practice,
means what the legislative body thinks the public wants and what it
designates as a public purpose. Although courts do not always agree
with the legislative determination, they tend to accept it if other
constitutional requirements are met.2 5 This is graphically illustrated
by the decisions in Berman v. Parker26" and Kamrowski v. State,267
which were previously discussed. Kamrowski, of course, is directly
in point and holds that promotion of aesthetic values through acqui-
sition of scenic easements satisfies the public purpose requirement.
In the second place, the increasing judicial acceptance of aes-
thetic considerations - at least in combination with other factors -
as a proper basis for regulation of land use under the police power
23 78 Stat. 1028, amending 23 U.S.C. § 319 (Supp. I, 1966).
24 W. WHYTE, supra note 232, at 16.
265 As Netherton and Markham have pointed out.
Within the memory of many of us the scope of "public purpose" has
increased beyond all expectation. Legislative trends in this respect have
broadened to include many areas, and where the authority has been ques-
tioned, the courts have by and large upheld the constitutionality of the tak-
ings authorized by the legislatures.
R. NETHERTON & M. MARKHAM, ROADSIDE DEVELOPMENT AND BEAUTIFICATION:
LEGAL AUTHORITY AND METHODS, PART I, 20 (Highway Research Board, 1965).
For further discussion of the changing concept of public purpose with respect
to transportation, see R. NETHERTON, CONTROL OF HIGHWAY ACCESS 210-12 (1963).
266 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
218 31 Wis. 2d 256, 142 N.W.2d 793 (1966).
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indicates the likelihood of general judicial acceptance of the preserva-
tion of scenic beauty as a public purpose.
There has been a truly prodigious amount of discussion as to
whether aesthetics is a proper goal of police power regulation.
26 8
The original strict doctrine that property rights cannot be regulated
for aesthetic purposes soon ran strongly against the felt necessities
of the times, and the strict doctrine gave way to the rule that aesthetic
considerations may be taken into account in drafting police power
regulations, so long as other, non-aesthetic considerations also pro-
vide some support for the regulations involved. As Norman Wil-
liams, Jr., has pointed out,
260
Once this door was open, all sorts of things went right through;
elaborate legal fiction began to luxuriate, as courts attempted to
uphold regulations which are really aesthetic. The classic example
is of course the argument in favor of regulating billboards, because
after all they might blow over and hit somebody, or because immoral
and terrible things might go on behind them. [Citing Thomas Cusack
Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); St. Louis Gunning Advertis-
ing Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911), appealdis-
missed 231 U.S. 761 (1913) .... I
In more recent case law, a strong trend is apparent towards
increasing recognition of the aesthetic factor.
270
The formula that aesthetic considerations may be recognized as
a basis for police power restrictions on land use, so long as other
factors are also present, is still repeated in many judicial opinions,
but a number of recent cases have given direct recognition to the
268 See, e.g., Agnor, Beauty Begins a Comeback: Aesthetic Considerations in Zoning,
11 J. PUB. L. 260 (1962); Anderson, Regulation of Land Use for Aesthetic Pur-
poses: An Appraisal of People v. Stover, 15 SYRACUSE L. REv. 33 (1963); Anderson,
Architectural Controls, 12 SYRACUsE L. REV. 26 (1960) ; Dukeminier, Zoning for
Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 218 (1955);
Rodda, Accomplishment of Aesthetic Purposes Under the Police Power, 27 S. CAL.
L. REV. 149 (1954) ; Sayre, Aesthetics and Property Values: Does Zoning Promote
the Public Welfare?, 35 A.B.A.J. 471 (1949). Examples of student writing on
aesthetics include the following Comments: 64 COLUM. L. REV. 81 (1964) ; 14 DE-
PAUL L. REV. 104 (1964); 29 FORDHAM L. REV. 729 (1961); 32 U. QN. L. REV.
367 (1963) ; 2 WILLAMETTE L.J. 420 (1963).
269 Williams, Legal Techniques to Protect and to Promote Aesthetics Along Transporia-
tion Corridors, in HIGHWAY RESEARCH REcoRD No. 182, HIGHWAYS AND ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY (Highway Research Board, 1967). The text discussion of police




0 Id. at 28-29. See, e.g., Bittenbender v. Tibbetts, 105 N.H. 481, 202 A.2d 232 (1964);
People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 191 N.E.2d 272 (1963);
Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1960) ; Opinion of the Justices,
333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955); Borough of Point Pleasant Beach v. Point
Pleasant Pavilion, Inc., 3 N.J. Super. 222, 66 A.2d 40 (App. Div. 1949) ; Murphy
v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944) ; City of Miami Beach
v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d 364 (1941) ; General Outdoor Adver-
tising Co. v. Dep't of Public Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935). See also
United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 198 A.2d 447 (1964);
Town of Lexington v. Govenar, 295 Mass. 31, 3 N.E.2d 19 (1936).
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aesthetic factor alone as a valid basis for police power regulations. 271
Of course, the case for aesthetic regulations is much stronger in situa-
tions where preservation of beauty plays a substantial part in the
local economy, e.g., by promoting tourism .
72
The aesthetic regulations restricting land use sustained by the
courts have generally involved signs and architectural controls. The
exclusion of advertising signs from commercial as well as residential
districts has been widely upheld,273 as have restrictions on signs along
both our older highways274 and our new interstate highways, 27 5 and
retroactive provisions requiring removal of signs after a fairly short
period of amortization. 76 Moreover, the protection of historic areas
by police power regulations establishing architectural controls over
changes in the exterior appearance of buildings is now well estab-
lished.2 77 Indeed, courts have even sustained some rather dubious
ordinances imposing architectural controls on new houses in areas
with no historic character whatever.278
All the cases supporting aesthetic zoning are based upon judicial
recognition of the fact that preservation or enhancement of aesthetic
271 See State ex. rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d
217 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955); People v. Stover, Sunad, Inc. v. City
of Sarasota, Borough of Point Pleasant Beach v. Point Pleasant Pavilion, Inc., City of
Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Dep't of
Public Works, cited note 270 supra. See also the dissenting opinion of Hall, J., in
United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 198 A.2d at 450. In many of
these cases, of course, the courts found other factors which justified the imposition of
aesthetic zoning - usually economic factors, e.g., State ex rel. Civello v. City of
New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440, 33 A.L.R. 260 (1923).
272 See, e.g., Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, Opinion of the Justices, Murphy v. Town
of Westport, City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., cited note 270 supra.
2
73 See, e.g., United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, Murphy v. Town of
Westport, cited note 270 supra.
274 E.g., Kelbro, Inc. v. Myrick, 113 Vt. 64, 30 A.2d 527 (1943); General Outdoor
Advertising Co. v. Dep't of Public Works, supra note 270.
275 E.g., Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425, 200 N.E.2d 328 (1964);
Moore v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. 1964); New York State Thruway Authority
v. Ashley Motor Court, 10 N.Y.2d 151, 176 N.E.2d 566 (1961); Opinion of the
Justices, 103 N.H. 268, 169 A.2d 762 (1962).
276 See, e.g., Grant v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363
(1957). But see Stoner McCray System v. Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1313, 78 N.W.2d
843, 58 A.L.R.2d 1304 (1956). Compare City of Santa Barbara v. Modern Neon Sign
Co., 189 Cal. App. 2d 188, 11 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1961) with National Advertising Co.
v. Monterey County, 211 Cal. App. 2d 375, 27 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1962).
277 See, e.g., Vieux Carre Property Owners & Associates, Inc. v. City of New Orleans,
246 La. 788, 167 So. 2d 367 (1964) (Vieux Carre) ; City of New Orleans v. Levy,
223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953) (same) ; City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 198
La. 852, 5 So.2d 129 (1941) (same) ; Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass. 773, 128
N.E.2d 557 (1955) (Nantucket and Siasconset) ; Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass.
783, 128 N.E.2d 563 (1955) (Beacon Hill) ; Bittenbender v. Tibbetts, 105 N.H. 481,
202 A.2d 232 (1964); City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389
P.2d 13 (1964) (Old Santa Fe) ; Manhattan Club v. Landmarks Preservation Com-
mission, 51 Misc. 2d 556, 273 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (Jerome House). Cf.
Hankins v. Borough of Rockleigh, 55 N.J. Super. 132, 150 A.2d 63 (1959) ; Hayes
v. Smith, 92 R.I. 173, 167 A.2d 546 (1961).
278 See State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d
217 (1955); Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d
74 (1963). Compare City of West Palm Beach v. State ex rel. Duffey, 158 Fla. 863,
30 So. 2d 491 (1947).
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values is an appropriate goal of governmental action and that the
use of the police power is an appropriate means for achieving the
goal. Thus it seems clear that preservation or enhancement of scenic
beauty through acquisition of scenic easements will be held to be a
public purpose in any state where the courts have accepted aesthetic
zoning as a valid exercise of the police power. And if police power
regulation is an appropriate means for achieving the governmental
objective, then a fortiori the expenditure of public funds to acquire
scenic easements is an appropriate method in cases where compensa-
tion must, or should, be paid to the landowners whose property is
subjected to scenic restrictions.
Moreover, it is likely that acquisition of scenic easements will
be held to involve a public purpose in many states where aesthetic
zoning has not yet been tested or upheld. The real problem with
aesthetic zoning is not whether aesthetic values should be recognized
as a basis for land-use regulation, but rather, how to define standards
for aesthetic regulation so as to avoid giving too much discretion to
an administrative agency.
279
Everyone will admit that there are real difficulties in defining
objectively what is beautiful. Indeed, the New Jersey court recently
gave up the attempt and adopted a lowest common denominator
approach-i.e., whatever the difficulty in defining "beauty," the
police power may be used to exclude those land uses which by univer-
sal consensus are recognized as "ugly. ' 280 But when we shift from un-
compensated regulation of land use under the police power to
expenditure of public funds for acquisition of scenic easements, the
problem of defining beauty becomes much less important; or, more
accurately, it becomes much less important for the courts to oversee
the legislative or administrative definition of "beauty" because the
landowner will receive either satisfactory compensation through a
negotiated purchase or just compensation in eminent domain pro-
ceedings. Hence the courts are more likely to sustain a scenic ease-
ment acquisition program than a scenic zoning program.
28
1
The cases directly upholding control of advertising along our
highways282 appear to provide strong support for the proposition
that acquisition of scenic easements adjacent to highways is for a
public purpose and designed to produce a public benefit. In some
of the billboard cases aesthetic considerations are expressly recog-
nized as a sufficient basis for regulation of billboards under the
2 See Williams, supra note 269, at 28.
280 United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 198 A.2d 447 (1964).
281 See the last paragraph of the quote from Kamrowski in the text at note 254, supra.
282 Cases cited notes 274-75 supra.
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police power. In General Outdoor Advertising Co v. Department of
Public Works, for example, the Massachusetts court said:
In so far as the granting or denial of permits for the location of bill-
boards in the cases at bar has been governed by considerations of
taste and fitness, the purpose has been to preserve places of natural
scenic beauty and historical interest from incongruous intrusion. It
is in substance exclusion of billboards and advertising devices by
zoning. It is an attempt to segregate them to a certain extent in places
where from the scenic or historical point of view the dominant use
of land is indifferent or is the transaction of business, and to shut
them out from regions where nature has afforded landscape of
unusual attractiveness and where historic and other factors have
created patriotic places hallowed by literary and humanitarian asso-
ciations.... [W]e think an administration of the rules and regula-
tions to the end that the scenic beauty of the commonwealth may be
protected and preserved violates no constitutional right of the plain-
tiffs. It is, in our opinion, within the reasonable scope of the police
power to preserve from destruction the scenic beauties bestowed on
the commonwealth by nature in conjunction with the promotion of
safety of travel on the public ways and the protection of travellers
from the intrusion of unwelcome advertising....
Even if the rules and regulations of billboards and other adver-
tising devices did not rest upon the safety of public travel and the
promotion of the comfort of travellers by exclusion of undesired
intrusion, we think that the preservation of scenic beauty and places
of historical interest would be a sufficient support for them.
2 8 8
More broadly, scenic easement acquisition can be viewed as ful-
filling important public purposes with respect to safety, recreation,
conservation, and the promotion of tourism.
Prohibition of billboards by means of the police power has
sometimes been upheld, at least in part, on the theory that it protects
the safety of the traveling public on the highways. 2 4 Where this
theory is accepted, it is clear that acquisition of scenic easements
which include a prohibition of billboards on the land adjacent to the
highway can be viewed, in part, as a public safety measure.
Scenic easement acquisition can also be viewed as a significant
means of providing for public recreation, a public purpose recog-
nized by the courts in many cases upholding land acquisition for
public parks.2 85 Driving for pleasure is America's most important
outdoor recreational activity. 286 More Americans engage in it more
283 193 N.E. at 816.
28 See the discussion id. at 813-14.
285E.g., Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707-08 (1923) ; Attorney
General v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476, 479, 55 N.E. 77, 78 (1899), aff'd sub nom.
Williams v. Parker, 188 U.S. 491 (1903); Higginson v. Slattery, 212 Mass. 583,
590, 99 N.E. 523, 527 (1912); Brunn v. Kansas City, 216 Mo. 108, 116, 115 S.W.
446, 449 (1908) ; City of Lexington v. Kentucky Chautauqua Assembly, 114 Ky. 781,
785, 71 S.W. 943, 944 (1903) ; In re Mayor of New York, 99 N.Y. 570, 585, 2 N.E.
642, 648-49 (1885) ; In re Commissioners of Central Park, 63 Barb. 282 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1872).




often than in swimming, boating, hunting, fishing, or any of the
other sports, and it accounts for 42 percent of all outdoor recrea-
tion.28 ' Moreover, about one-third of all highway travel in the United
States is for recreational, vacation, and social purposes.288
Public Health Service scientists who have studied the relation-
ship between recreational travel and mental health believe that such
travel contributes to mental health in at least two significant ways:
(a) it brings release from tensions generated by job pressures and
general urban living stresses; and (b) it confers positive benefits
through enjoyment of the natural beauty of streams, lakes, forests,
mountains, and other scenic resources.2 " Hence it seems clear that
enhancement of the recreational benefits of highway travel through
a program of scenic easement acquisition constitutes a public purpose.
The cases upholding land acquisition for public park purposes
often emphasize the public health benefits arising from the creation
of parks,29 ° but in many of these cases the courts have also explicitly
recognized the public benefits flowing from aesthetic considerations.
For example, in Attorney General v. Williams, the Massachusetts
court said:
The grounds on which public parks are desired are various. They are
to be enjoyed by the people who use them. They are expected to
minister, not only to the grosser senses, but also to the love of the
beautiful in nature, in the varied forms which the change of seasons
brings. Their value is enhanced by such touches of art as help to
produce pleasing and satisfactory effects on the emotional and spir-
itual side of our nature. Their influence should be uplifting, and,
in the highest sense, educational. If wisely planned and properly
cared for, they promote the mental as well as the physical health of
the people. For this reason it has always been deemed proper to
expend money in the care and adornment of them, to make them
beautiful and enjoyable. Their aesthetic effect never has been
thought unworthy of careful consideration by those best qualified to
appreciate it. It hardly would be contended that the same reasons
which justify the taking of land for a public park do not always
justify the expenditure of money to make the park attractive and
educational to those whose tastes are being formed, and whose love
of beauty is being cultivated. 291
And in Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, the United States Supreme
Court sustained a taking for highway purposes with the following
significant statement:
[T]hese roads, especially the main road, through its connection with




289 Id. at 37.
2 See, e.g., Owensboro v. Commonwealth ex. rel. Stone, 105 Ky. 344, 348-49, 49 S.W.
320, 321 (1899); Kansas City v. Ward, 134 Mo. 172, 177, 35 S.W. 600, 601
(1896) ; Village of Lloyd Harbor v. Huntingdon, 4 N.Y.2d 182, 190-91, 149 N.E.2d
851, 854 (1958) (holding that a village could not exclude a town beach by zoning).
29 55 N.E. at 78.
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afford a highway for persons desiring to travel along the shore to
the county line, with a view of the ocean on the one side, and of
the mountain range on the other, constituting, as stated by the trial
judge, a scenic highway of great beauty. Public uses are not limited,
in the modem view, to matters of mere business necessity and ordi-
nary convenience, but may extend to matters of public health, rec-
reation and enjoyment. Thus, the condemnation of lands for public
parks is now universally recognized as a taking for public use.... A
road need not be for a purpose of business to create a public exig-
ency; air, exercise and recreation are important to the general health
and welfare; pleasure travel may be accommodated as well as busi-
ness travel; and highways may be condemned to places of pleasing
natural scenery.... And manifestly, in these days of general public
travel in motor cars for health and recreation, such a highway as this,
extending for more than twenty miles along the shores of the Pacific
at the base of a range of mountains, must be regarded as a public
use.
2 9 2
Conservation, as an objective of the scenic easement program,
obviously overlaps recreational and aesthetic objectives. Yet it can
be viewed, to some extent at least, as a separate though related objec-
tive. As the recent report by the U.S. Department of Commerce to the
President's Council on Recreation and Natural Beauty points out,
Each scenic corridor could become a model of resource con-
servation. Appropriate exhibits, signs, and other informational de-
vices can advance conservation education and arouse deeper public
awareness of natural and aesthetic values. Highway builders and con-
servationists have a common ground .... 293
Although this was said in connection with a proposal for a
national system of "scenic roads and parkways," it is almost equally
applicable to the existing program of scenic enhancement of federal-
aid highways under the Highway Beautification Act, especially where
the federal-aid system includes primary and secondary roads which
can be converted into "scenic roads" of the type envisioned in the
proposal of the President's Council. There is, of course, no doubt
that conservation serves a significant public purpose.294
292 262 U.S. at 707-08.
293 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 286, at 39.
2" Whyte discusses the public purposes involved in a program of conservation easement
acquisition in the following terms:
In practice, a great proportion of the key areas that most people would agree
should be conserved are likely to be stream valleys. Many people would not
be thinking of the drainage and flood control aspect-but of the fishing
and the swimming in the streams, or the beauty of the meadows, or the
excellence of the farming, the contoured slopes that seem to go so well with
the stream valleys.
Yet for the reasons these valleys are beautiful, they are tremendously
useful. Like a great sponge, their flood plains temper the flow of the water
downstream; the good soil practices of the farmers help keep down the silt
that can be such a problem for communities and industries further down-
stream; because they have not been covered with asphalt, their runoff is
much less; and when there is a heavy rainfall, the streams and the creeks
that flow into a natural storm sewer system are far better than anything
constructed by man.
W. WHYTE, SECURING OPEN SPACE FOR URBAN AMERICA: CONSERVATION EAsE-
MENTS 16-17 (Urban Land Institute Tech. Bull. No. 36, 1959).
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Finally, it should be recognized that tourism is big business in
the United States today, and that promotion of tourism through
scenic enhancement of federal-aid highways will produce tangible
economic benefits for the public at large. As the just-mentioned
report to the President's Council on Recreation and Natural Beauty
indicates,
Florida, Nevada, New Jersey, and the District of Columbia rate
tourism as their most important industry. More than half of the
States consider it one of their three major sources of revenue. The
magnitude of the recreation travel business is indicated by the fact
that the combined annual payrolls of 12 of the Nation's largest
companies are equal to only one-half of annual tourist expenditures.
Travelers and tourists in the United States spend about $30
billion yearly. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimates that cash
returns from 24 tourists per day benefit a community as much as a
factory with an annual payroll of $100,000.
Tourism forecasts indicate even greater economic stimulus from
a national program of scenic roads and parkways. Studies by the
Federal Government, States, universities, and others indicate that
improved highways, and especially scenic roads and parkways, can
benefit the development of many more existing and potential resort
and recreational areas.2 95
Again, it should be noted, what was said with respect to the
proposed national system of scenic roads and parkways is almost
equally applicable to the existing program of scenic enhancement of
federal-aid highways under the Highway Beautification Act. Many
of the primary and secondary roads in the present federal-aid system
would qualify for the proposed national system of scenic roads and
parkways since about 41 percent of the proposed system is already
part of the primary system and about 37 percent is already part of
the secondary system.2"6 Even though highways in the interstate
system would not become part of the proposed system of scenic roads
and parkways, scenic enhancement along the interstate system will
nevertheless add appreciably to their recreational value, and thus
contribute to the increase in tourism forecast by the President's
Council. Scenic easements, it is clear, can contribute very significantly
to the scenic enhancement of the interstate system, as well as the
primary, secondary and other roads that would make up the pro-
posed national system of scenic roads and parkways.
2U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 286, at 34-35.
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 286, at 8. This assumes the recommended
minimum scenic roads program of 54,411 miles. Of this mileage, about 79% or
42,876 miles would be on existing roads to be improved, and the remaining 21% or
11,535 miles would be built on new locations. Most of the routes (about 95%) in
the recommended program are in rural areas, but all would be within reasonable
driving time of the population centers of the nation. Id. at 141.
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B. State Constitutional "Anti-Diversion" Provisions297
Assuming that acquisition of scenic easements outside the right-
of-way is considered a taking of property for a public use under
eminent domain and that expenditure of public funds is justified
by the public purpose involved, there remains a question in many
states as to whether it is lawful for the state to pay for the acquisition
of scenic easements with "dedicated highway funds."
Some 28 states have constitutional provisions which earmark
certain state revenues - typically the motor fuel excise taxes and the
vehicle registration fees - for specified highway purposes.298 These
provisions are generally known as the "anti-diversion amendments"
and have served the purpose of preventing the highway user taxes
from flowing into the states' general funds and later being appro-
priated by the legislatures for the support of governmental functions
and programs which have nothing to do with highways and confer
no benefit on the people who pay these taxes qua highway users.
In states like California, Colorado, Missouri, and South Dakota,
where the scenic easement enabling legislation precludes the use of
any state funds at all for acquisition of scenic easements, 299 or per-
mits use of state funds for this purpose only where the state will be
fully reimbursed by the federal government under the Highway
Beautification Act ° ° the effect of an anti-diversion provision in the
state constitution may not be very important.301 In states where the
scenic easement enabling legislation does not expressly preclude or
limit the use of state funds for scenic easement acquisition, however,
the proper interpretation of an anti-diversion provision will often be
of crucial importance if the state wishes to spend state funds on the
scenic easement program in addition to the federal funds available
under the Highway Beautification Act.
Although the forces that were originally mobilized in the 1920's
to promote the state anti-diversion amendments were, and still are,
9' The material dealing with this topic is based on HIGHWAY RESEARCH BOARD SPECIAL
REPORT No. 91, RELOCATION OF PUBLIC UTILTES 1959-1966: AN ANALYSIS OF
LEGAL ASPECTS (1966), and an unpublished speech by Ross D. Netherton at a
seminar held by the Nevada Department of Highways in the fall of 1966. Mr. Nether-
ton is Counsel for Legal Research, Highway Research Board, National Academy of
Sciences - National Research Council.
See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. X, § 18; MASS. CONST. art. 78. The others are Alabama,
Arizona, California, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia,
and Wyoming.
29 See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 226.780 (Supp. 1966).
300 See, e.g., CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE § 895 (West Supp. 1966) ; COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 120-3-10 (1963), as amended, Ch. 38, [19661 Colo. Laws 178.
301 Where the statute permits use of state funds only to the extent they are reimbursable
by the federal government, an "anti-diversion" provision in the state constitution may
still create difficulties if the state's general funds are insufficient to cover the initial
costs of scenic easement acquisition.
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energetic in their efforts, they were not able to secure uniformity of
language in the amendments that were adopted. As a result, each
state legislature which faces the problem of squaring its scenic ease-
ment program with its state constitution must look carefully to the
wording of the anti-diversion amendment in its own constitution.
All the amendments, naturally, are chiefly concerned with
directing highway user funds into road construction and mainte-
nance. The most liberal amendments simply specify "highway pur-
poses'' "0 2 or "highway purposes as defined by law" 803 or the creation
of a special highway fund,80 4 or add "other statutory purposes" to
the list. 05 In all these states, it seems clear that the legislature, by
designating the acquisition of scenic easements as a highway purpose,
can make available dedicated highway funds for acquisition of scenic
easements if it wishes. Minnesota, for example, has already taken
this step by including in its scenic easement enabling legislation a
provision that "all costs of acquisition of such rights" shall be
deemed "necessary for a highway purpose."' 06 New Mexico has a
similar provision in its scenic easement enabling legislation.
07
In many states, 08 the anti-diversion amendments prescribe in
substance that "construction, reconstruction, maintenance, and repair"
are the only permissible uses of highway user funds. Even under
such amendments, however, it would seem that highway user funds
could be properly expended for acquisition of scenic easements if
the scenic easement enabling legislation expressly states that such
acquisition may be deemed to constitute "a part of the establishment,
construction, or reconstruction of state highways on the federal-aid
highway system 309 or that "[l]and, or any interest therein, acquired
under... this act is hereby declared to be part of the adjacent or
nearest highway.''310
A few states have other general language in their anti-diversion
amendments which offers a possible interpretation permitting use
of highway user funds for scenic easement acquisition. For example,
the California and Utah provisions speak of "construction, improve-
302 E.g., KAN. CONST. art. 11, § 10.
303 E.g., MIcH. CONST. art. 9, § 9.
304 E.g., LA. CONST. art. 6, § 23.
305 E.g., ORE. CONST. art. 9, § 3.
306 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 173.05 (Supp. 1966).
307 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-11-14(c) (Supp. 1967), which says, "Acquisition of any
land under this section is for highway purpose."
308 Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, West
Virginia, and Wyoming.
309 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36 § 670-413.1 (Supp. 1966).
310 See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 27-12-109.1, -.3 '(Supp. 1967).
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ment, repair and maintenance of highways.""' And Washington's
provision speaks of "construction, reconstruction, repair and better-
ment of public highways." 1 ' Of all the amendments, however, only
that of Oregon specifically authorizes expenditure of highway user
funds for "acquisition, development, maintenance, care and use of
parks, recreational, scenic or other historic places." 313
Where the anti-diversion amendments expressly limit expendi-
ture to "construction, reconstruction, maintenance and repair," high-
way agency lawyers and right-of-way agents going out to acquire
scenic easements may well feel that in view of the restrictive lan-
guage of these amendments they are buying a lawsuit at every step
of the way. This is especially true if the scenic easement statute does
not expressly make scenic easement acquisition a part of highway
"construction or reconstruction."
Up until the late 1950's there was practically no case law inter-
preting the anti-diversion amendments. In recent years, however, as
a result of the enactment by Congress in 1956 of legislation 314
authorizing the use of federal-aid highway funds to reimburse states
for 90 percent of the cost of relocating utility fixtures from the high-
way right-of-way, a series of cases has dealt with the anti-diversion
principle. Following the authorization by Congress to use federal-aid
funds to reimburse for utility relocation costs, there was a rash of
state legislation designed to liberalize existing state limitations on
payments of this type, 15 and a number of suits were brought to test
its constitutionality. Decisions on the constitutional issue have been
rendered in the highest courts of Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Maine,
Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia.
In three of the states just mentioned 1 ' the constitution con-
tains no anti-diversion provision, and the constitutional issue with
regard to relocation payments was necessarily decided without refer-
ence thereto. In those states with a constitutional anti-diversion pro-
311 Likewise, the Missouri provision authorizes use of dedicated highway funds to com-
plete, widen, or improve the state highway system, and also for "such other purposes
and contingencies relating . . . to the construction and maintenance of such highways
as the commission may deem necessary and proper." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 226.780
(Supp. 1966) (emphasis added). But, as indicated in the text at note 299 supra, the
Missouri scenic easement legislation precludes the use of any state funds at all for
acquisition of scenic easements.
312 WASH. CONSr. art. 2, § 40b, amendment 18 (emphasis added).
313 ORE. CONST. art. 9, § 3 (emphasis added).
314 Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 § 111, 23 U.S.C. § 123 (1964).
315 A majority of the states with statutory provisions for reimbursement of utility reloca-
tion costs have included statements therein that such costs are to be considered a part
of the cost of the highway improvement itself. Of the 21 states with such statutory
declarations, 13 have "anti-diversion" provisions in their constitutions: Alabama,
Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Texas,
Utah, Washington, and West Virginia.
316 Delaware, New Mexico, and Tennessee.
1968
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
vision where the constitutionality of utility relocation payments has
been litigated, the decisions are divided, but a majority of the deci-
sions has sustained the legislation authorizing relocation payments
and has expressly held that such payments do not violate the consti-
tutional anti-diversion provisions. There are decisions to this effect
in Iowa, 17 Minnesota,"*8 Montana,31 New Hampshire,32 North
Dakota 2 Texas S2 2 and West Virginia.
8
3
In New Hampshire, the proposed statute authorizing reimburse-
ment of utility costs was ultimately not passed, but the New Hamp-
shire court, when requested to advise on the constitutionality of the
proposed statute, held that such reimbursement would not constitute
a violation of the anti-diversion amendment to the state constitution.
The court took a broad view of the term "highway purpose," declar-
ing that although relocation of utilities was subordinate to the pri-
mary use of highways, it was "an integral part of highway improve-
ments."
3 2 4
The Minnesota court said that the state was already committed
to the view that "the use of rights-of-way by utilities for locating
their facilities is one of the primary purposes for which highways
are designed, even though their principal use is for public travel
and transportation of persons and property. '3 2  It would be unrea-
sonable, the court held, to decide that dedicated highway funds
could not be used for anything reasonably necessary to the accom-
plishment of all the basic purposes for which a highway exists.
The North Dakota court held that the word "construction"
embraces " 'everything appropriately connected with, and necessarily
incidental to, complete accomplishment of the general purpose for
which the [highway] fund exists.' 326
The Iowa court noted that "It~he Congress and the legislatures
of many states . . . have determined the cost of relocating public
utility facilities is a proper part of the cost of construction of a high-
way."27 Although the General Assembly could not by subsequent
legislation define the scope of a constitutional provision, the deter-
mination of the Congress and the various legislatures, said the Iowa
court, was entitled to weight in consideration of the scope of the
317 Edge v. Brice, 253 Iowa 710, 113 N.W.2d 755 (1962).
318 Minneapolis Gas Co. v. Zimmerman, 253 Minn. 164, 91 N.W.2d 642 (1958).
319 Jones v. Burns, 138 Mont. 268, 357 P.2d 22 (1960).
320 Opinion of the Justices, 101 N.H. 527, 132 A.2d 613 (1957).
321 Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Wentz, 103 N.W.2d 245 (N.D. 1960).
322 Texas v. Austin, 160 Tex. 348, 331 S.W.2d 737 (1960).
323 State v. Gainer, 149 W. Va. 740, 143 S.E.2d 351 (1965).
324 132 A.2d at 615.
325 91 N.W.2d at 651.
326 103 N.W.2d at 256.
32 113 N.W.2d at 759.
VOL. 45
SCENIC EASEMENTS
constitutional anti-diversion provision. The court concluded, "It is
fair to say the intent of the term 'construction' as used in the (Iowa
anti-diversion] amendment includes all things necessary to the com-
pleted accomplishment of a highway for all uses properly a part
thereof."'
In Utah, the court sustained the statute authorizing utility
relocation payments without discussion of the anti-diversion issue,329
since the anti-diversion amendment was not passed until after the
decision was handed down. In Maine, Idaho, and Washington, how-
ever, it has been held that utility relocation does not constitute a
highway purpose and that use of dedicated highway funds to reim-
burse utility companies for the cost of relocation would violate the
anti-diversion amendments to the constitutions of these states.3 3 1 In
the Washington case, the court noted that such reimbursement could
result in substantially decreasing funds reserved for "safety, admin-
istration and operation of the highway system," and concluded that
expenditures for relocation of utilities could not be viewed as "exclu-
sively for highway purposes" as required by the anti-diversion
amendment.3 '
An issue more directly parallel to the question whether dedi-
cated highway funds can be used for scenic easement acquisition in
states with constitutional anti-diversion provisions was recently raised
in North and South Dakota. In 1963 the attorneys general of these
states were asked to render opinions on the constitutionality of legis-
lative bills then pending which would have authorized the state high-
way departments to enter into agreements with the Secretary of
Commerce under the 1958 federal-aid legislation providing for bill-
board control along the Interstate System.
South Dakota's Attorney General was of the opinion332 that use
of dedicated highway funds to purchase outdoor advertising rights
would violate the state constitutional provision which requires that
328 Id.
3 29 State Road Comm'n v. Utah Power & Light Co., 10 Utah 2d 333, 353 P.2d 171
(1960).
330Opinion of the Justices, 152 Me. 449, 132 A.2d 440 (1957); State v. Idaho Power
Co., 81 Idaho 487, 346 P.2d 596 (1959); Washington State Highway Comm'n v.
Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 59 Wash. 2d 216, 367 P.2d 605 (1961).
The Maine court, however, declared that reimbursement of relocation costs would
further a public purpose and that there would be no constitutional objection to such
reimbursement out of the state's general fund. The Maine legislature subsequently
passed the utility relocation bill, amended to provide for use of general funds. The
Idaho court, on the other hand, held that reimbursement of utility relocation costs
would not serve any general public purpose, since utilities are private, profit-making
rorporations not owned or controlled by the state, and the fact that they furnish
service to the public was held insufficient to remove the payment of relocation costs
from the constitutional ban on expenditure of public funds for non-public purposes.
3 Washington State Highway Comm'n v. Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 59 Wash. 2d 216,
367 P.2d 605 (1961).
332 S.D. Op. A'rT'Y GEN. 1963-64 at 34 (Feb. 18, 1963).
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such funds be spent "exclusively for the maintenance, construction and
supervision" of highways and bridges. In passing, he distinguished
the use of highway funds to pay for relocation of utilities from the
highway right-of-way by noting that no vested property rights were
disturbed by relocation and that it was merely incident to actual high-
way construction.
Shortly after the South Dakota opinion was issued, the Attorney
General of North Dakota issued his opinion.3 33 He noted that North
Dakota's constitution limits the use of dedicated highway funds to
"construction, reconstruction, repair and maintenance of public high-
ways," a limitation which he felt was even tighter than South
Dakota's, which includes "supervision." He also noted North Da-
kota's legislation providing for payment of utility relocation costs
and cited the North Dakota court's approval of that law on the
ground (stated above) that " 'construction' embraces everything
appropriately connected with and necessarily incidental to the com-
plete accomplishment of the general purpose for which the fund
exists." Despite this, however, the Attorney General found no author-
ity for regarding the acquisition of outdoor advertising rights, either
in the form of additional right-of-way or rights in land adjacent to
the right-of-way, as part of highway "construction." Instead, he
viewed control of roadside advertising as an independent project
and expressed "serious doubts" that dedicated highway funds could
lawfully be spent for this purpose.
Two years later, however, the Attorney General of North
Dakota was compelled to argue in support of the state's program
of billboard control through purchase of advertising rights and, in
Newman v. Hjelle,38 4 succeeded in convincing the court that this
practice should be sustained. The anti-diversion issue was squarely
raised in Newman by plaintiff's attempt to enjoin the state's use of
revenue from motor fuel taxes and vehicle license and registration
fees for the purchase of advertising rights. The court's opinion care-
fully traced the history of the North Dakota anti-diversion amend-
ment, and concluded:
It is clear the purpose of the amendment was to prevent any
use of the earmarked revenues for anything but highway purposes
and not to restrict the terms of the amendment by a narrow construc-
tion of the purpose for which the revenues may be used within the
area designated.
... [Ilt is clear the people intended. . . to make the scope
broad enough to include such matters as were considered within the
area of the powers of the State Highway Department, as those
powers may exist in relation to public highways. We find this
3 N.D. Op. ATr'Y GEN. 1962-64 at 148 (Mar. 16, 1963).
334 133 N.W.2d 549 (N.D. 1965).
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included the right to control advertising signs, billboards, and other
signs erected on the right of way, as well as on lands abutting there-
on, if such control was provided for by law.3 8 5
Although the case law dealing with the anti-diversion amend-
ments is certainly not conclusive, it presents substantial reason to
believe that these amendments will generally not be construed so
narrowly as to preclude the use of dedicated highway funds for the
purchase of scenic easements.
C. Equal Protection of the Laws
Any program of scenic easement acquisition along highways
may run into a two-pronged attack on the ground that it denies the
"equal protection of the laws" guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-
ment. An example of the first type of equal protection attack, and
the Wisconsin court's answer thereto, may be found in the Kamrow-
ski opinion, as follows:
Plaintiffs assert that scenic easements are being taken from
owners of agricultural lands along the Great River Road, but for one
reason or another will not be taken from the owners of all lands
abutting that highway. They point out that the Burlington railroad
tracks run between the highway and the river and that there are
cities along the highway, where the adjacent property is developed
for urban use. They suggest that the highway commission will not
take scenic easements from the railroad and from urban owners so
as to restrict all those lands to agricultural and limited residential
use. Plaintiffs argue that as a result they are being denied equal
protection of the laws.
The fact that urban land has been developed for commercial,
residential, or similar purposes, and the fact that the railroad prop-
erty is used for railroad purposes, and those uses cannot readily or
economically be destroyed is probably basis enough for classification
if a reasonable classification is needed in this context. We consider,
however, that once it has been determined that the use for which
property rights are taken is a public use, and that the taking is neces-
sary for such use, neither a property owner whose property is taken
in return for just compensation nor a property owner whose prop-
erty is not so taken is in a position to claim that he is denied equal
protection of the laws.
"It is not for the courts to oversee the choice of the boundary
line nor to sit in review on the size of a particular project area. Once
the question of the public purpose has been decided, the amount and
character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a par-
ticular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion
of the legislative branch."38 6
It should be noted that the Wisconsin court, quoting from
Berman v. Parker, said, "the need for a particular tract to complete
the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch."
(Emphasis added.) This strongly suggests that some sort of "inte-
33
5 Id. at 557-58.
338 31 Wis. 2d 256, 266, 142 N.W.2d 793, 797-98 (1966) (footnote omitted).
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grated plan" for scenic easement acquisition may be neceessary to
provide a rational basis for determining what land is to be subjected
to scenic easement restrictions. It should also be observed, however,
that the power to formulate an appropriate integrated plan and to
make decisions for scenic easement acquisition can certainly be dele-
gated to an administrative agency, such as the state highway depart-
ment, provided the enabling statute lays down a sufficient general
standard for the exercise of the delegated powers. In the Kamrowski
case, the court expressly approved the delegation of power in the
following language:
It is also clear that the legislature has determined that the protection
of scenic resources along highways is a public purpose, has set the
policy of acquiring scenic easements along particular routes, in order
to protect such resources, and has delegated to the state highway
commission the function of deciding the exact terms of the ease-
ments to be acquired, and of exercising the power of eminent domain
to acquire them.
... [W]e consider that the concept of preserving a scenic cor-
ridor along a parkway, with its emphasis upon maintaining a rural
scene and preventing unsightly uses is sufficiently definite so that
the legislature may be said to have made a meaningful decision in
terms of public purpose, and to have fixed a standard which suf-
ficiently guides the commission in performing its task.337
The federal courts have repeatedly sustained the delegation of
power to administrative agencies under such vague standards as
"just and reasonable," "in the public interest," and the like. 8'
Indeed, as Professor Davis has pointed out,339 "In the federal courts,
nothing but a congressional abdication or clear abuse is likely to be
held an invalid delegation." And even though "the law of state
delegation differs substantially from the law of federal delega-
tion, "340 most state courts have consistently upheld the delegation
of power to administrative agencies under relatively vague standards.
For example, state courts have generally upheld the delegation
to local zoning boards of the power to grant "variances" under such
standards as the following: "such variance from the terms of the
ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest, where owing
to special conditions, a literal enforcement of the provisions of the
ordinance will result in unnecessary hardship, and so that the spirit
of the ordinance shall be observed and substantial justice done" ;341
337 Id. at 263, 266, 142 N.W.2d at 796-97.
338 1 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.03 (1958).
339 Id. § 2.15 at 150.
340 Id. § 2.07 at 101.
341 This is the variance provision in § 7 of the U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE., STANDARD
STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (1923) (revised in 1924 and 1926), which served as
the model for a majority of the state zoning acts adopted from 1925 to 1940. This




"where there are practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship in
the way of carrying out the strict letter of such ordinances,... [and]
so that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed, public safety
and welfare secured and substantial justice done" ;342 where "(1) the
property in question cannot yield a reasonable return if permitted
to be used only under the conditions allowed by the regulations in
that zone; and (2) the plight of the owner is due to unique circum-
stances; and (3) the variation, if granted, will not alter the essential
character of the locality" ;343 or "in particular cases and for special
reasons" where "such relief can be granted without substantial detri-
ment to the public good and will not substantially impair the intent
and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance.' '
44
Similarly, the delegation of power to local zoning boards of the
power to grant "special exceptions to the terms of the ordinance in
harmony with its general purpose and intent and in accordance with
general or specific rules therein contained, ' '3 45 has generally been
sustained even where the local zoning ordinances "merely echo the
words of the statute, and authorize the granting of exceptions under
a generalized standard which may vaguely be termed as a reference
to the general welfare. ' 3 41 Moreover, an ordinance providing, with-
out specific statutory authorization, for the issuance of "special use
permits for 'the location of special classes of uses which are deemed
desirable for the public welfare within a given district or districts,
but which are potentially incompatible with typical uses herein per-
mitted within them,' . . . [subject to conditions considered] necessary
to protect the public health, safety and welfare," has been upheld
against the attack that the standard is too vague. 47
In Wisconsin at the time of the scenic easement acquisition
challenged in the Kainrowski case, an "integrated plan" for such
acquisition did exist as a result of the general legislative designation
of areas where scenic easements were to be acquired with ORAP
funds and the more detailed scenic corridor plans prepared by the
state highway agency. If the enabling statute in Wisconsin is broad-
ened to permit scenic easement acquisition in other areas, further
3 42 N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267(5) (McKinney 1965), N.Y. GEN. CI' LAW § 81(4)
(McKinney 1951), and N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 179-b (McKinney 1966).
34 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-13-4 (Smith-Hurd 1962) (applicable to cities larger
than 500,000).
3 4This is the well-known "special reasons" variance provision in N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:55-39(d) (1967).
3 5 Special exception provision in the STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, § 7,
supra note 341.
36 Mandelker, Delegation of Power and Function in Zoning Administration, 1963
WASH. U.L.Q. 60, 76.
347 Kotrich v. County of Du Page, 19 II. 2d 181, 166 N.E.2d 601, 604-05 (1960),
appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 475 (1960).
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detailed plans can be formulated on the basis of the inventory of
scenic resources which comprises a part of the outdoor recreation
plan prepared by the Wisconsin Department of Resource Develop-
ment. 48 Similarly, scenic easement acquisition planning in Vermont
can be based on the recently published Study of Scenic Values and
Location of Scenic Sites and Views in Vermont, 49 and scenic ease-
ment acquisition plans in California can be based on the criteria for
selection of scenic areas contained in a recent report to the legisla-
ture.33 ' Presumably all states which undertake programs of scenic
easement acquisition will find it both necessary and desirable to base
their programs on some sort of "plan" which, in turn, is based on an
inventory of scenic resources in existing or proposed highway
corridors.
However, this may not solve all the problems of equal protec-
tion. Since all or almost all of the states with scenic easement enabling
legislation have also enacted billboard control legislation designed
to implement Title I of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965,351
most of the areas in which scenic easements are likely to be acquired
are already subject to state or local police power controls over new
advertising signs; and in order to avoid the 10 percent penalty
provided by Title I of the Act, existing billboards within 660 feet
of the right-of-way in areas which are neither industrial nor com-
mercial in character must, with some exceptions, be removed by
July 1, 1970. But Title I also requires the payment of just compen-
sation not only for taking the sign itself, but also for taking from the
owner of the real property the right to erect future signs.
As a result of the provisions of Titles I and III of the Highway
Beautification Act, many state highway agencies may want to develop
an integrated highway beautification plan for different areas along
the following lines:
(1) In some areas which are neither industrial nor commercial
and where there are lawfully existing signs, the agency may remove
the existing signs and acquire a standard scenic easement which will
prohibit the erection of new signs and prohibit any substantial
change in the existing use of the land adjacent to the highway.
Payment to the landowner for the scenic easement, together with
payment to the owners of the signs themselves, will satisfy the just
compensation requirements of Title I.
348 WISCONSIN DEP'T OF RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT, RECREATION IN WISCONSIN
(1962).
349CENTRAL PLANNING OFFICE, STATE OF VERMONT, VERMONT SCENERY PRESERVA-
TION, ch. V '(1966).
350 
DIVISION OF HIGHWAYS, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS, REPORT ON
AcQuismoN OF SCENIC AREAS ADJACENT TO STATE HIGHWAYS (1966).
35179 Stat. 1028, amending 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1964).
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(2) In some areas which are neither industrial nor commercial
and where there are lawfully existing signs, the agency may remove
existing signs and acquire a scenic easement which merely prohibits the
erection of new signs. Again, payment to the landowner for the
scenic easement, together with payment to the owners of the signs,
will satisfy the just compensation requirements of Title I.
(3) In some areas where there are no existing signs, the agency
may acquire a standard scenic easement which will prohibit the erec-
tion of signs and also prohibit substantial changes in the existing
use of the land. Title I does not require payment for the prohibition
of new signs in such a case, but payment to the landowner will be
necessary in order to acquire the complete scenic easement package.
(4) In some areas where there are no lawfully existing signs,
the agency may be satisfied with the newly-imposed police power
prohibition against the erection of new signs.
(5) In some areas, the agency may want to supplement its
scenic easement program by imposing, under the police power, a
package of restrictions equivalent to those which comprise a standard
scenic easement. This, of course, would require new enabling legis-
lation in nearly all states.
It is obvious that action along the lines suggested in (1), (2),
and (3), without more, does not raise any equal protection issues
provided there is a rational basis (some sort of 'plan") for treating
the different areas differently. In all these situations, the landowner
is fully compensated for the rights purchased or taken from him.
Equal protection problems may arise, however, if action along the
lines suggested in (4) and (5) above is added to the action sug-
gested in (1), (2), and (3). The problems arise from the attempt
to supplement land-use controls based on purchase or condemnation
with police power controls.
In many areas, at least, use of the police power to preserve
scenic beauty may be reasonable and therefore constitutional when
viewed in isolation. But the combination of a scenic easement acquisi-
tion program - where land owners are compensated for the restric-
tive easement which is acquired - and a program of police power
regulation, such as highway zoning - where landowners are not
compensated for the restrictions imposed upon them, even though
the restrictions are exactly the same as those imposed by a scenic
easement - raises an obvious equal protection problem. The problem,
of course, is not whether the scenic easement acquisition program is
valid, but whether the supplementary program of police power
regulation is valid in view of the discrimination between landowners
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who are compensated for land use restrictions imposed on them and
those who are not.
Theoretically, of course, equal protection could be assured by
using police power restrictions only in cases where there clearly is no
taking of the landowner's property in a constitutional sense, and by
acquiring scenic easements with compensation to the landowner in
any case where there is a taking of property. Unfortunately, however,
there is no way to be sure whether there is a taking in many cases
unless and until a court decides that there is or is not a taking. The
mere fact of loss of value to the landowner is clearly not enough to
establish a taking,352 and in some states, at least, nothing short of a
total loss of value to the landowner will constitute a taking where
the landowner retains the right to possession of the land.35 3 Thus,
there is a substantial gray area within which the imposition of land
use restrictions may or may not constitute a taking in the constitutional
sense, and within which any distinction between cases where com-
pensation is paid and cases where it is not paid ought to be based on
a reasonable classification.
It would no doubt be possible to classify land abutting highways
on the basis of the amount of immediate loss in value which will
result from imposition of scenic restrictions. The police power could
be used where the immediate loss is relatively small, and negotiated
purchase or condemnation used where the immediate loss to the
landowner is relatively large. But such a simple system of classifica-
tion is not likely to work well because it gives too little consideration
to the development potential of a particular tract of land.
In many rural areas the land may have so little development
potential that virtually no loss will occur, even in the distant future,
as a result of imposition of scenic restrictions. In other areas, how-
ever, although the immediate loss to the landowner from imposition
of scenic restrictions may be small, the land may have sufficient
potential for development so that, as time goes on, the loss is likely
to become greater and greater, as is the vigor of the landowner's
attack on the police power restrictions to which his land may be
subject. It would seem, therefore, that a policy of acquiring scenic
easements and compensating the landowner wherever the land has
substantial development potential would be wise, even though the
anticipated development may appear to be rather far in the future.
The equal protection guarantee would certainly be satisfied by
a classification which based compensation upon a finding of sub-
352 This proposition needs no citation of authority. If reduction in value were enough to
establish a taking, practically all zoning ordinances would be unconstitutional.
353 See, e.g., Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal.2d 515, 370
P.2d 342 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962).
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stantial development potential in a particular tract of land, and
which denied compensation where no substantial development poten-
tial is found. Moreover such a classification would also tend to
assure the relative permanency of scenic restrictions because, in areas
where development potential exists, the state would have a perma-
nent scenic easement restricting land use rather than a mere police
power regulation subject to repeal, amendment, or variance by legis-
lative or administrative action.
How would the principle suggested for determining when to
purchase (or condemn) and compensate and when to impose police
power regulations apply to an integrated highway beautification
program of the type outlined above? In areas where there are law-
fully existing signs, it can be presumed that the land adjacent to the
highway has sufficient development potential to justify purchase or
condemnation of at least some of the landowner's development
rights - either the full standard scenic easement package or the
right to erect new signs. Whether the state highway agency should
acquire the full scenic easement package or only the right to erect
new signs should depend upon a determination of the development
potential of the particular location for other than advertising uses.
In areas where there are no lawfully existing signs, the decision
between acquisition with compensation and police power regulation
can be based on the same criterion. But an additional problem may
arise. Since all such areas are (or will be) subject to police power
restrictions against new signs in most states, should the compensation
paid to the landowners in areas where scenic easements are acquired
include the full value of the right to erect new signs?
One possible answer is that when a scenic easement is acquired
in an area already subject to a police power restriction against new
advertising signs, the landowner should be paid, as compensation
for the additional restriction against advertising signs, only the dif-
ference between the value of the land subject to a temporary police
power restriction and the value of the land subject to a permanent
scenic easement restriction. But such a distinction may present a very
difficult, if not insoluble, problem of valuation. In this connection
it should be noted that the 10 percent penalty provided by Title I
of the Highway Beautification Act might be sufficient to induce the
states generally to maintain adequate police power controls over out-
door advertising - at least so long as highway construction with
federal-aid funds continues to be an important activity of the state
highway agencies. Thus the distinction between the value of perma-
nent restrictions against advertising signs imposed by scenic easement
and the value of temporary restrictions imposed under the police
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power may be difficult to maintain. In the final analysis, the differ-
ence in treatment of landowners may have to be justified on the
ground that administrative convenience and feasibility require pay-
ment for all the restrictions imposed when a scenic easement is pur-
chased or taken, without any deduction on account of the existing
police power restrictions against advertising signs.
Although the author favors use of the principle already dis-
cussed to determine when to acquire and compensate and when to
impose police power regulations, it is possible to make the determi-
nation on other grounds. For example, the state highway agencies
might decide to rely entirely on the police power to exclude new
signs in areas where there are no existing signs. In such areas, the
restrictions imposed by the standard scenic easement would not
include the usual restriction against advertising signs, and the land-
owners would not be compensated for that restriction. But where
existing signs must be removed in order to avoid the 10 percent
penalty imposed by Title I, the removal of the existing signs would
be accompanied by the acquisition of a scenic easement package
which would, inter alia, prohibit new signs, with the landowners
being compensated for all the rights they lose. This procedure would
seem to satisfy the requirements of Title I and also the requirements
of equal protection.
It can, of course, be argued that the treatment of sign restric-
tions suggested in the preceding paragraph would result in denial
of equal protection because landowners who have no existing signs
on their land would not be compensated for the loss of their right
to erect signs in the future, while landowners with signs on their
land would be compensated for the loss of such right as well as the
loss caused by removal of existing signs. It would appear to be an
adequate answer, however, that the existence of signs on the land
can be regarded as sufficient evidence of the value of the land for
future sign use to justify compensation for loss of that value; and,
contrariwise, that where there are no existing signs, such evidence is
lacking.
The major objection to relying solely on the police power to
prohibit advertising signs where none lawfully exist at present is
that police power regulation is not necessarily permanent. As we
have previously noted, the 10 percent penalty of the Highway Beauti-
fication Act may be sufficient to induce the states to maintain effec-
tive roadside control until completion of the Interstate System and
perhaps even longer. But Title I of the Act provides a loophole
which may enable the advertising industry, in many states, to pre-
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vent achievement of the goal of effective control by means of the
police power. Section 101(d) of the Act8 4 provides:
In order to promote the reasonable, orderly and effective dis-
play of outdoor advertising while remaining consistent with the
purposes of this section, signs, displays, and devices whose size,
lighting and spacing, consistent with customary use is to be deter-
mined by agreement between the several States and the Secretary,
may be erected and maintained within six hundred and sixty feet
of the nearest edge of the right-of-way within areas adjacent to the
Interstate and primary systems which are zoned industrial or com-
mercial under authority of State law, or in unzoned commercial or
industrial areas as may be determined by agreement between the
several States and the Secretary. The States shall have full authority
under their own zoning laws to zone areas for commercial or indus-
trial purposes, and actions of the States in this regard will be
accepted for the purpose of this Act. [Emphasis supplied.]
Under the above provision, local governments with zoning
power under state enabling acts can, unless restrained by state legis-
lation, emasculate the proposed "effective control" of highway adver-
tising by zoning or rezoning substantial areas adjacent to the Inter-
state and primary highway system for industrial or commercial use,
despite the fact that there are presently no such uses, and no adver-
tising signs, in these areas. The state statutes on billboard control
enacted in response to the Highway Beautification Act appear gen-
erally to leave the zoning power with the units of local government,
free of any restraint which might close the loophole under discussion.
It would thus appear that acquisition of standard scenic easements
by the state highway agency, including a prohibition on erection of
new signs, may provide a desirable permanency of restriction which
would not be assured if police power controls are relied upon.
Similar equal protection problems may arise because of the over-
lap between the scenic easement programs developed under Title III
of the Act and the junkyard control program established by Title
11.
3 5
5 Title II imposes the same 10 percent penalty as does Title I
upon any state that does not make "provision for effective control
of the establishment and maintenance along the Interstate System
and the primary system of outdoor junkyards." The Act defines
"effective control" to mean that "junkyards shall be screened by
natural objects, plantings, fences, or other appropriate means so as
not to be visible from the main traveled way of the system, or shall
be removed from sight." Title II further provides that "the federal
share of landscaping and screening costs under this section shall be
75 per centum," and that the federal share of the cost of relocation,
removal, or disposal of junkyards which "as a practical matter can-
not be screened" shall also be 75 percent.
54 79 Stat. 1028, amending 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1964).
355 79 Stat. 1030, amending 23 U.S.C. § 136 (1964).
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Although Title II fails to make this absolutely clear, it would
seem that the "federal share" is only payable for screening and land-
scaping existing junkyards. It seems to be implied, therefore, that
control over establishment of new junkyards- either total prohibi-
tion within sight of the "main traveled way of the system" or require-
ments as to screening and landscaping - should be exercised by the
states through their police power. In many areas, at least, police
power controls will certainly be held valid. But prohibition of the
establishment of new junkyards is normally a standard feature of
scenic easements. If the police power is relied on in some areas and
in other areas landowners are compensated (through purchase or
condemnation) for loss of the right to establish junkyards in the
future, equal protection problems arise which are similar to those
already discussed in connection with the control of outdoor adver-
tising.
D. "fNecessity" for Acquisition of Easements at Particular Locations
Let us assume that any challenge to a program of scenic ease-
ment acquisition based on the alleged absence of any public use or
public purpose, or the alleged denial of equal protection, or the
alleged lack of adequate standards to guide the exercise of discretion
by the state highway agency can be defeated. When the highway
agency decides to condemn scenic easements at particular locations,
the landowner might still challenge the condemnation on the ground
that there is no "necessity" for the taking of a scenic easement at
that location.
If the legislature were to determine the precise locations at
which scenic easements should be acquired, any challenge to its deter-
mination would be practically certain to fail. As Nichols points out,
The overwhelming weight of authority makes clear beyond any
possibility of doubt that the question of the necessity or expediency
of a taking in eminent domain lies within the discretion of the legis-
lature and is not a proper subject of judicial review....
There are various aspects of this principle which have crystal-
lized into specific questions. In accordance with the general prin-
ciple, it has been held that the courts may not inquire into the
question
(1) Whether there is any necessity for the taking,
(2) Whether there is any need for resorting to eminent
domain in effecting such acquisition,
(3) Whether the time is a fitting one,
(4) Whether there is a need for the property to the extent
sought to be acquired,
'(5) Whether there is a need for the particular tract sought to
be acquired (and, correlatively, whether another tract would not
better serve the purposes of the condemnor),
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(6) Whether there is any need for the particular estate sought
to be condemned,
(7) Whether the mode of acquisition with respect to the
instrumentalities employed, such as a state officer, an individual,
or a corporation, is proper insofar as the exercise of the legislative
discretion is concerned.3 5 6
In implementing the scenic easement acquisition program, how-
ever, decisions as to the precise location of scenic easements and the
precise terms of the scenic easement restrictions will have to be dele-
gated to the state highway agency. The state highway agency will
have to operate in practically all states on the basis of a general
delegation of power to acquire interests in land adjacent to federal-
aid highways "necessary for the restoration, preservation, and en-
hancement of scenic beauty adjacent to such highways," or some
similar formula. And so the question recurs: what is the likelihood
of successful attack on highway agency determinations on the ground
that the taking of a particular scenic easement at a particular location
was not necessary? The answer, unfortunately, is not so clear-cut as it
would be if all such determinations were made by the legislature.
According to Nichols,
the necessity is for the condemnor and not for the courts to decide,
and the decision of such condemnor is final as long as it acts reason-
ably and in good faith. If the land is of some use to it in carrying
out its public object, the degree of necessity is its own affair.
Whether there is any necessity whatever to justify the taking is,
however, a judicial question, and as a taking without necessity in
such a case would be unauthorized, the courts may hold it to be
unlawful without the reluctance they feel in declaring acts of the
legislature unconstitutional.
3 57
In short, the determination of an administrative agency on the
question of necessity may be subjected to judicial scrutiny with
respect to its reasonableness or good faith or both. Hence it would
seem to be very important for state highway agencies to work out a
"plan" or a set of general criteria upon which the choice of scenic
easement locations and restrictions is to be based. Any determination
as to condemnation of a scenic easement imposing particular restric-
tions on a particular tract of land based on the plan or the general
criteria developed in advance can then be successfully defended as
having been made reasonably and in good faith.
Reference has previously been made to the plans or general
criteria for scenic easement acquisition developed in Wisconsin,
Vermont, and California. 358
356 1 P. NicxHoLs, THE LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 4.11 at 540, 545-51 (3d rev. ed.
1964) (footnotes omitted).
3 i7 ld. at 570-73 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
358 Text accompanying notes 348-50 supra.
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VI. SOME TECHNICAL LEGAL PROBLEMS
A. Enforcement of Scenic Easements Against Successive Owners of
the Servient Land: Does the Burden "Run"?
1. General Rules as to "Running" of Burdens With Land
As previously indicated,"8 9 it is quite doubtful whether the
burden of a scenic easement can "run" with the servient land, so as
to be enforcible against subsequent owners of the land, if the benefit
is only "personal" or "in gross." This is true whether the scenic ease-
ment is viewed as a legal negative easement or as an equitable servi-
tude. But the burden of an appurtenant scenic easement will run with
the servient land, so as to be enforceable against subsequent owners of
the land, provided the instrument creating the scenic easement is
properly recorded. The running of the burden with the servient land
is an inherent characteristic of a scenic easement if it is viewed as a
legal negative easement. And the burden will also run with the
servient estate, subject to the notice requirement discussed below, if
it is viewed as an equitable servitude.
No privity of estate between the parties to the instrument creat-
ing the scenic easement need be shown, beyond that arising from
the easement or servitude thereby created, in order for the burden
of an appurtenant easement or servitude to run with the servient
land.8"' Subject to the satisfaction of the requirements of the local
recording statute, a legal negative easement will be protected against
interference by both legal and equitable remedies. A purely equit-
able servitude, on the other hand, will be protected against interfer-
ence only by equitable remedies. However, as previously noted, "
in many instances a restrictive covenant may be enforced not only
as an equitable servitude but as a covenant running with the land at
law. If the covenant is contained in a deed of conveyance and
restricts the use of land conveyed for the benefit of land retained
by the grantor, or restricts the use of land retained by the grantor
for the benefit of the land conveyed, practically all United States
courts hold that there is sufficient privity of estate between the
parties to the covenant to permit the burden of the covenant to run
with the land at law. 62 Thus, in many cases, if a scenic restriction
is not deemed to create a legal negative easement, it may be enforced
359 See notes 60-62 supra and accompanying text.
360 This has always been clear with regard to "legal easements." That it is also true
with regard to equitable servitudes, see 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.26
(A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY f 674 (1968).
11 Text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
3 62 See note 58 supra.
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either at law as a covenant running with the land863 or in equity as
an equitable servitude.
As noted above, enforcement of restrictions on land use is sub-
ject to certain recording or notice requirements.86 4 But in the United
States the requirements appear to be identical whether we consider
a restriction to create a legal negative easement, an equitable servi-
tude, or a covenant running with the land at law.
In the English cases... enforcement of an equitable servitude
can only be had against a subsequent purchaser of the burdened
land who takes with notice. In other words, the equitable remedy
by way of injunction to enforce an agreement as an equitable servi-
tude is subject to the defense that equitable interests are cut off by
a transfer of the legal title of the burdened land to an innocent
purchaser for value. However, since these covenants or agreements
respecting the use of land create an equitable property interest upon
the burdened land, they are entitled to be recorded under the usual
[American] recording statutes, so that the constructive notice arising
from such recording prevents the existence of a subsequent bona
fide purchaser. Likewise, since the same recording statutes provide
that an unrecorded conveyance of a legal easement or of a covenant
running with the land at law shall be void as against a subsequent
bona fide purchaser, there is today no fundamental difference
between the enforcement of legal easements or covenants and equit-
able servitudes, as against subsequent purchasers of the servient
land in respect to this defense of bona fide purchase for value.3 68
If it is desired to provide, in connection with a scenic easement,
for performance of affirmative duties by the servient land owner,
- e.g., to require him to keep fields mowed, brush cleared, or the
like - the easement deed may include a covenant by the servient
land owner, for himself and his successors, to perform such affirma-
tive duties. In almost all American jurisdictions the burden of such
a covenant would run with the servient land at law ;366 and in many
states it could also be enforced against successors of the covenantor
as an equitable servitude.
6 7
363 Most kinds of restrictive covenants, of course, may be enforced at law against a sub-
sequent owner of the servient estate if all requirements, including the privity require-
ment, for running of the burden at law are satisfied.
364 See discussion of Tulk v. Moxhay, London and S.W. Ry v. Gomm, and London
County Council v. Allen in the text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
365 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.24, at 404 '(A.J. Casner ed. 1952) (footnotes
omitted). Accord, C. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH
"RUN WITH LAND" 183 (2d ed. 1947). See also 5 R. POWELL, supra note 360,
680.
36 6 The fact that the covenant is in a deed conveying the scenic easement would satisfy
the privity of estate requirement in most states where there is such a requirement,
although the interest conveyed is an easement rather than an estate. See Carlson v.
Libby, 137 Conn. 362, 77 A.2d 332 (1950). Since the covenant is "in aid of an ease-
ment," the Massachusetts privity requirement is also satisfied.
367 Although in England affirmative covenants cannot be enforced as equitable servitudes
the weight of authority in the United States is to the contrary. See Fitzstephens v.
Watson, 218 Ore. 185, 344 P.2d 221 (1959) and cases cited therein; 2 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.36 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 3 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY § 859 at 481 (3d ed. 1939).
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2. Can Scenic Easements be Deemed Appurtenant to the High-
way Right-of-Way?
Because of the doubt as to whether restrictions imposed by a
scenic easement can be enforced against a transferee of the servient
land (even when the transferee has actual notice of the restrictions)
if the scenic easement is not "appurtenant" to some dominant tene-
ment, it becomes important to determine whether a scenic easement
acquired by a state highway agency for the purpose of preserving
scenic beauty adjacent to a highway can be classified as an easement
"appurtenant" to that highway, with the highway serving as the
dominant tenement.
As Professor Powell has pointed out:
Historically, easements appurtenant were substantial factors in the
agricultural set-up of England. Such easements were required to
have been created for the purpose of benefiting the owner of the
dominant estate as the possessor of the dominant estate. In an agri-
cultural community, where dominant estates were always farm lands,
this test was easy to apply, and became crystallized to mean that, to
be found appurtenant, the easement must be found serviceable to
the agricultural utilization of the dominant estate. As the types of
land utilization have become more diversified in modem society,
especially in the United States, it has become necessary to loosen the
crystallized English rule and to recognize that serviceability to the
dominant estate can exist even when the dominant estate is devoted
to business purposes .... This liberalization of the scope of appur-
tenant easements makes a corresponding increase in the burden of
such easements.... The basic requirement that to be appurtenant,
the easement must have been created for the purpose of benefiting
the owner of the dominant estate as the possessor of such estate
remains, but the content of this requirement has altered with
changes in land utilization. It is also required that the easement shall
in fact benefit the possessor of the dominant estate in his use of
such land. A constructional preference for the finding of an ease-
ment to be appurtenant (rather than in gross) exists and is very
strong. It is not normally regarded as essential that the dominant
and servient tenements be contiguouss6s
There can be little doubt that scenic easements are intended to
benefit the public generally, insofar as the public makes use if its
highways. Since the state holds title to the highway right-of-way in
trust for the public, the highway itself can readily be regarded as
a dominant tenement to which scenic easements may be appurtenant,
provided the state's interest in the highway right-of-way is of a
nature which permits it to be so regarded.
The highway right-of-way may be regarded as a dominant tene-




ment if the state's interest therein is a fee simple estate.369 But if
the state's interest therein is merely an easement, there is likely to be
difficulty in persuading the courts that a scenic easement can be
appurtenant to the "easement of way" held by the state. This follows
from the traditional classification of easements as an incorporeal
species of real property3 70 and the ancient common law rule that an
easement may only be appurtenant to corporeal property.3 71
In 43 states, the state highway agency has express statutory
authority to acquire by purchase or condemnation either a fee simple
estate or an easement for right-of-way purposes. In Kansas, the high-
way agency may acquire either a fee simple estate or an easement by
purchase, but only an easement by condemnation. Only Alabama and
Pennsylvania expressly restrict the highway agency to acquisition of
an easement for right-of-way purposes, regardless of the method of
acquisition. In three states3 72 the statutes are wholly silent as to the
interest that may be acquired for right-of-way purposes. And although
the Iowa statute generally authorizing right-of-way acquisition is
silent on the subject, 7 8 the statute authorizing acquisition of prop-
erty for controlled-access highways expressly prescribes that acquisi-
tion is to be in fee simple only.374
It thus appears that, at the present time, the great majority of
the state highway agencies have statutory authority to acquire a fee
simple estate for highway right-of-way purposes. In the future, it
seems probable that this authority will be exercised in all, or almost
all cases. As recently as 1958,175 however, nine states8 76 had express
statutory provisions limiting the highway agency to acquisition of
an easement for right-of-way purposes, and nine other states 77 had
statutes which were wholly silent on the subject. In the latter nine
states, as a general rule, the highway agencies could acquire only an
369 "A dominant tenement is one the possessor of which is, by virtue of his possession,
entitled to the benefit of the uses authorized by the easement." 2 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 8.13 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). See also id. §§ 9.28, 9.29 with respect to
the land which the benefit of land-use restrictions imposed by covenant "touches or
concerns" and which the parties intend to be benefitted.
3 7
0E. WASHBURN, EASEMENTS AND SERVITUDES 3 (4th ed. 1885); L. JONES, EASE-
MENTS 4 (1898).
371 E. WASHBURN, supra note 370; L. JONES, supra note 370.
372 Missouri, South Dakota, and Washington.
373 IOWA CODE ANN. § 306.13 (Supp. 1966).
374 Id. § 306A.5.
3
75 HIGHWAY RESEARCH BOARD SPECIAL REPORT No. 32, CONDEMNATION OF PROP-
ERTY FOR HIGHWAY PURPOSES: A LEGAL ANALYSIS, PART I, at 9-12 (1958).
376 Alabama, Alaska, Kansas, Montana, New Mexico Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Utah.
North Dakota also had such a provision in its general condemnation statute, but this
seems to have been rendered inapplicable by a 1953 amendment to the highway code
which expressly provided that a fee simple estate may be acquired for highway
purposes. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-03(2) (1960). See also Wallentinson v.
Williams County, 101 N.W.2d 571 (N.D. 1960).




easement for right-of-way purposes by condemnation, and this is
still true in the three states where the statutes are wholly silent on
the subject. This conclusion follows from the general rule that
statutes authorizing condemnation are strictly construed against the
condemnor- a rule which means, as applied to the question now
under consideration, that authorization for the acquisition of a fee
simple estate must appear either by express provision or by neces-
sary implication.8
78
In some 18 states,3 79 therefore, the state's interest in the high-
way rights-of-way acquired up until the very recent past will gen-
erally, if not always, consist only of an easement, and in some five
states380 this will continue to be the case as to rights-of-way acquired
in the future. In these states, the question whether a scenic easement
can be regarded as appurtenant to the highway easement may become
important.
In dealing with this question, it may be helpful to remember
that a highway easement is an easement of a very peculiar character.
As against the "fee owner," - usually the abutting landowner -
the public has what amounts practically to an exclusive right of pos-
session and use. Hence it can be argued that a highway easement is
not really an incorporeal or nonpossessory interest at all, but rather
an estate in the nature of a fee simple determinable in the surface
of the land, with an easement of support in the soil below.38' Such
an argument is supported by the frequent judicial references to the
abutting landowner's right of reversion when the highway is aban-
doned.38 It would appear, arguably, at least, that the real distinction
378 See 3 P. NicHoLs, supra note 356, § 9.2[1] at 268, and § 10.1 at 338; see also
HIGHWAY REsEARcH BOARD, supra note 375, at 11.
37 Listed in notes 376-77 supra.
380 Alabama, Missouri, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Washington.
381 3 P. NicHoLs, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 273 (3d rev. ed. 1965):
The estate or interest which is acquired by eminent domain when it is
not necessary to condemn the fee is usually called an easement or servitude.
This designation has been criticized, since there is a wide difference between
such an estate or interest and a private easement; it is appurtenant to
nothing, there is no dominant tenement, and it is commonly held by the
public at large rather than by any definite person or organized body.
In the case of a state highway, of course, the "easement or servitude" is held by the
state in trust for the public at large, but the criticism of the term seems well-directed.
It goes without saying that the fee owner of land within a modern highway right-
of-way can make no use of the land except for travel in the same manner as the
public at large. Hence it seems strange to refer to the public interest in the surface as
a mere "easement or servitude," and the abutting landowner's interest therein as a
fee simple.
382 Id. at 327:
It is well settled that when an easement has been taken by eminent
domain for the public use or has been acquired by purchase, prescription or
dedication .... if the public use is subsequently discontinued or abandoned,
the public easement is extinguished, and the possession of the land reverts to
the owner of the fee free from any rights in the public.
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with respect to highway rights-of-way is not between fee simple and
easement, but between fee simple absolute" 8 and fee simple deter-
minable in the surface.
Moreover, it can be argued that the ancient common law rule
requiring a corporeal property interest as the dominant tenement is
really not a strict requirement, but rather a reflection of the usual
fact situation in which the question of the appurtenancy of an ease-
ment was raised. As a practical matter, during the formative period
of the common law, and down to relatively recent times, there was
no reason to try to make one easement appurtenant to another. But
the common law is capable of change, as history graphically demon-
strates, and there is no reason why, in order to serve the general
public interest in scenic preservation, the courts should not regard
the state's interest in the highway right-of-way as sufficient to con-
stitute a dominant tenement to which scenic easements may be made
appurtenant.
In any case where the state's right-of-way interest is an easement
and doubt may exist as to the enforceability of scenic easement
restrictions against transferees of the servient land, it will be desir-
able for the legislature to provide expressly for enforcement against
transferees with notice of the restrictions, without regard to the
question whether the scenic easement is appurtenant or in gross.
B. Transfer of Benefit of Scenic Easements
If scenic easements are deemed to be appurtenant to a highway
right-of-way, no problems are likely to arise with respect to transfer
of the benefit of such easements. The right-of-way and the scenic
easement will generally both be owned by the state, and it is un-
likely that the state will want to transfer the benefit of the scenic
easement. It is possible, of course, that occasionally a state highway
right-of-way might be transferred to county jurisdiction, or vice versa,
but this should create no problems since the scenic easements appur-
tenant to the highway right-of-way will pass with it.3s4
Suppose, however, that public-spirited individuals or conserva-
tion organizations desire to acquire scenic easements adjacent to or
near highways, and then to transfer these scenic easements to the
state. An attempted transfer to the state would raise a serious ques-
tion because in nearly all cases such a privately purchased scenic
383 If the highway right-of-way is held in fee simple absolute, then upon discontinuance
or abandonment of the highway use, the state "may leave it idle, or devote it to a
different use, or sell it in the same manner and to the same extent as an ordinary
private owner." Id. at 331.
384 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.71 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 3 R. POWELL, THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 9 418 (1967).
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easement would be in gross rather than appurtenant. As a recent
study concludes,
The question of the assignability of an easement in gross pre-
sents ... difficult problems, and there is an enormous amount of
confusion in the authorities. The general rule is that easements in
gross are not assignable, but there are so many conflicts in the
authorities that it is very difficult to generalize. A quite general
exception to the "rule" is that easements with a profit are assign-
able. Easements which include the right to sever and remove a por-
tion of the servient land are alienable "in all situations involving
easements of a commercial nature and in most other situations as
well." There are so many other exceptions to the general statement
above that it can scarcely be stated to be a rule at all. In an apparent
effort to reconcile the conflict in the cases, the Restatement took the
position that easements in gross are assignable if they are "commer-
cial" in nature, but not if they are not, but this attempted distinction
drew such heavy criticism that it can scarcely be looked to as a reli-
able guide by either the practitioner or by the courts. Lacking a clear
holding in his jurisdiction that easements in gross are assignable,
which the researcher is unlikely to find, it should not be assumed
that they can be assigned. Even if there are cases in a particular
jurisdiction holding that some interests having the characteristics of
easements in gross are assignable, it cannot be assumed that these
holdings will apply to all easements in gross; the cases must be
examined with care....
... The fact is that in many jurisdictions critical questions
simply have not been decided.... In some jurisdictions the drafts-
man may feel that he can insure assignability by a clear expression
of intent to permit assignment. But there are many statements that
such interests are simply not assignable, and the parties cannot make
them so. The path of safety lies in the most careful scrutiny of the
authorities in the jurisdiction. In the absence of clear authority in
support of alienability, it should be assumed that the easement can-
not be assigned.8 85
There appear to be no authorities on the question whether the
benefit of an equitable servitude in gross can be transferred. It seems
to the writer that decisions in favor of transferability are unlikely in
the absence of a statutory declaration to that effect.
C. Termination of Scenic Easements
It has been assumed in all of the foregoing discussion that
scenic easements will normally be of perpetual duration. But unless
care is taken to draft the enabling statute or the scenic easement deed
itself in such a way as to assure perpetual duration, there is always
38 5 R. BRENNEMAN, PRIVATE APPROACHES TO THE PRESERVATION OF OPEN LAND 30-32
(1967). See also C. CLARK, supra note 365, at 67-89; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROP-
ERTY §§ 8.75-.83 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 3 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY 419 (1967); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 489-92 (1944). It should
be noted that the Restatement does not state that "non-commercial easements in gross"
are never alienable, but rather that their alienability "is determined by the manner or
terms of their creation"; the stated factors which determine alienability include the
ersonal relations of the parties at the time of creation, the extent of the increased




a possibility of adventitious termination by operation of law or -
more accurately- by judicial decision. This possibility is especially
strong if the scenic easement is viewed as an equitable servitude
rather than a legal negative easement.
The courts, in exercising their discretion to grant or withhold
equitable remedies, have frequently refused to enjoin violation of
restrictive covenants in cases where a "change in conditions in the
neighborhood" is found to have frustrated the purpose of the
restriction3 86 Although the author has found no authority on the
point, it is conceivable that the changed conditions rule might be
carried over and applied to legal negative easements. In any case,
there is a well-settled analogous rule in the law of easements. If an
easement is created for a particular purpose, the easement is extin-
guished by operation of law if that purpose becomes impossible of
realization or is no longer served by the easement.
8 8 7
The significance of these rules in connection with scenic ease-
ments is obvious. If a servient landowner challenges scenic easement
restrictions, a court may decide that the purpose of the restrictions
has been frustrated and is no longer capable of realization because,
e.g., there is substantial new commercial or residential development
nearby, or a group of new billboards on nearby land not covered by
the scenic easement. In that event, the court may hold either that the
easement has been extinguished or that it cannot be enforced by
injunction. Either holding means, in substance, that the state's inter-
est in the scenic easement is extinguished without compensation.
This is clearly an undesirable result.
The power to terminate scenic easement restrictions should rest
with the state highway agency and not with the courts. If circum-
stances change over time and the highway agency decides that the
maintenance of a scenic easement is no longer in the public interest,
it should have authority to effect its termination in such a way as to
minimize the loss to the public - e.g., by obtaining compensation for
the release of the scenic easement restrictions.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The scenic easement would appear to be an extremely useful
device for implementing the highway beautification program. In
rural areas where the land is not yet ripe for development, the cost
of scenic easements is quite low as compared to the cost of fee simple
388C. CLARK, supra note 365, at 184; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.39 (A.J.
Casner ed. 1952); 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 684 (1968).
387 3 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 422 (1967), and authorities cited;
HIGHWAY RESEARCH BOARD, supra note 375, at 9; N. WILLIAMS, LAND ACQUISITION
FOR OUTDOOR RECREATION -ANALYSIS OF SELECTED LEGAL PROBLEMS 52 (Out-
door Recreation Resources Review Commission Study Report No. 16, 1962).
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acquisition. This is particularly true when scenic easements are
acquired over wetlands, flood plains, and areas of rough topography,
but it is also true in agricultural areas where the scenic restrictions
do not interfere with the continued use of the land for agricultural
purposes and where development potential for other than agricultural
uses is limited. Even where the development potential of the land for
other uses is greater, the cost of a scenic easement may be consider-
ably less than the cost of fee simple acquisition.
The experience of the Wisconsin highway commission indicates
that it is possible to operate a program of scenic easement acquisition
and maintenance very successfully if (1) landowners are fully edu-
cated as to the objectives of the program and the rights they are
relinquishing when they grant a scenic easement; (2) a system of
periodic inspections is established, with prompt reporting of any
violations of scenic restrictions; and (3) the local courts are well-
informed as to the objectives and mode of operation of the scenic
easement program.
It is likely that use of the power of eminent domain and the
expenditure of state funds to acquire scenic easements will be sus-
tained in most states, if challenged, on the ground that scenic ease-
ments promote a "public purpose" and make possible a "public use"
of the servient land. In some states with constitutional anti-diversion
provisions, the use of dedicated highway funds for scenic easement
acquisition may present more of a problem. Equal protection may
also raise problems, not with respect to scenic easement acquisition
per se, but in connection with related police power restrictions on
land use adjacent to highways.
In connection with the constitutional public purpose and public
use requirements, it would seem desirable to include in scenic en-
abling legislation an express declaration that acquisition of scenic
interests in land adjacent to highways is for a public purpose and
will provide for a public use. One of the few current enabling stat-
utes with such a declaration is the California statute, which provides
as follows:
The Legislature hereby declares that the acquisition of interests
in real property for the preservation, maintenance or conservation
of scenic lands or areas adjacent to any highway included in the
national system of interstate and defense highways or the federal-
aid primary highway system or to preserve, improve or enhance the
natural beauty of points of interest in the lands or areas traversed
by such highways ... constitutes a public use and purpose3 88
Such a declaration is, of course, not conclusive on the issues of "public
purpose" and "public use," but it is accorded substantial weight by the
388 CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE § 896 (West Supp. 1966).
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courts. It could well be strengthened by an express declaration that
the contemplated public use may be either active - as where there
is a public right of entry on scenic overlook areas - or passive - as
where the only public rights are negative and the public use consists
of visual occupancy.
A few other conclusions as to scenic easement enabling legisla-
tion may be in order:
(1) It is desirable to state in the enabling act - as most of the
current acts do - that scenic interests may include the fee simple or
any lesser interest, and to mention scenic easements expressly - as
most of the current acts do not.
(2) The enabling act should include some definition of a
scenic easement - a feature conspicuously lacking in practically all
of the current enabling legislation.
(3) The enabling act should provide for acquisition of scenic
interests, including easements, by condemnation, as well as by pur-
chase, exchange, and gift, for without the power to condemn the
state highway agency is severely handicapped in negotiating for
the purchase of scenic interests and may, on occasion, find it impos-
sible to preserve an especially significant scenic area at a reasonable
price.
(4) If the power to condemn scenic interests is given to the
state highway agency, it should also be authorized to withdraw from
a condemnation proceeding on payment of the landowner's costs, in
the event the condemnation jury finds a value grossly in excess of
what the highway agency believes the scenic interest is worth.
(5) The enabling act should authorize not only acquisition of
the fee simple and less-than-fee interests, but also the acquisition of
the fee simple and resale of the fee subject to scenic restrictions.
(6) The enabling act should expressly provide that all scenic
easements acquired by the state highway agency adjacent to or in
locations visible from the highway shall be deemed appurtenant to
the highway, and that all scenic easements shall be binding upon and
enforceable against the original owner of the servient land and his
heirs and assigns in perpetuity unless the scenic easement deed
expressly provides for some lesser duration.
(7) The enabling act should expressly provide that no court
may declare a scenic easement to be extinguished or unenforceable on
the ground of changed conditions or frustration of purpose.
(8) The enabling act should expressly authorize the state high-
way agency, in certain defined situations, either to release the state's
rights under a scenic easement or to grant an appropriate variance of
the scenic easement restrictions.
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In drafting scenic easement deeds, it would seem that the cur-
rent Wisconsin practice has substantial advantages in terms of tailor-
ing the land-use restrictions and the grant of affirmative rights to
fit the particular situation. It will be recalled that the current prac-
tice in Wisconsin is to select from a substantial list of restrictions
and affirmative rights those most appropriate for the particular scenic
easement location, and to type these into the deed when agreement
is reached between the landowner and the negotiator. The latter is
given authority to add other provisions not contained in the standard
list where necessary to deal with an unusual situation.
Finally, additional thought should be given to the problems
involved in developing an integrated highway beautification pro-
gram combining the acquisition of scenic interests with police power
scenic controls.
